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1 Introduction
The permanent integration into regular employment is the primary purpose of active labour
market policy (ALMP) in Germany. To achieve this goal, the Federal Employment Agency
(FEA) spends substantial amounts on measures like vocational training programmes (VT),
job creation schemes (JCS) and special promotion for disabled people and aspirants for voca-
tional rehabilitation. ALMP was first introduced in Germany in the late 1960s. Since then,
the labour market experienced several important changes, caused by the oil price shocks dur-
ing the 1970s and the growth of the labour market after the German Re-Unification in 1990.
The set of programmes was gradually adjusted to these changes. Despite these reforms and
large spending on ALMP, the German labour market is still plagued by high and persistent
unemployment. Therefore, evaluating ALMP has become a major topic and was also legally
anchored in the reformed legal basis for ALMP in 1998 (Social Code III). The main question
to be answered is, if programmes improve the employment chances of participants.
In this paper we evaluate the effects of JCS for the participating individuals. JCS, which
have been one major element of ALMP in Germany over the last years, are a form of sub-
sidised employment and aim at the stabilisation and qualification of unemployed persons with
disadvantages on the labour market. The main purpose of these programmes is the (re-) inte-
gration of unemployed persons into the first labour market.1 Recent empirical studies of JCS
for Germany have shown that the average effects for the participating individuals are nega-
tive (see for example Hujer, Caliendo, and Thomsen (2004)).2 The reasons for these findings
have to be analysed. One possible explanation may be the poor quality of programmes in
1 Other purposes of JCS, for example the relief of the stock of unemployed in regions with great imbalances
of the labour market, are secondary only and will not be evaluated here.
2 This is also a common finding in the recent evaluation literature of ALMP programmes in Europe. Whereas
ALMP were seen as a reasonable opportunity to reduce and avoid unemployment for a long time, the inter-
national experiences with the implemented programmes show a mixed picture. The majority of programmes
seem to be ineffective in terms of their goals. As the overviews by Martin and Grubb (2001) for OECD
countries and Calmfors, Forslund, and Hemstro¨m (2002) for Sweden clarify, ALMP are in their present design
and implementation not able to achieve a lasting reduction of unemployment.
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conjunction with often cited stigma- and ‘locking-in’-effects. But leaving this argument aside
for a moment, the results may also come from inefficient allocation mechanisms. The central
motivation in this context is that programme impacts are heterogeneous (Manski, 1997 and
2000) and therefore negative average effects may not apply for all strata of the population. As
Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith (1999) point out, negative mean impacts may be acceptable if
most participants benefit from participation. Abandoning the ‘common effect’ assumption of
treatment effects and identifying the individuals who gain from the programmes is an obvious
opportunity to improve their future efficiency. If we are able to identify the personal charac-
teristics which are responsible for the effect heterogeneity in individual impacts, we can use
this knowledge for a better future allocation of individuals to programmes. A good example is
a situation where we find e.g. that a certain programme works for older participants but does
not work for younger participants at all. If in the past more younger individuals have been
allocated to the programme, the average effect of the programme may have been negative.
Knowing the sources of effect heterogeneity would have helped to achieve a better allocation.
Our evaluation focuses on two main issues: First, we analyse if individuals gain on average
from participation. To do so, we use matching methods to estimate the average treatment
effect on the treated. Thereby we take gender-specific and regional differences into account.
Since the average effects may not apply to all strata of the population, we examine different
sources of effect heterogeneity in a second step. We start with a selection of special problem-
groups of the labour market like long-term unemployed or individuals without professional
training and estimate their treatment effects separately. After that, we construct a simple
indicator, which we call target score, based on the individual’s number of disadvantages
on the labour market, to analyse whether programme effects differ corresponding to the
individual labour market hindrances. If programmes are tailored to the needs of the most-
disadvantaged, one would expect stronger effects for persons with a higher target score.
3
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Finally, we use the estimated participation probability to answer the question, whether a
higher participation probability correlates with a higher programme effect. We use data on
participants who started their JCS programme in February 2000, and on a comparison group
of nonparticipants who were eligible for participation at the end of January 2000, but did not
participate in February. We observe the employment status of our sample until December
2002, i.e. almost three years after programmes have started.
The paper is organised as follows: In the following section we briefly review some stylised
facts of ALMP and JCS in Germany. We present the data used in section three and introduce
the econometric methodology in section four. In section five we discuss the results for the
main population. After that, we present the results of the target approaches. Finally, section
seven concludes.
2 Some Stylised Facts of Active Labour Market Policy and
Job Creation Schemes in Germany
The legal basis for ALMP in Germany is the Social Code III. ALMP are part of the employ-
ment promotion and primarily aim at the permanent (re-)integration of unemployed persons
into regular employment. According to Social Code III, employment promotion should help
to achieve the balancing of labour demand and supply. Therefore, unemployment should be
circumvented by an efficient filling of vacancies and the increase of the individual employ-
ment chances due to an upgrade of the worker’s human capital. Although ALMP have a
long tradition in Germany, their importance increased after the German Re-Unification in
1990. Especially in the eastern part, ALMP were implemented on a large scale to cushion
the strong employment reduction in the first years of the transition process. During the last
decade two major instruments characterised German ALMP: First, VT programmes that
4
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aim at a qualification transfer to circumvent and solve structural problems on the labour
market. Second, JCS whose main purpose is to stabilise and qualify unemployed workers for
later re-integration into regular employment, but which are also used to relieve tense labour
market situations in regions with high unemployment rates.
Promotion of JCS3 can be authorised if they support activities which are of value for society
and additional in nature. Furthermore, individuals have to be placed, whose last chance to
stabilise and qualify for later re-integration into regular employment is participation in these
schemes. Additional in nature means that the activities could not be executed without the
subsidy. Measures with a predominantly commercial purpose have been excluded explicitly up
to January 2002. The majority of activities is conducted in the public and non-commercial
sector. Financial support for JCS is obtained as a wage subsidy to the employer. Even
though JCS should be co-financed measures where between 30 and 75 percent of the costs
are subsidies by the FEA and the rest is paid by the supporting institution, exceptions
can be made in the direction of a higher subsidy-quota (up to 100 percent). The legal
requirements for individuals to enter JCS are relaxed by the Social Code III amendment
(Job-AQTIV-Gesetz) in January 2002. Before that time, potential participants had to be
long-term unemployed (more than one year) or unemployed for at least six months within
the last twelve months. Furthermore, they had to fulfil the conditions for the entitlement
of unemployment compensation. In addition, the local placement officers were allowed to
place up to five percent of the allocated individuals who did not meet these conditions (Five-
Percent-Quota). Further exceptions are made for young unemployed (under 25 years) without
professional training, short-term unemployed (with at least three months of unemployment)
3 The legal basis for JCS is §§ 260–271, 416 Social Code III. They have been the second most important
instrument of ALMP in Germany in respect of the fiscal volume and the number of promoted individuals. For
2002 the number of promoted individuals in JCS amounts to 112,462 in East and 52,229 in West Germany.
These figures correspond to spendings from 1,639.5 million euro in East and 693.5 million euro in West
Germany.
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placed as tutors, and disabled who could be stabilised or qualified.4 The subsidy is in general
paid for 12 months, but may be extended up to 24 months or even 36 months under special
circumstances. Participants are allowed to do a practical training up to 40 percent of the
time and a VT up to 20 percent, together no more than 50 percent of the programme
duration. Priority should be given to projects which enhance the chances for permanent jobs,
support structural improvement in social or environmental services or aim at the integration of
extremely hard-to-place individuals. Participation in JCS results from placement by the local
labour office. Unemployed individuals who cannot be integrated into regular employment or
do not fit the conditions for another instrument of ALMP may be offered a place. The
responsible caseworker may cancel a running programme at any time if the participant can
be placed into regular employment. If an unemployed person rejects the JCS offer or if a
participant denies a career counselling by the placement officer, the labour office can stop the
payment of unemployment benefits for up to twelve weeks.
3 Data Set
The data used for the empirical analysis contain information on all participants who were
placed in a JCS in February 2000, and on a comparison group of nonparticipants who were
eligible for participation in January 2000, but did not enter those schemes in February.
Information on nonparticipants and participants were merged from several sources of the
FEA. Central source for the information derived on participants is a prototype version of
the programme participants master data set (‘Maßnahme-Teilnehmer-Gesamtdatei’, MTG).
This data set includes information from the job-seekers data base (‘Bewerberangebotsdatei’,
BewA), an adjusted version of this data set for statistical purposes (ST4) and the particular
4 With the 2002 amendment, unemployed individuals whose only occupation opportunity is participation
in JCS can be placed in programmes independently of the preceding unemployment duration. In addition,
the Five-Percent-Quota was augmented up to ten percent.
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information of subsidised employment programmes (ST11TN). For this reason, the MTG
contains a large number of attributes to describe individual aspects on the one hand and
on the other hand provides a reasonable basis for the construction of the comparison group.
The included attributes can be split into four classes: socio-demographic and qualification
information, labour market history and particular programme information.5 The information
on the comparison group is derived from the BewA with the additional attributes of the ST4.
Therefore, almost all characteristics in the analysis for the comparison as well as for the
treatment group originate from the same data sources (see Appendix B for more details).
The information is completed by a characterisation of the regional labour market situation
by a classification of similar and comparable labour office districts (see Blien et al. (2004)
and appendix C).6
For the outcome variable we use information from the Employment Statistics Register
(‘Bescha¨ftigtenstatistik’, BSt), which includes information on the total population of persons
who are registered in the social security system. These are employees and participants of
several ALMP programmes, but no self-employed or pensioners. We define only regular
employment as a success, whereas all kinds of subsidised employment or participations in
ALMP programmes are defined as a failure. While this definition might conflict with the
institutional setting, it reflects the economic point of view to measure the integration ability
of JCS into non-subsidised employment.7 To identify spells of regular employment without
further promotion, we use the excerpted information of the final version of the MTG on the
individual’s time spent in ALMP programmes. We observe the labour market outcome for the
5 The final version of the MTG includes information on all ALMP programmes of the FEA.
6 The value of good data is an essential building block for a valid evaluation. As for example Heckman,
Ichimura, Smith, and Todd (1998) mention, having access to a geographically-matched comparison group
administered the same questionnaire as programme participants matters in devising effective non-experimental
estimators of programme impacts.
7 Only the first programme participation is evaluated, any participation in later programmes is viewed as
an outcome of the first treatment and is defined as a failure.
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participating and nonparticipating group until December 2002. Our analysis in the following
parts refer to this last month of the observation period. So, all employment effects of JCS are
estimated for December 2002, that is 35 months after programmes have started. We exclude
information on participants in Berlin.8 Our final sample consists of 11,151 participants and
219,622 nonparticipants. Previous empirical findings have shown that the effects of JCS
differ with respect to region and gender (Hujer, Caliendo, and Thomsen, 2004). Therefore,
we separate our analysis by these characteristics, i.e. we separately estimate the effects for
men and women in East and West Germany.
4 Econometric Methodology
Estimation of treatment effects based on non-experimental data requires consideration of
some identifying issues. As we want to compare participation in one specific programme with
nonparticipation, we can use the potential outcome framework with two potential outcomes
Y 1 (individual receives treatment) and Y 0 (individual does not receive treatment). The
actually observed outcome for any individual i can be written as: Yi = Y 1i ·Di+(1−Di) ·Y 0i ,
where D ∈ {0, 1} is a binary treatment indicator. The treatment effect for each individual i
is the difference between her potential outcomes ∆i = Y 1i − Y 0i . Since one of the outcomes
is unobservable for each individual, there is no opportunity to calculate individual effects
directly. Thus, we have to concentrate on population averages of gains from treatment. A
common evaluation parameter is the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT), which
focusses explicitly on the effects of those for whom the programme is actually intended. It is
given by:
∆ATT = E(∆ | D = 1) = E(Y 1 | D = 1)−E(Y 0 | D = 1). (1)
8 The special situation of the labour market in the capital city requires a separate evaluation of the integra-
tion effects of JCS into regular employment. The small number of participants aggravates the interpretation
of the results.
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Given equation (1), the problem of selection bias is straightforward to see, since the second
term on the right hand side of equation (1) is unobservable.
If the condition E(Y 0 | D = 1) = E(Y 0 | D = 0) holds, we can use the nonparticipants
as an adequate control group. However, this identifying assumption is likely to hold only in
randomised experiments. Consequently, estimating the ATT by the difference between the
subpopulation means of participants E(Y 1 | D = 1) and nonparticipants E(Y 0 | D = 0)
will lead to a selection bias, which may be caused by observable (e.g. age, skill differences)
or unobservable factors (e.g. motivation). For both cases different estimation strategies are
available.9 If we are willing to assume that all relevant attributes for selection are observable,
the matching estimator is an appealing choice. It is based on the idea that if individuals
are similar conditional on all relevant variables, further differences in the labour market out-
come between participants and nonparticipants result from the programme only.10 It is well
known that matching on X can become hazardous when X is of high dimension (‘curse of
dimensionality’). To deal with this dimensionality problem, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983)
suggest the use of balancing scores b(X), i.e. functions of the relevant observed covariates
X such that the conditional distribution of X given b(X) is independent of the assignment
to treatment. For participants and nonparticipants with the same balancing score, the dis-
tributions of the covariates X are the same, i.e. they are balanced across the groups. The
propensity score P (X), i.e. the probability of participating in a programme, is one possible
balancing score. It summarises the information of the observed covariates X into a single
index function. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) show that if treatment assignment is strongly
ignorable given X, it is also strongly ignorable given any balancing score. Since we focus on
9 See for example Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith (1999), Angrist and Krueger (1999) or Blundell and
Costa-Dias (2002).
10 See Imbens (2004) or Smith and Todd (2005) for a recent review regarding matching methods.
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ATT, it is sufficient to assume that (in the notation of Dawid (1979)):
Y 0 qD|P (X). (2)
Similar to randomisation in a classical experiment, matching balances the distributions of
all relevant11 pre-treatment characteristics X in the treatment and comparison group, and
thus achieves independence between the potential outcomes and the assignment to treatment.
Hence, if the mean exists, E(Y 0 | P (X), D = 1) = E(Y 0 | P (X), D = 0) = E(Y 0 | P (X)) and
the missing counterfactual mean can be constructed from the outcomes of nonparticipants.
In order for both sides of the equations to be well defined simultaneously for all P (X), it is
usually additionally assumed that
Pr(D = 1 | X) < 1 (3)
for all X. This implies that the support ofX is equal in both groups, i.e. S = Support(X|D =
1) = Support(X|D = 0). These assumptions are sufficient for identification of (1), because
the moments of the distribution of Y 1 for the treated are directly estimable.
Several matching methods have been suggested in the literature. Good overviews can be
found in Heckman, Ichimura, Smith, and Todd (1998) and Smith and Todd (2005). The
choice of the matching method usually involves a trade-off between matching quality and
variance. First, one has to decide on how many nonparticipating individuals to match to a
single treated individual. Nearest-neighbour (NN) matching only uses the participant and
its closest neighbour. Therefore it minimises the bias but might also involve an efficiency
loss, since a large number of close neigbours is disregarded. Kernel-based matching on the
other hand uses more nonparticipants for each participant thereby reducing the variance
but possibly increasing the bias. Finally, using the same nonparticipating individual more
11 Relevant variables are all those covariates that jointly determine assignment to treatment and the potential
outcomes.
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than once (NN matching with replacement) may possibly improve the matching quality, but
increases the variance. We have also tested the sensitivity of the results with respect to
different matching methods. It turns out that the results are not sensitive to the choice of
the matching estimator and therefore we will use and present only one matching strategy,
namely nearest-neighbour (NN) matching without replacement and a caliper of 0.02. (See
appendix A for technical details.)
5 Empirical Impacts of Job Creation Schemes
5.1 Estimating the Propensity Score
We have estimated the propensity scores using binary logit models with participation as de-
pendent variable. To take account for regional heterogeneity and to allow for gender-specific
interaction effects, we have estimated separate models for men and women in East and West
Germany.12 Several model specifications have been tested for the selection of variables to
be included in the model. Our final specification contains explanatory variables like age,
marital status, the number of children, nationality and health restrictions that describe the
sociodemographic background of individuals. Furthermore, qualification is included by char-
acteristics like professional training, the occupational group, the professional rank and work
experience. The influence of the individual labour market history is given by the unem-
ployment duration, the number of (successless) placement propositions, the duration of the
last occupation, the last contact to the personal caseworker, whether the person is an as-
pirant for vocational rehabilitation, present placement restraints due to health restrictions
and information on an ALMP participation in the past. The regional context is considered
12 We have also estimated the propensity scores for the two regions using dummy variables for sex. However,
using the results of the two estimations ignores possible gender-specific interaction effects and the fact, that
the coefficients in the estimation differ in their significance and magnitude. This leads to a worse matching
quality in the sense that the balancing of covariates after mathing is reduced, i.e. the standardised bias (see
below) is higher.
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by using the classification of the FEA for comparable labour office districts (see Appendix
C). Table 1 presents the estimation results for the participation probability in JCS for the
four main groups. Additionally, the number of observations in the four participating and
nonparticipating groups are included.
It becomes obvious that allocation differs by regions. The coefficients of the sociodemo-
graphic variables show that the participation probability of men in West Germany decreases
with age, while in East Germany older men and women are more likely to participate. This
indicates the slightly different purpose of the programmes in East and West Germany. Es-
pecially in East Germany, JCS function as a relief for the labour market and are used as a
bridge to retirement. Furthermore, it has to be noted that German nationals are more likely
to participate than foreigners. This may be due to the fact that other measures of ALMP (e.g.
language courses) are preferred for foreigners. Regardless of region, health restrictions in-
crease the individual participation probability. This finding indicates an allocation according
to the legal basis.
The coefficients for the qualification characteristics emphasise gender specific differences in
the allocation. A higher qualification increases the participation probability in both regions
for women, whereas the coefficients are insignificant for higher qualified men. The positive
coefficients may be seen as an indication that for higher qualified women it is even harder
to return to regular employment and so they are willing to participate in a JCS to finish
unemployment. As expected, work experience reduces the participation probability of all
groups. Work experience is in general an important criterion for placement into regular
employment. The finding indicates that experienced workers have other opportunities on the
labour market. Since unemployment duration is an eligibility criterion for participation, its
influence is of major importance. We included unemployment duration in three categories,
up to 13 weeks, between 13 weeks and one year, and for more than one year. As expected,
12
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participation probability increases with unemployment duration.
< Include table 1 about here. >
The number of (successless) placement propositions is an indicator for bad labour market
opportunities. The coefficient affirms allocation according to the law. A last interesting point
to note is that placement restrictions annotated by the caseworker harm the participation
probability. This is somewhat surprising, because JCS should even be offered to these groups.
The coefficients for the regional context are in reference to the labour office districts with
the best (in relation to the region) labour market environment. More severe labour market
conditions correlate with a decrease in the participation probabilities in both parts. For men
in East Germany, living in labour office districts with average labour market opportunities
bears the clearest reduction of participation probability, while analogously for West German
women and men living in labour office districts dominated by large cities with an above
average unemployment shows the strongest decrease. The better the labour market condi-
tions in the respective labour office district, the more likely are the unemployed persons to
participate.
5.2 Matching Quality and First Results
Quality of Propensity Score Estimation and Matching Before we present the results,
we first have to check the quality of our propensity score estimation and second, the success
of the matching procedure in balancing the covariates between treatment and comparison
group.
Our model specification for the propensity score estimation was based on specification
tests to identify the relevant variables.13 One simple method to validate the ability of a
13 See Caliendo (2005) for an overview regarding such specification tests and other issues concerning the
implementation of matching estimators.
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good prediction is the computation of hit-rates, i.e. the proportion of persons with a correct
prediction of their status (participation and nonparticipation). As becomes obvious from
table 2, these hit-rates lie between 70.6 percent for men and 75.7 percent for women in West
Germany. For East Germany, the hit-rates are 74.2 for men and 72.2 percent for women. This
implies a quite accurate underlying model. However, the aim of propensity score matching is
not to maximise the hit-rate, but to balance the covariates between treatment and comparison
groups. Since we do not condition directly on all covariates but on the propensity score, we
have to check the ability of the matching procedure to balance the relevant covariates. We do
so by comparing the absolute bias between the respective participating and nonparticipating
groups before and after matching took place. One suitable indicator to assess the distance
in the marginal distributions of the X-variables is the standardised bias (SB) suggested
by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985). For each covariate X it is defined as a percentage of the
quotient between the difference of the sample means in the treated and (matched) comparison
subsamples and the square root of the average of the sample variances in both groups. The
SB before and after matching are given by
SBbefore = 100 · (X1−X0)√0.5·(V1(X)+V0(X)) , SBafter = 100 ·
(X1M−X0M )√
0.5·(V1M (X)+V0M (X))
,
(4)
where X1 (V1) is the mean (variance) in the treated group before matching and X0 (V0) the
analogue for the comparison group. X1M (V1M ), X0M (V0M ) are the corresponding values
after matching. This is a common approach used in many evaluation studies, e.g. by Sianesi
(2004). To abbreviate the documentation, we present only the means of the SB before and
after matching for the four main groups (Table 2). While the mean SB lies between 10.83
and 14.62 percent before matching, it reduces to 1.60 to 3.20 percent after matching.
< Include table 2 about here. >
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Sianesi (2004) additionally suggests to re-estimate the propensity score on the matched
sample, that is only on participants and matched nonparticipants and compare the pseudo-
R2’s before and after matching. The pseudo-R2 indicates how well the regressors X explain
the participation probability. After matching there should be no systematic differences in the
distribution of the covariates between both groups. Therefore, the pseudo-R2 after matching
should be fairly low. As the results from Table 2 show, this is true for our estimation.
The results of the F -tests (with degrees of freedom in brackets) point in the same direction
indicating a joint influence before, and no joint influence after matching.
First Results All estimated effects in the later sections of this paper correspond to De-
cember 2002, the last month of our observation period. We are aware of the fact that
consideration of only this month bears some shortcomings for a valuable interpretation of the
programme effects. Since December 2002 is almost three years after programmes have started,
and with respect to the average duration of programmes of twelve months for the majority of
participants almost two years after the programmes have ended, there may be other events
influencing the labour market status of participants and nonparticipants at that time. As we
do not consider further participation and assignment to other ALMP programmes explicitly
in our estimation, possible influences have to be mentioned. Apart from that criticism, our
analysis focusses on the mid-term effects of job creation schemes and therefore requires this
time horizon.
< Include figure 1 about here. >
To give an idea of the time path of the effects, figure 1 presents the estimated effects for
the four main groups between February 2000 and December 2002. At the beginning of the
observation period, the programme effect is expected to be overlayed by so-called ‘locking-in’-
effects (van Ours, 2004) due to a reduced search intensity of the participants. This reduced
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search intensity is plausible for participants, since they are occupied by participation and
spend less time on job search. Thus, a valid interpretation of the programme effects on the
employment rates should start after the majority of participants has left the programmes, i.e.
after twelve months. Since the purpose of JCS is to stabilise and qualify unemployed persons
for the re-integration into regular employment, we would expect increasing employment rates
after the programmes have ended. We find these ‘locking-in’-effects for all groups (see figure
1). After this initial fall there is a clear rising tendency for the groups in West Germany and
a moderate rising tendency for the groups in East Germany. For the smallest group, women
in West Germany, there is the strongest rise in the employment rates with significant positive
effects at the end of the observation period in December 2002. The effects for men in West
Germany are also rising, but the effects are insignificant in the end, i.e. an increase in the
employability by participation cannot be established. While the effects in West Germany are
clearly rising, we find a stepwise increase with relatively constant levels over one-year-periods
in East Germany. Besides that, the ‘locking-in’-effects during the first year after programmes
start are not as strong as in the West. This finding can be interpreted as an indication of
worse outside options for the nonparticipants.
Although the effects show a rising tendency for all groups, a significant increase of the
employment rates due to participation can only be stated for women in West Germany, who
have a significant positive effect of 4.6 percent in December 2002. For men in West Germany
we do not find any significant effects in December 2002, whereas men in East Germany have
a significant negative effect of -2.9 percent. For women in East Germany the effect is slightly
better but still significantly negative at -1.4 percent. So it seems that JCS rather decrease than
increase the employment prospects of participants. Of course, due to the strong ‘locking-in’-
effects, the starting position for the participants is on average lower than for nonparticipants.
However, since we observe the outcomes until 35 months after start of the programmes and
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almost two years after the majority of the individuals has left the programmes, a successful
programme should overcompensate for this initial fall.
6 Targeting
Clearly, as already mentioned, one possible explanation for the discouraging results in the
previous section may be the poor quality of the programmes in conjunction with stigma- and
‘locking-in’-effects. Another possible cause might be an inefficient allocation of participants.
Since programme effects are heterogeneous (Manski, 1997 and 2000), the average effects
depicted in the above section must not apply to all strata of the population. Negative mean
impact results may be acceptable if the majority of participants gains from the programme
(Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith, 1999). Abandoning the ‘common effect’ assumption of
treatment effects and identifying the individuals that benefit from the programmes is an
obvious opportunity to improve the future efficiency of ALMP. If we are able to identify
the individual characteristics, which are responsible for the effect heterogeneity in individual
impacts, we can use this knowledge to suggest allocation rules for a better future allotment
of programme participants.
The potential improvement of allocation mechanisms is a much discussed topic in the
recent evaluation literature (see for example Lechner and Smith (2005), Fro¨lich, Lechner,
and Steiger (2003) and Fro¨lich (2001)). An optimal allocation should guarantee the best
results according to the underlying programme goal, where two goals - efficiency and equity -
can be distinguished. If the goal is efficiency, programmes target at the maximisation of the
impacts of the outcome of interest. If the goal is equity, treatment is administered to those
individuals identified as ‘neediest’, i.e. for example those individuals with the lowest predicted
re-employment probabilities (Plesca and Smith, 2002). Fro¨lich, Lechner, and Steiger (2003)
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distinguish between statistical and non-statistical allocation mechanisms.
Caseworker discretion is the most common non-statistical allocation mechanism. Poten-
tial programme participants are interviewed by their personal caseworker and allocation to
programmes depends on the caseworker’s evaluation of the unemployed person’s capabilities,
the individual’s interests and the availability of slots in the particular programmes. The cru-
cial feature of the caseworker allocation mechanism for an optimal allocation of unemployed
persons to programmes is the knowledge of the characteristics of the unemployed person, the
situation on the local labour market and the programme providers as well as the professional
expertise of the caseworker (Lechner and Smith, 2005). There are only a few studies that
examine the quality of caseworker allocation in Europe. Fro¨lich (2001) analyses the effects
of caseworker allocation in Sweden; Lechner and Smith (2005) and Fro¨lich, Lechner, and
Steiger (2003) evaluate the effectiveness of Swiss caseworkers in comparison to a simulated
targeting system. The results indicate that caseworker allocation lacks the ability to achieve
the expected programme goals. Reasons for the ineffectiveness of the caseworker allocation
may be lack of knowledge of caseworkers regarding the effectiveness of certain programmes.
Caseworkers have to build expectations about impacts of programmes on a very uncertain
basis. Additionally, the broad variety of available programmes makes it difficult to select an
optimal strategy for a specific person (Fro¨lich, Lechner, and Steiger, 2003). Another issue
concerns possible ‘cream-skimming’. The experiences from the Job Training Partnership Act
(JTPA) showed that tying the funding to the performance of local programmes as measured
by job placement rates creates the incentive to serve the most able applicants, without re-
garding how much different groups might have benefited from programmes (see for example
Bell and Orr (2002)).
Statistical allocation mechanisms avoid these possible problems by relying on some model
indicating the individual gains of participation in a specific programme. Up to now, there is
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no consistent classification of statistical treatment rules. OECD (2002) defines ‘profiling’ as
‘a procedure where a numerical score, calculated on the basis of multivariate information, de-
termines the referral of a job-seeker to further employment services’. Based on this definition,
we will present three approaches to identify potential sources of effect heterogeneity, which
could be used, if successful, for a better targeting in future. At first, we will select target
groups with disadvantages on the labour market, e.g. long-term unemployed persons. In a
second step, we will use these definitions and build a simple index that we call ‘target score’.
The target score simply sums up the number of individual disadvantages. If programmes
are tailored to the needs of the most disadvantaged on the labour market, we would expect
higher impacts for persons with higher target scores. For the evaluation of the effects in
the target groups and for the target scores, we estimate separate propensity scores for each
group and category considered.14 Finally, we test whether the effects differ corresponding to
different participation probabilities. To do so, we stratify our sample in 20 sub-samples along
the propensity score of the participants and use a stratification matching estimator.
6.1 Effects for Selected Target Groups
Identifying groups of participants who benefit from programmes is a central purpose of pro-
gramme evaluation. Recent evaluation studies of JCS in Germany (Hujer, Caliendo, and
Thomsen, 2004) and experiences from abroad (Martin and Grubb, 2001) recommend a tighter
targeting of programmes to individuals with disadvantages on the labour market. Selecting
persons that are supposed to have a below average employability is a sensible first approach
to identify possible effect heterogeneity due to personal characteristics. Several groups of
individuals who should be promoted predominantly are defined in Social Code III. These are
long-term unemployed persons, individuals with health restrictions or persons who aspire for
14 The results of these estimations and the standardised biases before and after matching are available on
request by the authors.
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vocational rehabilitation.15 Further target groups are young ond older unemployed as well as
workers without any professional training. In addition, JCS should be particularly applied
to individuals with special placement restrictions.
Our selection is oriented on these legal definitions. We estimate the effects for participants
younger than 25 years and for participants older than 50 years respectively. Further groups
are long-term (more than one year when programmes start) unemployed persons, individuals
with special placement restrictions due to health restrictions and aspirants for vocational
rehabilitation. Additionally, we select four groups of persons who are hard-to-place. The
first group contains individuals with more than five (unsuccessful) placement propositions
by the local labour offices, the second group are persons who have already participated
in an ALMP programme before unemployment. Group three contains individuals without
professional training and the last group are people without any work experience.
< Include table 3 about here. >
Table 3 contains the shares of individuals in each of the selected groups differentiated by
treatment status. For most of the groups, the results show significant differences of the shares
between treatment and comparison group. Thus, one can assume that these characteristics
affect the allocation decision to some extent. Surprisingly, long-term unemployment (more
than 52 weeks) which is expected to be an important selection criterion (in accordance to
the law), differs only for men in East Germany. Additionally, the shares of aspirants for
vocational rehabilitation of this group and the proportions of men and women without work
experience in the region are approximately equal for participants and nonparticipants. This
shows once again the different purpose of JCS in East and West Germany.
Further notable findings are the different proportions of participants between the regions.
15 This are especially persons who are no more able to work in their profession due to health restrictions,
and therefore should receive a promotion for vocational rehabilitation.
20
Page 20 of 113
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
While the share of younger unemployed (below 25 years) in West Germany is clearly larger
in the participants’ group, the situation in East Germany is the other way round. Older
unemployed are more likely to participate here. These differences have to be interpreted in
light of the different labour market situation in East and West Germany and the consequently
different purpose of JCS in both regions. Placing a larger share of young unemployed into
programmes in West Germany complies to the law that postulates stabilising efforts for later
re-integration. In East Germany, JCS are used to relieve the labour market and therefore
older unemployed are more likely to participate than younger ones.
Besides the age differences, it has to be mentioned that persons with a larger number of
placement propositions or who have participated in an ALMP programme before unemploy-
ment are more frequent in the participating group. This agrees with the expectation as the
number of successless placement propositions directly indicates the placement difficulties.
Furthermore, earlier participation may identify to so-called ‘programme careerists’, who are
assigned to ALMP programmes subsequently, interrupted by unemployment spells only.
Table 4 presents the employment effects in December 2002 for these nine groups with fur-
ther distinction for gender and region as above. It becomes obvious that programme effects
are heterogeneous across the selected groups. Whereas the results for the four main groups
showed insignificant effects for men in West Germany, men and women in East Germany suf-
fered from participation and women in West Germany benefited on average from programmes.
Consideration of the effects for the selected groups of male participants in West Germany
shows, that the effects are for almost all groups insignificant, too, but with one exception.
The group of long-term unemployed men benefits from participation and has an employment
rate which is 5.03 percent higher compared to the rate of matched nonparticipants in De-
cember 2002. The female counterparts in that region are the only group who benefited on
average from participation. With regard to the results in table 4, it becomes clear that this
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finding does not hold for all groups. While three groups clearly gain from participation, i.e.
older unemployed (12.67 percent), long-term unemployed (11.25 percent), and hard-to-place
women indicated by the number of placement propositions (7.79 percent), the others do not
experience any enhancement of the employability. Anyhow, the three significant effects are
above the effects for the whole sample of females in West Germany.
< Include table 4 about here.>
Turning to the estimates for the East German groups reveals a quite similar picture. Again,
most of the estimates are statistically insignificant and participants do neither suffer nor
benefit form participation at all in December 2002. Whereas the results for men in this
region have been significantly negative on average, this finding is confirmed by the result of
one group only, namely participants who have participated in an ALMP programme before
(-3.36 percent). All other estimates do not show significant differences to the nonparticipants’
outcomes. Regarding women, we find long-term unemployed to benefit from participation
(2.45 percent). No significant differences in the employment rates can be established for the
remaining groups.
Together with the results for the West German groups, especially long-term unemployed
participants seem to benefit from programmes (except men in East Germany). This finding is
somewhat satisfactory since JCS are especially arranged for this group. Although the effects
refer to one single month only, the results are plausible. Since occupations in JCS have to be
additional in nature, i.e. they do not compete with regular jobs to avert substitution effects,
the qualifying elements for market-competitive jobs have to be assumed to be negligible.
Thus, the stabilising elements in the design of JCS (to keep in touch with the labour market)
may be more important for this group. Furthermore, participation in JCS comes along with
a stigmatisation of the participant if potential employers suspect a reduced productivity.
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However, long-term unemployment is a stigma itself and hence the additional stigma-effect
of JCS might be of minor importance. To the contrary, for these groups participation must
be seen as an indicator for individual motivation to change the personal situation. Hence,
the stigma-effect of JCS may be more important for short-term unemployed and younger
persons.
Summarising the findings for the selected target groups leads us to three recommendations.
First, due to the unsatisfactory results for most of the groups where no differences in the
employment rates between participants and nonparticipants could be established, JCS have
to be reviewed critically in terms of their goals. Nevertheless, they are no complete failure
for some participants as the results especially for long-term unemployed indicate. Second,
a tighter targeting of programmes to persons for whom the possible negative aspects (like
stigmatisation, lack of human capital transfer etc.) are only of minor importance for the
individual labour market prospects, should help to increase programme efficiency. Third,
since long-term unemployed persons are not the majority of unemployed in Germany, the
number of promotions should be reduced significantly. JCS are definitely sensible for the
most disadvantaged workers, but no means for reducing unemployment permanently for all
unemployed persons.
6.2 Effects for Target Groups Using Target Scores
The results in the previous section show that JCS do not work for most of the analysed
groups. Nevertheless, as the estimates are significantly positive especially for the most disad-
vantaged persons, the long-term unemployed, the question arises whether a higher number of
explicit labour market disadvantages correlates with gains from participation. To answer this
question, we build a simple index which we call ‘target score’ as the sum of the individual
number of disadvantages from section 6.1. Without any particular weighting, each disadvan-
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tage adds one point to the target score. Persons who do not belong to any of the categories
in section 6.1, have a target score of zero. The maximum level is eight, since the categories
for the age groups are mutually exclusive. For example, if an individual is below 25 years
old and has no professional training, she is assigned a target score of two. If an individual
belongs to three of the target groups, the target score is three, and so on. Due to a small
number of individuals with a target score of more than five, we summarise these persons in
one group, i.e. target score five (and more); the other categories refer to the actual number
of disadvantages. We estimate the programme effect on the employment rates in December
2002 within each category of the target score.
< Include table 5 about here.>
If programmes are tailored to the needs of the most disadvantaged and if a higher target
score indicates higher need of assistance than we would expect better outcomes for higher
scores. The estimates of the effects in December 2002 are given in table 5. Ignoring the
significance of the estimates at first, the results show non-negative effects for all groups in
West Germany with a target score greater or equal three. For the lower target score groups,
the picture is not that homogeneous. While men in West Germany with a target score of one
or two are harmed, women with the same score seem to benefit. In East Germany, groups
with a target score of less than three have reduced employment rates in December 2002. For
women with more disadvantages there seems to be no effect, while for men the estimates tend
to be negative except for a target score of three.
The tendencies in the results for West Germany support the hypothesis that a higher
target score coincides with a higher need of assistance and a better fit of programmes for
those groups, but a clear statement is hampered due to the insignificant estimates for most
groups. It is self-evident that our construction of the target score is very simple and is not
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guided by some strong theory. First, the different targeting criteria are included with the
same weights and clearly may not have the same importance for the individual employability.
Second, the selection of groups is incomplete. There are other characteristics that increase or
decrease the individual employability. Third, the construction of the target score leaves room
for further effect heterogeneity. The target score just notes the number of single targets, but
does not identify clear sets of disadvantages where participation improves the employability.
Unfortunately, considering the significance of the results shows that our assumption cannot
be empirically approved. For each of the West German groups only one estimate for the
higher target scores is significant. For men with a target score of five, i.e. five or more
disadvantage criteria on the labour market, the employment rates increase by 14.49 percent
after participation, for women with a target score of four by 11.76 percent. For the other
groups the estimates are insignificant, i.e. no clear increase or decrease in the employment
rates by participation can be established. The estimates for East Germany show a slightly
different picture. The results illustrate that allocating individuals without any of the selected
targeting criteria and therefore a target score of zero to programmes, reduces the employment
rates in December 2002 by 10.14 for men and 8.12 percent for women. Analogously to the
finding for West Germany, there are no further significant results. Since our construction of
the target score is very simple, it has to be reviewed, whether incorporation of further selection
criteria and/or a different weighting of the single targets may improve the significance of the
estimates. Although the estimates are unsatisfying yet, the usage of the target score provides
some practical utility to identify possible sources for effect heterogeneity.
6.3 Targeting by Stratification Matching
The estimated propensity score reflects the individual participation probability conditional
on the relevant observable characteristics. If allocation to the programme is target-oriented,
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a higher participation probability should also correlate with a higher impact of treatment.
Clearly, this argument only holds, if the programmes are tailored according to the needs
of the participants. If this is not the case, i.e. if the programmes have the same effects
for all participants, individuals with low participation probabilities may benefit more since
a high participation probability can to some extent be interpreted as an indicator for bad
labour market prospects. Furthermore, an interesting opportunity arises, if the empirical
evidence supports a positive relationship between a higher participation probability and a
higher impact of treatment. If this is the case, the estimated participation probability could
be used as an allocation instrument, i.e. persons with higher propensity score values should
be primarily allocated to programmes.
An intuitively appealing method to check this hypothesis is stratification matching, also
known as blocking or subclassification. The idea is to divide the sample of participants
and nonparticipants conditional on the propensity score into several strata. Within these
strata, participants and nonparticipants should have approximately the same probability of
treatment. The average treatment effect is estimated within each stratum as if random as-
signment holds. Estimation of the treatment effect for the treated is carried out by weighting
the within-strata average treatment effects by the number of treated units. Stratification
matching can be interpreted as a crude form of non-parametric regression where the un-
known function is approximated by a step function with fixed jump points (Imbens, 2004).
An important issue in employing this estimator is to make sure that the covariates are bal-
anced within each stratum. The distribution among the treatment and comparison group
should be balanced, if the true propensity score is constant. Comparison of the distribution
of covariates of both groups within strata yields a possibility to assess the adequacy of the
statistical model.
To check our hypothesis whether a higher participation probability correlates with a higher
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programme impact, we divide our samples into twenty subclasses each. This division is based
on the estimated propensity scores of the participants.16 Therefore, we have the same number
of participants in each stratum, but different numbers of nonparticipants with approximately
the same scores as the participants. Individuals with the lowest participation probabilities
are placed in stratum 1, persons with the highest participation probabilities are placed in
stratum 20. It can be seen that this stratification leaves meaningful numbers of observations
in each stratum except women in West Germany.
< Include tables 6 and 7 about here. >
The estimated treatment effects for each stratum are presented in table 6 for East Germany
and in table 7 for West Germany. The effectiveness of the programmes can be estimated
by comparing the employment rates of participants and nonparticipants in December 2002
given by E(Y1) and E(Y0) in the tables. The average treatment effect within each stratum,
i.e. the difference of the mean outcomes of the participants and the nonparticipants is also
given (∆). The last lines of the tables provide the average treatment effect on the treated.
Obviously, these effects are similar to those estimated with the NN-matching estimators in
section 5. In addition to the mean outcomes and the effects, the tables also present the
results of the hypothesis testing of equal propensity scores in the treatment and comparison
group. We tested the null hypothesis (H0) that the difference of the mean propensity scores
in both groups is zero. Therefore, the alternative hypothesis (HA) imposes inequality of the
propensity score. The p-values of the HA are given in the tables; if we reject the hypothesis
due to a larger value than 0.05, we assume equality of the propensity scores and therefore
16 Due to the large number of observations in our samples, using the whole range of the propensity scores of
participants and nonparticipants leads to a skewed stratification. Hence, we refer to the propensity scores of
the participants only to reduce this skewness. The choice of twenty strata for each of the four groups emerged
from balancing tests of the propensity score among treated and comparison persons using a smaller number
of blocks.
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balancing of the covariates among both groups.17
The results of the hypothesis tests show that the division into twenty strata provides
approximately equal propensity scores for most groups. The equality is hampered only for
the groups at the borders of the propensity score range. For men in West Germany, strata
1, 5, 7 and 20 are imbalanced, for women in the same region so are strata 1, 17 and 19. In
East Germany the strata with lower participation probabilities are imbalanced. For women
the propensity scores are not balanced in 1 and 2, for men in 1 and 3, but also in stratum 19.
Although we find significant treatment effects for several strata, these findings do not assist
our hypothesis. Taking a look at the results for East Germany (table 6), we find that for the
first four strata (except for women in stratum 1) allocation of persons with a low participation
probability has a tendential n gative influence on the employment chances in December 2002.
For men in this region, this tendency is stable for participants up to stratum 14; from stratum
15 onwards the direction of the effects changes to positive. For women we could not establish a
clear distinction, since most of the effects are insignificant. For participants in West Germany
(table 7) our hypothesis cannot be empirically approved either. One can loosely see that
higher participation probabilities correlate with higher impacts, but these findings may be
inconsistent as the balancing tests above show. It seems that the participation probability
is no adequate measure for effect heterogeneity here and successful integration into regular
employment depends on different compositions of the individual characteristics than selection
into programmes.
17 We also checked the balancing property of stratification by comparing the means of the incorporated vari-
ables in the logit models for participants and nonparticipants within each stratum as suggested by Rosenbaum
and Rubin (1983). The results for selected variables are available on request by the authors.
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7 Conclusion
Previous empirical studies of JCS in Germany have shown that the average effects for par-
ticipating individuals are negative. Whereas this inefficiency may be due to the poor quality
of programmes, it may be also driven by an inefficient allocation of potential participants
to programmes. Allocation of individuals into programmes in Germany is accomplished by
caseworker discretion. On the one hand, a positive aspect of this mechanism is that de-
cisions are based on personal contact. On the other hand, since ALMP consist of very
different programmes, caseworkers may lack knowledge regarding programme impacts. Since
this problem is not specific to Germany, the topic of a potential improvement of allocation
mechanisms has become important in recent literature. Broadly, two categories can be dis-
tinguished: Non-statistical allocation mechanisms like caseworker discretion and statistical
allocation mechanisms called profiling or targeting. Since statistical allocation systems are
not introduced in the German labour market yet, there is no empirical evidence for their
effectiveness.
In this paper we estimate the average treatment effects for men and women in East and
West Germany participating in JCS. Following that we use three strategies to identify possible
effect heterogeneity. We use data on all participants, who started a JCS in February 2000,
and on nonparticipants from January 2000, who were eligible to participate, but did not
enter those schemes in February. The employment effects of JCS are evaluated in December
2002. The results show positive effects for women in West Germany and negative effects for
men and women in East Germany, men in West Germany do neither suffer nor benefit from
participation.
For the three approaches used to analyse effect heterogeneity, we select target groups with
disadvantages on the labour market oriented by the definition of the legal basis in a first
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step. Our findings show that JCS do neither harm nor improve the labour market chances
for most of the groups. Exceptions are long-term unemployed men in West Germany, long-
term unemployed women in both regions, older women and women who are hard-to-place in
West Germany, who benefit from participation. Given these results and remembering that
(re-)integration into regular employment is the main purpose, it has to be recommended that
JCS should be targeted to those benefiting groups and should not be used on large scale. In a
second step, we use these definitions to build up a simple indicator (target score) as the sum of
the individual number of disadvantages. If programmes are tailored to the needs of the more
disadvantaged persons on the labour market, we expect positive impacts for groups with a
higher score. Unfortunately, most of the estimates are insignificant and although the expected
tendency is observable, one has to be cautious with interpretation. Finally, we implement
stratification matching to analyse if a higher participation probability also correlates with
higher impacts. No clear picture can be revealed. The estimated participation probability
is no adequate measure for effect heterogeneity here and successful integration into regular
employment is determined by different compositions of the individual attributes than selection
into programmes. Even though the results could not confirm some of our hypotheses, they
show that heterogeneity in treatment effects is an important topic which has to be considered
more accurately in further research. We have also shown that this might be a way to improve
efficiency of ALMP and hence to allocate scarce resources more effectively.
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Tables
Tab. 1: Estimation Results of the Logit-Models for the Propensity Score
West Germany East Germany
Men Women Men Women
Variable Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
Constant -1.1739 0.2731 -3.1254 0.4533 -5.7880 0.3659 -8.0021 0.3944
Socio-Demographic Variables
Age -0.0599 0.0145 -0.0067 0.0235 0.0901 0.0141 0.1702 0.0136
Age(squared) 0.0004 0.0002 -0.0003 0.0003 -0.0008 0.0002 -0.0019 0.0002
Married -0.1676 0.0612 -0.4483 0.0761 0.2683 0.0506 0.1145 0.0344
Number of children 0.0653 0.0281 -0.0183 0.0439 -0.0335 0.0266 -0.0238 0.0184
German 0.4402 0.0683 0.2825 0.1211 0.6284 0.1966 0.7082 0.2432
Health restrictions
No health restrictions Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Acc. DoR1, 80% and over 0.9160 0.1826 1.3404 0.2578 0.5491 0.2758 1.1375 0.2442
Acc. DoR, 50% to under 80% 0.8052 0.1267 0.6433 0.1978 0.4991 0.1270 0.6032 0.1242
Acc. DoR, 30% to under 50% 1.1190 0.3658 1.9871 0.4246 0.5691 0.1925 0.7999 0.1954
Acc. DoR, 30% to under 50%, no equalis.2 0.2757 0.1570 0.0651 0.2685 -0.0708 0.1721 -0.0725 0.1826
Other health restrictions -0.0472 0.0892 -0.0751 0.1390 -0.1918 0.0716 -0.1422 0.0608
Qualification Variables
Professional training
Without compl. prof. training, no CSE Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Without compl. prof. training, with CSE -0.3364 0.0622 0.2294 0.1334 0.1015 0.0823 0.3428 0.0865
Industrial training -0.6738 0.0692 -0.0808 0.1399 -0.1777 0.0748 0.3315 0.0820
Full-time vocational school -0.7639 0.2685 -0.0734 0.2432 -0.3223 0.2594 0.8588 0.1384
Technical school -0.0987 0.1756 0.7183 0.1927 0.2227 0.1231 1.0166 0.0977
Polytechnic 0.3534 0.2009 1.4983 0.2144 -0.0135 0.2058 1.0388 0.1794
College, University 0.2399 0.1577 1.0221 0.1869 0.0810 0.1354 0.9004 0.1272
Occupational group
Plant cultivation, breeding, fishery 0.2222 0.0927 0.2628 0.2501 0.0092 0.0828 0.2370 0.0670
Mining, mineral extraction -0.5605 0.4657 – – -0.7494 0.5154 – –
Manufacturing Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Technical professions -0.5810 0.1544 -0.1609 0.2605 -0.1954 0.0999 0.2149 0.0819
Service professions -0.3077 0.0544 0.3167 0.0995 -0.1739 0.0478 0.0127 0.0406
Other professions 0.1023 0.1533 0.3933 0.2628 -1.1891 0.2170 -1.2092 0.2860
Professional rank
Worker, not skilled worker Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Worker, skilled worker -0.5499 0.0982 -0.1637 0.1944 -0.1811 0.0597 0.0657 0.0525
White-collar worker, simple occupations 0.0163 0.1152 0.1490 0.1256 0.1809 0.1067 0.2197 0.0605
White-collar worker, advanced occupations 0.0877 0.1536 0.5131 0.1624 -0.2838 0.1662 -0.0404 0.1215
Other -0.0112 0.0563 0.1512 0.1054 0.0345 0.0528 0.1004 0.0437
Qualification (with work experience) -0.3397 0.0745 -0.3139 0.1017 -0.2279 0.0695 -0.1175 0.0527
Career Variables
Duration of last employment (months) -0.0046 0.0005 -0.0033 0.0007 -0.0038 0.0004 -0.0028 0.0003
Duration of unemployment (weeks)
Up to 13 weeks Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Between 13 and 52 weeks 0.2055 0.0616 0.0698 0.0889 0.4673 0.0561 0.2509 0.0511
More than 52 weeks 0.3087 0.0678 0.0888 0.0974 0.4498 0.0599 0.1694 0.0509
Number of placement propositions 0.0494 0.0028 0.0530 0.0042 0.0610 0.0030 0.0919 0.0031
Last contact to job center (weeks) -0.0013 0.0125 0.0520 0.0177 -0.1204 0.0114 -0.0644 0.0085
Rehabilitation attendant -0.1533 0.1185 0.0696 0.2039 0.2958 0.0939 0.1535 0.1024
Placement restrictions -0.3396 0.0989 -0.2654 0.1546 -0.3164 0.0870 -0.3000 0.0825
Programme before unemployment
No further education or programme Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Further education compl., cont. education 0.2292 0.0801 0.5301 0.1043 0.4830 0.0628 0.5263 0.0422
Further education compl., voc. adjustment 0.6479 0.2286 0.4613 0.4466 0.6545 0.0893 0.5634 0.0746
Job-preparative measure -0.4764 1.0285 2.6387 0.5245 1.1431 0.4289 0.3364 0.5250
Job creation scheme 2.1463 0.0777 3.0671 0.1141 1.7272 0.0546 1.5382 0.0418
Rehabilitation measure -0.0929 0.2706 0.9368 0.3406 0.4232 0.2273 0.3780 0.2720
Regional Context Variables3
Cluster Ia – – – – -0.1040 0.1291 0.1421 0.1238
Cluster Ib – – – – -0.3077 0.1248 -0.0242 0.1210
Cluster Ic – – – – -0.2838 0.1361 -0.1841 0.1292
Cluster II -0.2225 0.0730 -0.5666 0.0960 Ref. Ref.
Cluster III -0.1841 0.0722 -0.4601 0.0917 – – – –
Cluster IV -0.0080 0.1002 -0.4530 0.1423 – – – –
Cluster V Ref. Ref. – – – –
No. of Part. 2,140 1,052 2,924 5,035
No. of Nonpart. 44,095 34,227 64,788 76,512
Bold letters indicate significance at the 1% level. Italic letters refer to the 5% level. Ref. denotes the reference category.
– not included in the estimation/ no observations.
1 DoR = Degree of restriction
2 People with accepted degree of restriction, but no equalisation to other persons with the same DoR.
3 See appendix C for further information. 35
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Tab. 2: Some Quality Indicators
West Germany East-Germany
Men Women Men Women
Before Matching
Observations1 46,235 35,271 67,712 81,505
Hit-Rate2 70.6 75.7 74.2 72.2
Pseudo R2 0.1389 0.1775 0.1225 0.1144
F -Test 2,406.8 (41) 1,679.4 (40) 2,951.3 (41) 4,323.3 (40)
Mean of Standardised Bias (in percent)3 14.62 16.08 12.01 10.83
After Matching
Observations4 4,246 1,960 5,846 10,054
Pseudo-R2 0.006 0.009 0.004 0.003
F -Test 38.0 (41) 23.4 (40) 35.3 (41) 39.2 (40)
Mean of Standardised Bias (in percent)3 2.51 3.20 1.78 1.60
1 Observations are the sum of participating and nonparticipating individuals.
2 Hit-rates are computed as follows: If the estimated propensity score is larger than the sample proportion of
persons taking treatment, i.e. Pˆ (X) > P¯ , observations are classified as ‘1’. If Pˆ (X) ≤ P¯ observations are
classified as ‘0’.
3 Mean of Standardised Bias calculated as mean of the single characteristics’ standardised biases.
4 Since we apply NN-matching without replacement and a caliper of 0.02 the number of treated individuals is
reduced after matching by observations off support. The numbers of the treated individuals can be calculated
by dividing the number of observations by 2.
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Tab. 3: Descriptive Statistics for the Selected Target Groups (Partic-
ipants and NonParticipants)
West Germany Men Women
Part. Nonpart. Part. Nonpart.
Variable Shares in percent1
Age < 25 years 21.40 9.30 17.30 7.14
Age > 50 years 16.12 37.27 15.30 35.21
Without professional training 62.62 49.12 45.25 49.94
Without work experience 12.76 7.44 15.11 7.44
Long-term unemployed (more than 52 weeks)2 39.16∗ 40.79∗ 39.16∗ 42.16∗
More than 5 placement propositions 49.21 21.21 42.49 17.05
Vocational rehabilitation3 5.19 6.27 4.18 3.11
Placement restrictions4 16.54 21.58 14.07 17.51
Participation in ALMP before unemployment 28.55 10.05 33.17 8.86
East Germany Men Women
Part. Nonpart. Part. Nonpart.
Variable Shares in percent1
Age < 25 years 8.21 13.49 2.94 6.36
Age > 50 years 38.06 31.05 30.69 35.71
Without professional training 28.63 23.10 22.26 25.85
Without work experience 10.02∗ 10.84∗ 9.89∗ 10.38∗
Long-term unemployed (more than 52 weeks)2 37.55 30.75 49.45 48.89
More than 5 placement propositions 41.24 17.87 37.28 15.32
Vocational rehabilitation3 7.46∗ 7.48∗ 3.10 4.60
Placement restrictions4 13.47 16.16 7.47 11.92
Participation in ALMP before unemployment 47.16 17.08 57.28 27.85
∗ Denotes approximate equality of shares between treatment and comparison group (5% significance
level).
1 Shares are computed with respect to the number of participating/nonparticipating individuals in
the according main group.
2 Unemployment duration for participants and nonparticipants at end of January 2000.
3 Persons in vocational rehabilitation are no more able to work in their profession and have to be
qualified for a new profession.
4 Placement restrictions refer to the assessment of the caseworker that health restrictions of the
job-seeker reduce the number the job opportunities.
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Tab. 4: Effects for Selected Target Groups in December 2002
West Germany Men Women
Group Effect Std. Err. No. of
Partici-
pants
Effect Std. Err. No. of
Partici-
pants
Age < 25 years -0.0276 0.0326 440 -0.0679 0.0573 161
Age > 50 years 0.0262 0.0241 344 0.1267 0.0562 159
Without professional training -0.0046 0.0169 1,323 0.0425 0.0297 451
Without work experience -0.0040 0.0414 256 -0.0703 0.0595 128
Long-term unemployed (more than 52 weeks) 0.0503 0.0169 832 0.1125 0.0326 403
More than 5 placement propositions 0.0300 0.0176 1,039 0.0779 0.0302 400
Vocational rehabilitation1 0.0300 0.0603 106 0.0571 0.0845 36
Placement restrictions2 0.0153 0.0287 335 0.1026 0.0562 130
Participation in ALMP before unemployment -0.0323 0.0217 594 0.0541 0.0313 279
East Germany Men Women
Group Effect Std. Err. No. of
Partici-
pants
Effect Std. Err. No. of
Partici-
pants
Age < 25 years -0.0437 0.0503 240 0.0278 0.0589 148
Age > 50 years -0.0130 0.0079 1,109 -0.0020 0.0093 1,529
Without professional training 0.0120 0.0161 833 -0.0215 0.0156 1,119
Without work experience 0.0069 0.0349 292 0.0225 0.0220 495
Long-term unemployed (more than 52 weeks) -0.0018 0.0093 1,097 0.0245 0.0080 2,487
More than 5 placement propositions -0.0264 0.0145 1,201 -0.0054 0.0108 1,869
Vocational rehabilitation1 -0.0140 0.0369 217 -0.0068 0.0418 154
Placement restrictions2 0.0189 0.0254 394 -0.0166 0.0217 368
Participation in ALMP before unemployment -0.0336 0.0114 1,378 -0.0028 0.0079 2,877
Effects are estimated using 1-NN matching without replacement and caliper of 0.02. Bold letters
indicate significance on a 5% level. Standard errors calculated by bootstrapping with 50 replications.
1 Persons in vocational rehabilitation are no more able to work in their profession and have to be qualified
for a new profession.
2 Placement restrictions refer to the assessment of the caseworker that health restrictions of the job-seeker
reduce the number the job opportunities.
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Tab. 5: Estimated Effects for the Target Scores1 in
December 2002
West Germany Men Women
Target-Score Effect Std. Err. No. of
Partici-
pants
Effect Std. Err. No. of
Partici-
pants
0 0.0182 0.0850 55 -0.0133 0.0789 76
1 -0.0138 0.0363 295 0.0518 0.0401 208
2 -0.0180 0.0212 740 0.0316 0.0474 305
3 0.0256 0.0261 652 0.0276 0.0339 257
4 0.0199 0.0331 274 0.1176 0.0527 100
5 and more 0.1449 0.0591 84 0.0455 0.1033 32
East Germany Men Women
Target-Score Effect Std. Err. No. of
Partici-
pants
Effect Std. Err. No. of
Partici-
pants
0 -0.1014 0.0484 141 -0.0812 0.0333 271
1 -0.0293 0.0198 581 -0.0064 0.0118 1,090
2 -0.0225 0.0155 937 -0.0093 0.0110 1,754
3 0.0013 0.0191 821 0.0112 0.0103 1,289
4 -0.0161 0.0213 322 0.0062 0.0159 508
5 and more -0.0532 0.0448 94 0.0000 0.0393 106
Effects are estimated using 1-NN matching without replacement and
caliper of 0.02. Bold letters indicate significance on a 5% level. Stan-
dard errors calculated by bootstrapping with 50 replications.
1 Target Scores are calculated as the sum of the number of individual dis-
advantages from the selection of the target groups.
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Tab. 6: Results for Stratification Matching in East Germany
Strata Men Women
No. of
Obs.
p-value
for HA
1
E(Y1),
E(Y0)
∆ No. of
Obs.
p-value
for HA
1
E(Y1),
E(Y0)
∆
1 Participants 146 0.1781 251 0.1355
Nonparticipants 16,171
0.0001
0.2366
-0.0585
18,980
0.0002
0.1221
0.0134
2 Participants 146 0.1781 252 0.1032
Nonparticipants 9,532
0.9303
0.2446
-0.0666
11,309
0.0168
0.1267
-0.0235
3 Participants 146 0.1233 252 0.1190
Nonparticipants 7,657
0.0218
0.2130
-0.0897
7,396
0.1633
0.1458
-0.0267
4 Participants 146 0.1575 252 0.0913
Nonparticipants 5,529
0.3283
0.1923
-0.0347
5,641
0.1581
0.1480
-0.0568
5 Participants 147 0.0816 251 0.1633
Nonparticipants 4,432
0.0537
0.1588
-0.0772
5,098
0.2593
0.1497
0.0137
6 Participants 146 0.1233 252 0.1111
Nonparticipants 3,093
0.2077
0.1478
-0.0245
4,298
0.1555
0.1356
-0.0245
7 Participants 146 0.0822 252 0.1627
Nonparticipants 2,727
0.9609
0.1298
-0.0476
3,852
0.5875
0.1449
0.0178
8 Participants 146 0.0685 252 0.1071
Nonparticipants 2,640
0.4523
0.1182
-0.0497
2,804
0.3221
0.1566
-0.0494
9 Participants 146 0.1027 251 0.1036
Nonparticipants 2,116
0.5098
0.1229
-0.0201
2,785
0.2600
0.1645
-0.0609
10 Participants 147 0.1020 252 0.0952
Nonparticipants 2,037
0.7602
0.1193
-0.0173
2,276
0.1690
0.1375
-0.0423
11 Participants 146 0.0616 252 0.1190
Nonparticipants 1,448
0.4703
0.1057
-0.0440
2,228
0.3124
0.1382
-0.0192
12 Participants 146 0.0959 252 0.1508
Nonparticipants 1,592
0.4960
0.1124
-0.0165
1,665
0.9466
0.1375
0.0133
13 Participants 146 0.0411 251 0.1036
Nonparticipants 1,132
0.3424
0.1140
-0.0729
1,651
0.9627
0.1187
-0.0151
14 Participants 146 0.0616 252 0.1310
Nonparticipants 980
0.8348
0.0990
-0.0373
1,471
0.0541
0.0938
0.0371
15 Participants 147 0.1224 252 0.0992
Nonparticipants 948
0.7724
0.0928
0.0296
1,143
0.2967
0.0866
0.0126
16 Participants 146 0.0890 252 0.1071
Nonparticipants 772
0.8285
0.0738
0.0152
1,124
0.9422
0.0907
0.0164
17 Participants 146 0.0753 251 0.0797
Nonparticipants 600
0.9521
0.0500
0.0253
910
0.3790
0.0868
-0.0071
18 Participants 146 0.0822 252 0.0913
Nonparticipants 645
0.4996
0.0419
0.0403
749
0.6872
0.1041
-0.0129
19 Participants 146 0.0548 252 0.1349
Nonparticipants 479
0.0053
0.0355
0.0193
648
0.7600
0.1157
0.0192
20 Participants 147 0.0748 252 0.1548
Nonparticipants 258
0.6655
0.0504
0.0244
442
0.6248
0.1281
0.0267
ATT: -0.0251 -0.0084
Bold letters indicate significance at the 1% level. Italic letters refer to the 5% level. Subgroups are
constructed using the estimated propensity score of the participants from the logit model reported in
Table 1.
1 Testing H0 : P (Z,D = 1) − P (Z,D = 0) = 0. Corresponding HA: P (Z,D = 1) − P (Z,D = 0) 6= 0 in
stratum.
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Tab. 7: Results for Stratification Matching in West Germany
Strata Men Women
No. of
Obs.
p-value
for HA
1
E(Y1),
E(Y0)
∆ No. of
Obs.
p-value
for HA
1
E(Y1),
E(Y0)
∆
1 Participants 107 0.1869 52 0.3846
Nonparticipants 14,220
0.0000
0.1105
0.0764
12,954
0.0005
0.1197
0.2649
2 Participants 107 0.1963 53 0.3585
Nonparticipants 4,913
0.1905
0.2009
-0.0046
4,119
0.1774
0.2391
0.1194
3 Participants 107 0.2336 52 0.3077
Nonparticipants 4,065
0.2521
0.2303
0.0034
2,754
0.5364
0.2876
0.0201
4 Participants 107 0.2150 53 0.3962
Nonparticipants 3,522
0.8130
0.2504
-0.0355
2,782
0.7943
0.2793
0.1169
5 Participants 107 0.2617 53 0.3019
Nonparticipants 2,403
0.0430
0.2339
0.0278
1,742
0.6186
0.3129
-0.0110
6 Participants 107 0.1682 52 0.2692
Nonparticipants 2,384
0.5197
0.2680
-0.0998
1,556
0.7633
0.3033
-0.0341
7 Participants 107 0.2056 53 0.3585
Nonparticipants 2,331
0.0045
0.2540
-0.0484
1,347
0.9023
0.3215
0.0370
8 Participants 107 0.2056 52 0.2885
Nonparticipants 1,748
0.4353
0.2649
-0.0593
1,366
0.6411
0.3192
-0.0307
9 Participants 107 0.2336 53 0.2830
Nonparticipants 1,533
0.2616
0.2701
-0.0364
1,214
0.9991
0.3311
-0.0481
10 Participants 107 0.2804 53 0.3396
Nonparticipants 1,229
0.3627
0.2799
0.0005
841
0.6523
0.3639
-0.0242
11 Participants 107 0.1963 52 0.3269
Nonparticipants 1,049
0.1798
0.2793
-0.0831
611
0.8903
0.3453
-0.0184
12 Participants 107 0.2991 53 0.2830
Nonparticipants 929
0.5893
0.2648
0.0343
733
0.3965
0.3438
-0.0608
13 Participants 107 0.2617 52 0.3846
Nonparticipants 751
0.6554
0.2690
-0.0073
623
0.2097
0.3949
-0.0102
14 Participants 107 0.2617 53 0.3208
Nonparticipants 684
0.3683
0.2529
0.0088
571
0.3294
0.3468
-0.0260
15 Participants 107 0.2056 53 0.4340
Nonparticipants 661
0.5013
0.2723
-0.0667
447
0.2556
0.3154
0.1185
16 Participants 107 0.2430 52 0.3077
Nonparticipants 551
0.4412
0.1978
0.0452
265
0.0935
0.2906
0.0171
17 Participants 107 0.1402 53 0.3208
Nonparticipants 473
0.8646
0.1734
-0.0332
108
0.0282
0.2593
0.0615
18 Participants 107 0.1308 52 0.3654
Nonparticipants 295
0.0955
0.1186
0.0122
78
0.7560
0.1667
0.1987
19 Participants 107 0.2617 53 0.3396
Nonparticipants 191
0.4283
0.1204
0.1413
70
0.0389
0.1714
0.1682
20 Participants 107 0.2710 53 0.3585
Nonparticipants 163
0.0038
0.1104
0.1606
38
0.1637
0.0870
0.2715
ATT: 0.0018 0.0565
Bold letters indicate significance at the 1% level. Italic letters refer to the 5% level. Subgroups are
constructed using the estimated propensity score of the participants from the logit model reported in
Table 1.
1 Testing H0 : P (Z,D = 1) − P (Z,D = 0) = 0. Corresponding HA: P (Z,D = 1) − P (Z,D = 0) 6= 0 in
stratum.
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Figures
Fig. 1: ATT (Employment) between February 2000 and December 2002
West Germany
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A The Matching Estimator
The general form of matching estimators is given by:
∆MAT =
1
N1
∑
i∈I1
[Y 1i −
∑
j∈I0
WN0(i, j)Y
0
j ], (5)
where N0 is the number of observations in the comparison group I0 and N1 is the number of
observations in the treatment group I1. We estimate the effect of treatment for each treated
observation i ∈ I1 in the treatment group, by contrasting her outcome with treatment with a
weighted average of comparison group observations j ∈ I0. Matching estimators differ in the
weights attached to the members of the comparison group (Heckman, Ichimura, Smith, and
Todd, 1998), whereWN0(i, j) is the weight placed on the j-th individual from the comparison
group in constructing the counterfactual for the i-th individual of the treatment group. The
weights always satisfy
∑
jWN0(i, j) = 1, ∀i, that is the total weight of all comparisons sums up
to one for each treated individual. Define a neighbourhood C(Pi) for each i in the participant
sample and denote as neighbours for i those nonparticipants j ∈ I0 for whom Pj ∈ C(Pi).
Individuals matched to i are those people in the set Ai where Ai = {j ∈ I0|Pj ∈ C(Pi)}.
Nearest neighbour (NN) matching sets
CNN (Pi) = min
j
‖Pi − Pj‖, j ∈ N0, (6)
where ‖(.)‖ is obtained through a distance metric. Doing so, the nonparticipant with the
value of Pj that is closest to Pi is selected as the match, therefore:
WNNN0N1(i, j) =

1 if ‖Pi − Pj‖ = minj‖Pi − Pj‖
0 otherwise
. (7)
Several variants of NN matching are proposed, e.g. NN matching ‘with’ and ‘without re-
placement’. In the former case a nonparticipating individual can be used more than once as
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a match, whereas in the latter case it is considered only once. Matching with replacement
involves a trade-off between bias and variance. If we allow replacement, the average quality
of the matching will increase and the bias will decrease. NN matching faces the risk of bad
matches if the closest neighbour is far away. This can be avoided by imposing a tolerance on
the maximum distance ‖Pi−Pj‖ allowed. This form of matching, caliper matching (Cochrane
and Rubin, 1973), imposes the condition:
‖Pi − Pj‖ < ², j ∈ N0, (8)
where ² is a pre-specified level of tolerance. The weights for caliper matching (CM) are given
by:
WCM (i, j) =

1 if ‖Pi − Pj‖ = minj ‖Pi − Pj‖ ∧ ‖Pi − Pj‖ < ²
0 else
. (9)
Treated observations for whom no matches within the neighbourhood C(Pi) = {Pj |‖Pi −
Pj‖ < ²} can be found are excluded from the analysis. Hence, caliper matching is one form
of imposing a common support condition.
B Data Sources and Attributes
Table B.1 gives detailed information of the data sources and the included attributes. A
selection of these attributes is used to estimate the participation probability.
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Tab. B.1: Data Sources and Attributes
Data Source Attributes
MTG1 BewA and ST42 a) Socio-demographic: age, gender, marital status, number
of children, nationality, health restrictions
b) Qualification: graduation, professional training, occupa-
tional group, position in last occupation, work experience, ap-
praisal of qualification by the placement officer
c) Labour market history: duration of unemployment, du-
ration of last occupation, number of job offers, occupational
rehabilitation, programme participation before unemployment
ST11TN3 d) Programme: institution that receives subsidy, activity
sector, time of qualification and/or practical training during
programme, begin and end of programme (payment of the
subsidy), entry and leave of the participant, duration of pro-
gramme
1 Programme participants master data set (Maßnahme-Teilnehmer-Gesamtdatei, MTG)
2 Job-seekers data base (Bewerberangebotsdatei, BewA) and adjusted version for statistical pur-
poses (ST4)
3 Programme participants of subsidised employment data set (ST11TN)
C Regional Context Variables
The classification of the labour office districts was undertaken by a project group of the FEA.
The aim of the project was to enhance the comparability of the labour office districts for a
more efficient allocation of funds. The 181 labour office districts were split into twelve types
of office districts with similar labour market circumstances. The comparability of the office
districts is build upon several labour market characteristics. The most important criteria are
the underemployment quota and the corrected population density. The underemployment
quota is defined as the relation of the sum of unemployed individuals and participants in
several ALMP programmes to the sum of all employed persons and these participants. The
corrected population density is used to improve the comparability of rural labour office dis-
tricts with metropolitan and city areas. In addition to that, the vacancy quota describing the
relation of all reported vacancies at the labour office, the placement quota, that contains the
number of placements to the number of employments, and the quota of people who achieve
maintenance allowance in relation to the underemployment quota are used. Furthermore, an
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indicator for the tertiarisation level built on the number of employed persons in agricultural
occupations and an indicator for the seasonal unemployment are considered.
The twelve types of comparable labour office districts can be summarised into five types for
strategic purposes. Since almost all labour office districts in East Germany belong to the first
of these five strategic types, we use the finer typing of three groups here. For West Germany
we use the remaining four types for strategic purposes. Table C.1 presents the classification
used in the analysis, containing a short description of the clusters and the number of labour
offices in each clusters.
Tab. C.1: Classification of labour office districts in Germany
Cluster Description No.
Ia East German labour office districts with worst labour market conditions 5
Ib East German labour office districts with bad labour market conditions 23
Ic East German labour office districts with high unemployment 5
II Labour office districts dominated by large cities 21
III West German labour office districts with rural elements, medium-sized
industry and average unemployment
63
IV West German centers with good labour market prospects 10
V West German labour office districts with the best labour market
prospects
47
No. describes the number of labour offices in cluster.
Source: Blien et al.(2004)
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Identifying Effect Heterogeneity to Improve the
Efficiency of Job Creation Schemes in Germany
Abstract
Previous empirical studies of job creation schemes in Germany have shown that the average effects for
the participating individuals are negative. However, we find that this is not true for all strata of the
population. Identifying individual characteristics that are responsible for the effect heterogeneity and
using this information for a better allocation of individuals therefore bears some scope for improving
programme efficiency. We present several stratification strategies and discuss the occurring effect
heterogeneity. Our findings show that job creation schemes do neither harm nor improve the labour
market chances for most of the groups. Exceptions are long-term unemployed men in West and long-
term unemployed women in East and West Germany who benefit from participation in terms of higher
employment rates.
Keywords: Evaluation – Active Labour Market Policy – Targeting – Efficient Allocation – Effect
Heterogeneity
JEL Classification: C13, H43, J68
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1 Introduction
The permanent integration into regular employment is the primary purpose of active labour
market policy (ALMP) in Germany. To achieve this goal, the Federal Employment Agency
(FEA) spends substantial amounts on measures like vocational training programmes (VT),
job creation schemes (JCS) and special promotion for disabled people and aspirants for voca-
tional rehabilitation. ALMP was first introduced in Germany in the late 1960s. Since then,
the labour market experienced several important changes, caused by the oil price shocks dur-
ing the 1970s and the growth of the labour market after the German Re-Unification in 1990.
The set of programmes was gradually adjusted to these changes. Despite these reforms and
large spending on ALMP, the German labour market is still plagued by high and persistent
unemployment. Therefore, evaluating ALMP has become a major topic and was also legally
anchored in the reformed legal basis for ALMP in 1998 (Social Code III). The main question
to be answered is, if programmes improve the employment chances of participants.
In this paper we evaluate the effects of JCS for the participating individuals. JCS, which
have been one major element of ALMP in Germany over the last years, are a form of sub-
sidised employment and aim at the stabilisation and qualification of unemployed persons with
disadvantages on the labour market. The main purpose of these programmes is the (re-) inte-
gration of unemployed persons into the first labour market.1 Recent empirical studies of JCS
for Germany have shown that the average effects for the participating individuals are nega-
tive (see for example Hujer, Caliendo, and Thomsen (2004)).2 The reasons for these findings
have to be analysed. One possible explanation may be the poor quality of programmes in
1 Other purposes of JCS, for example the relief of the stock of unemployed in regions with great imbalances
of the labour market, are secondary only and will not be evaluated here.
2 This is also a common finding in the recent evaluation literature of ALMP programmes in Europe. Whereas
ALMP were seen as a reasonable opportunity to reduce and avoid unemployment for a long time, the inter-
national experiences with the implemented programmes show a mixed picture. The majority of programmes
seem to be ineffective in terms of their goals. As the overviews by Martin and Grubb (2001) for OECD
countries and Calmfors, Forslund, and Hemstro¨m (2002) for Sweden clarify, ALMP are in their present design
and implementation not able to achieve a lasting reduction of unemployment.
2
Page 48 of 113
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
conjunction with often cited stigma- and ‘locking-in’-effects. But leaving this argument aside
for a moment, the results may also come from inefficient allocation mechanisms. The central
motivation in this context is that programme impacts are heterogeneous (Manski, 1997 and
2000) and therefore negative average effects may not apply for all strata of the population. As
Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith (1999) point out, negative mean impacts may be acceptable if
most participants benefit from participation. Abandoning the ‘common effect’ assumption of
treatment effects and identifying the individuals who gain from the programmes is an obvious
opportunity to improve their future efficiency. If we are able to identify the personal charac-
teristics which are responsible for the effect heterogeneity in individual impacts, we can use
this knowledge for a better future allocation of individuals to programmes. A good example is
a situation where we find e.g. that a certain programme works for older participants but does
not work for younger participants at all. If in the past more younger individuals have been
allocated to the programme, the average effect of the programme may have been negative.
Knowing the sources of effect heterogeneity would have helped to achieve a better allocation.
Our evaluation focuses on two main issues: First, we analyse if individuals gain on average
from participation. To do so, we use matching methods to estimate the average treatment
effect on the treated. Thereby we take gender-specific and regional differences into account.
Since the average effects may not apply to all strata of the population, we examine different
sources of effect heterogeneity in a second step. We start with a selection of special problem-
groups of the labour market like long-term unemployed or individuals without professional
training and estimate their treatment effects separately. After that, we construct a simple
indicator, which we call target score, based on the individual’s number of disadvantages
on the labour market, to analyse whether programme effects differ corresponding to the
individual labour market hindrances. If programmes are tailored to the needs of the most-
disadvantaged, one would expect stronger effects for persons with a higher target score.
3
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Finally, we use the estimated participation probability to answer the question, whether a
higher participation probability correlates with a higher programme effect. We use data on
participants who started their JCS programme in February 2000, and on a comparison group
of nonparticipants who were eligible for participation at the end of January 2000, but did not
participate in February. We observe the employment status of our sample until December
2002, i.e. almost three years after programmes have started.
The paper is organised as follows: In the following section we briefly review some stylised
facts of ALMP and JCS in Germany. We present the data used in section three and introduce
the econometric methodology in section four. In section five we discuss the results for the
main population. After that, we present the results of the target approaches. Finally, section
seven concludes.
2 Some Stylised Facts of Active Labour Market Policy and
Job Creation Schemes in Germany
The legal basis for ALMP in Germany is the Social Code III. ALMP are part of the employ-
ment promotion and primarily aim at the permanent (re-)integration of unemployed persons
into regular employment. According to Social Code III, employment promotion should help
to achieve the balancing of labour demand and supply. Therefore, unemployment should be
circumvented by an efficient filling of vacancies and the increase of the individual employ-
ment chances due to an upgrade of the worker’s human capital. Although ALMP have a
long tradition in Germany, their importance increased after the German Re-Unification in
1990. Especially in the eastern part, ALMP were implemented on a large scale to cushion
the strong employment reduction in the first years of the transition process. During the last
decade two major instruments characterised German ALMP: First, VT programmes that
4
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aim at a qualification transfer to circumvent and solve structural problems on the labour
market. Second, JCS whose main purpose is to stabilise and qualify unemployed workers for
later re-integration into regular employment, but which are also used to relieve tense labour
market situations in regions with high unemployment rates.
Promotion of JCS3 can be authorised if they support activities which are of value for society
and additional in nature. Furthermore, individuals have to be placed, whose last chance to
stabilise and qualify for later re-integration into regular employment is participation in these
schemes. Additional in nature means that the activities could not be executed without the
subsidy. Measures with a predominantly commercial purpose have been excluded explicitly up
to January 2002. The majority of activities is conducted in the public and non-commercial
sector. Financial support for JCS is obtained as a wage subsidy to the employer. Even
though JCS should be co-financed measures where between 30 and 75 percent of the costs
are subsidies by the FEA and the rest is paid by the supporting institution, exceptions
can be made in the direction of a higher subsidy-quota (up to 100 percent). The legal
requirements for individuals to enter JCS are relaxed by the Social Code III amendment
(Job-AQTIV-Gesetz) in January 2002. Before that time, potential participants had to be
long-term unemployed (more than one year) or unemployed for at least six months within
the last twelve months. Furthermore, they had to fulfil the conditions for the entitlement
of unemployment compensation. In addition, the local placement officers were allowed to
place up to five percent of the allocated individuals who did not meet these conditions (Five-
Percent-Quota). Further exceptions are made for young unemployed (under 25 years) without
professional training, short-term unemployed (with at least three months of unemployment)
3 The legal basis for JCS is §§ 260–271, 416 Social Code III. They have been the second most important
instrument of ALMP in Germany in respect of the fiscal volume and the number of promoted individuals. For
2002 the number of promoted individuals in JCS amounts to 112,462 in East and 52,229 in West Germany.
These figures correspond to spendings from 1,639.5 million euro in East and 693.5 million euro in West
Germany.
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placed as tutors, and disabled who could be stabilised or qualified.4 The subsidy is in general
paid for 12 months, but may be extended up to 24 months or even 36 months under special
circumstances. Participants are allowed to do a practical training up to 40 percent of the
time and a VT up to 20 percent, together no more than 50 percent of the programme
duration. Priority should be given to projects which enhance the chances for permanent jobs,
support structural improvement in social or environmental services or aim at the integration of
extremely hard-to-place individuals. Participation in JCS results from placement by the local
labour office. Unemployed individuals who cannot be integrated into regular employment or
do not fit the conditions for another instrument of ALMP may be offered a place. The
responsible caseworker may cancel a running programme at any time if the participant can
be placed into regular employment. If an unemployed person rejects the JCS offer or if a
participant denies a career counselling by the placement officer, the labour office can stop the
payment of unemployment benefits for up to twelve weeks.
3 Data Set
The data used for the empirical analysis contain information on all participants who were
placed in a JCS in February 2000, and on a comparison group of nonparticipants who were
eligible for participation in January 2000, but did not enter those schemes in February.
Information on nonparticipants and participants were merged from several sources of the
FEA. Central source for the information derived on participants is a prototype version of
the programme participants master data set (‘Maßnahme-Teilnehmer-Gesamtdatei’, MTG).
This data set includes information from the job-seekers data base (‘Bewerberangebotsdatei’,
BewA), an adjusted version of this data set for statistical purposes (ST4) and the particular
4 With the 2002 amendment, unemployed individuals whose only occupation opportunity is participation
in JCS can be placed in programmes independently of the preceding unemployment duration. In addition,
the Five-Percent-Quota was augmented up to ten percent.
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information of subsidised employment programmes (ST11TN). For this reason, the MTG
contains a large number of attributes to describe individual aspects on the one hand and
on the other hand provides a reasonable basis for the construction of the comparison group.
The included attributes can be split into four classes: socio-demographic and qualification
information, labour market history and particular programme information.5 The information
on the comparison group is derived from the BewA with the additional attributes of the ST4.
Therefore, almost all characteristics in the analysis for the comparison as well as for the
treatment group originate from the same data sources (see Appendix B for more details).
The information is completed by a characterisation of the regional labour market situation
by a classification of similar and comparable labour office districts (see Blien et al. (2004)
and appendix C).6
For the outcome variable we use information from the Employment Statistics Register
(‘Bescha¨ftigtenstatistik’, BSt), which includes information on the total population of persons
who are registered in the social security system. These are employees and participants of
several ALMP programmes, but no self-employed or pensioners. We define only regular
employment as a success, whereas all kinds of subsidised employment or participations in
ALMP programmes are defined as a failure. While this definition might conflict with the
institutional setting, it reflects the economic point of view to measure the integration ability
of JCS into non-subsidised employment.7 To identify spells of regular employment without
further promotion, we use the excerpted information of the final version of the MTG on the
individual’s time spent in ALMP programmes. We observe the labour market outcome for the
5 The final version of the MTG includes information on all ALMP programmes of the FEA.
6 The value of good data is an essential building block for a valid evaluation. As for example Heckman,
Ichimura, Smith, and Todd (1998) mention, having access to a geographically-matched comparison group
administered the same questionnaire as programme participants matters in devising effective non-experimental
estimators of programme impacts.
7 Only the first programme participation is evaluated, any participation in later programmes is viewed as
an outcome of the first treatment and is defined as a failure.
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participating and nonparticipating group until December 2002. Our analysis in the following
parts refer to this last month of the observation period. So, all employment effects of JCS are
estimated for December 2002, that is 35 months after programmes have started. We exclude
information on participants in Berlin.8 Our final sample consists of 11,151 participants and
219,622 nonparticipants. Previous empirical findings have shown that the effects of JCS
differ with respect to region and gender (Hujer, Caliendo, and Thomsen, 2004). Therefore,
we separate our analysis by these characteristics, i.e. we separately estimate the effects for
men and women in East and West Germany.
4 Econometric Methodology
Estimation of treatment effects based on non-experimental data requires consideration of
some identifying issues. As we want to compare participation in one specific programme with
nonparticipation, we can use the potential outcome framework with two potential outcomes
Y 1 (individual receives treatment) and Y 0 (individual does not receive treatment). The
actually observed outcome for any individual i can be written as: Yi = Y 1i ·Di+(1−Di) ·Y 0i ,
where D ∈ {0, 1} is a binary treatment indicator. The treatment effect for each individual i
is the difference between her potential outcomes ∆i = Y 1i − Y 0i . Since one of the outcomes
is unobservable for each individual, there is no opportunity to calculate individual effects
directly. Thus, we have to concentrate on population averages of gains from treatment. A
common evaluation parameter is the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT), which
focusses explicitly on the effects of those for whom the programme is actually intended. It is
given by:
∆ATT = E(∆ | D = 1) = E(Y 1 | D = 1)−E(Y 0 | D = 1). (1)
8 The special situation of the labour market in the capital city requires a separate evaluation of the integra-
tion effects of JCS into regular employment. The small number of participants aggravates the interpretation
of the results.
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Given equation (1), the problem of selection bias is straightforward to see, since the second
term on the right hand side of equation (1) is unobservable.
If the condition E(Y 0 | D = 1) = E(Y 0 | D = 0) holds, we can use the nonparticipants
as an adequate control group. However, this identifying assumption is likely to hold only in
randomised experiments. Consequently, estimating the ATT by the difference between the
subpopulation means of participants E(Y 1 | D = 1) and nonparticipants E(Y 0 | D = 0)
will lead to a selection bias, which may be caused by observable (e.g. age, skill differences)
or unobservable factors (e.g. motivation). For both cases different estimation strategies are
available.9 If we are willing to assume that all relevant attributes for selection are observable,
the matching estimator is an appealing choice. It is based on the idea that if individuals
are similar conditional on all relevant variables, further differences in the labour market out-
come between participants and nonparticipants result from the programme only.10 It is well
known that matching on X can become hazardous when X is of high dimension (‘curse of
dimensionality’). To deal with this dimensionality problem, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983)
suggest the use of balancing scores b(X), i.e. functions of the relevant observed covariates
X such that the conditional distribution of X given b(X) is independent of the assignment
to treatment. For participants and nonparticipants with the same balancing score, the dis-
tributions of the covariates X are the same, i.e. they are balanced across the groups. The
propensity score P (X), i.e. the probability of participating in a programme, is one possible
balancing score. It summarises the information of the observed covariates X into a single
index function. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) show that if treatment assignment is strongly
ignorable given X, it is also strongly ignorable given any balancing score. Since we focus on
9 See for example Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith (1999), Angrist and Krueger (1999) or Blundell and
Costa-Dias (2002).
10 See Imbens (2004) or Smith and Todd (2005) for a recent review regarding matching methods.
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ATT, it is sufficient to assume that (in the notation of Dawid (1979)):
Y 0 qD|P (X). (2)
Similar to randomisation in a classical experiment, matching balances the distributions of
all relevant11 pre-treatment characteristics X in the treatment and comparison group, and
thus achieves independence between the potential outcomes and the assignment to treatment.
Hence, if the mean exists, E(Y 0 | P (X), D = 1) = E(Y 0 | P (X), D = 0) = E(Y 0 | P (X)) and
the missing counterfactual mean can be constructed from the outcomes of nonparticipants.
In order for both sides of the equations to be well defined simultaneously for all P (X), it is
usually additionally assumed that
Pr(D = 1 | X) < 1 (3)
for all X. This implies that the support ofX is equal in both groups, i.e. S = Support(X|D =
1) = Support(X|D = 0). These assumptions are sufficient for identification of (1), because
the moments of the distribution of Y 1 for the treated are directly estimable.
Several matching methods have been suggested in the literature. Good overviews can be
found in Heckman, Ichimura, Smith, and Todd (1998) and Smith and Todd (2005). The
choice of the matching method usually involves a trade-off between matching quality and
variance. First, one has to decide on how many nonparticipating individuals to match to a
single treated individual. Nearest-neighbour (NN) matching only uses the participant and
its closest neighbour. Therefore it minimises the bias but might also involve an efficiency
loss, since a large number of close neigbours is disregarded. Kernel-based matching on the
other hand uses more nonparticipants for each participant thereby reducing the variance
but possibly increasing the bias. Finally, using the same nonparticipating individual more
11 Relevant variables are all those covariates that jointly determine assignment to treatment and the potential
outcomes.
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than once (NN matching with replacement) may possibly improve the matching quality, but
increases the variance. We have also tested the sensitivity of the results with respect to
different matching methods. It turns out that the results are not sensitive to the choice of
the matching estimator and therefore we will use and present only one matching strategy,
namely nearest-neighbour (NN) matching without replacement and a caliper of 0.02. (See
appendix A for technical details.)
5 Empirical Impacts of Job Creation Schemes
5.1 Estimating the Propensity Score
We have estimated the propensity scores using binary logit models with participation as de-
pendent variable. To take account for regional heterogeneity and to allow for gender-specific
interaction effects, we have estimated separate models for men and women in East and West
Germany.12 Several model specifications have been tested for the selection of variables to
be included in the model. Our final specification contains explanatory variables like age,
marital status, the number of children, nationality and health restrictions that describe the
sociodemographic background of individuals. Furthermore, qualification is included by char-
acteristics like professional training, the occupational group, the professional rank and work
experience. The influence of the individual labour market history is given by the unem-
ployment duration, the number of (successless) placement propositions, the duration of the
last occupation, the last contact to the personal caseworker, whether the person is an as-
pirant for vocational rehabilitation, present placement restraints due to health restrictions
and information on an ALMP participation in the past. The regional context is considered
12 We have also estimated the propensity scores for the two regions using dummy variables for sex. However,
using the results of the two estimations ignores possible gender-specific interaction effects and the fact, that
the coefficients in the estimation differ in their significance and magnitude. This leads to a worse matching
quality in the sense that the balancing of covariates after mathing is reduced, i.e. the standardised bias (see
below) is higher.
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by using the classification of the FEA for comparable labour office districts (see Appendix
C). Table 1 presents the estimation results for the participation probability in JCS for the
four main groups. Additionally, the number of observations in the four participating and
nonparticipating groups are included.
It becomes obvious that allocation differs by regions. The coefficients of the sociodemo-
graphic variables show that the participation probability of men in West Germany decreases
with age, while in East Germany older men and women are more likely to participate. This
indicates the slightly different purpose of the programmes in East and West Germany. Es-
pecially in East Germany, JCS function as a relief for the labour market and are used as a
bridge to retirement. Furthermore, it has to be noted that German nationals are more likely
to participate than foreigners. This may be due to the fact that other measures of ALMP (e.g.
language courses) are preferred for foreigners. Regardless of region, health restrictions in-
crease the individual participation probability. This finding indicates an allocation according
to the legal basis.
The coefficients for the qualification characteristics emphasise gender specific differences in
the allocation. A higher qualification increases the participation probability in both regions
for women, whereas the coefficients are insignificant for higher qualified men. The positive
coefficients may be seen as an indication that for higher qualified women it is even harder
to return to regular employment and so they are willing to participate in a JCS to finish
unemployment. As expected, work experience reduces the participation probability of all
groups. Work experience is in general an important criterion for placement into regular
employment. The finding indicates that experienced workers have other opportunities on the
labour market. Since unemployment duration is an eligibility criterion for participation, its
influence is of major importance. We included unemployment duration in three categories,
up to 13 weeks, between 13 weeks and one year, and for more than one year. As expected,
12
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participation probability increases with unemployment duration.
< Include table 1 about here. >
The number of (successless) placement propositions is an indicator for bad labour market
opportunities. The coefficient affirms allocation according to the law. A last interesting point
to note is that placement restrictions annotated by the caseworker harm the participation
probability. This is somewhat surprising, because JCS should even be offered to these groups.
The coefficients for the regional context are in reference to the labour office districts with
the best (in relation to the region) labour market environment. More severe labour market
conditions correlate with a decrease in the participation probabilities in both parts. For men
in East Germany, living in labour office districts with average labour market opportunities
bears the clearest reduction of participation probability, while analogously for West German
women and men living in labour office districts dominated by large cities with an above
average unemployment shows the strongest decrease. The better the labour market condi-
tions in the respective labour office district, the more likely are the unemployed persons to
participate.
5.2 Matching Quality and First Results
Quality of Propensity Score Estimation and Matching Before we present the results,
we first have to check the quality of our propensity score estimation and second, the success
of the matching procedure in balancing the covariates between treatment and comparison
group.
Our model specification for the propensity score estimation was based on specification
tests to identify the relevant variables.13 One simple method to validate the ability of a
13 See Caliendo (2005) for an overview regarding such specification tests and other issues concerning the
implementation of matching estimators.
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good prediction is the computation of hit-rates, i.e. the proportion of persons with a correct
prediction of their status (participation and nonparticipation). As becomes obvious from
table 2, these hit-rates lie between 70.6 percent for men and 75.7 percent for women in West
Germany. For East Germany, the hit-rates are 74.2 for men and 72.2 percent for women. This
implies a quite accurate underlying model. However, the aim of propensity score matching is
not to maximise the hit-rate, but to balance the covariates between treatment and comparison
groups. Since we do not condition directly on all covariates but on the propensity score, we
have to check the ability of the matching procedure to balance the relevant covariates. We do
so by comparing the absolute bias between the respective participating and nonparticipating
groups before and after matching took place. One suitable indicator to assess the distance
in the marginal distributions of the X-variables is the standardised bias (SB) suggested
by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985). For each covariate X it is defined as a percentage of the
quotient between the difference of the sample means in the treated and (matched) comparison
subsamples and the square root of the average of the sample variances in both groups. The
SB before and after matching are given by
SBbefore = 100 · (X1−X0)√0.5·(V1(X)+V0(X)) , SBafter = 100 ·
(X1M−X0M )√
0.5·(V1M (X)+V0M (X))
,
(4)
where X1 (V1) is the mean (variance) in the treated group before matching and X0 (V0) the
analogue for the comparison group. X1M (V1M ), X0M (V0M ) are the corresponding values
after matching. This is a common approach used in many evaluation studies, e.g. by Sianesi
(2004). To abbreviate the documentation, we present only the means of the SB before and
after matching for the four main groups (Table 2). While the mean SB lies between 10.83
and 14.62 percent before matching, it reduces to 1.60 to 3.20 percent after matching.
< Include table 2 about here. >
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Sianesi (2004) additionally suggests to re-estimate the propensity score on the matched
sample, that is only on participants and matched nonparticipants and compare the pseudo-
R2’s before and after matching. The pseudo-R2 indicates how well the regressors X explain
the participation probability. After matching there should be no systematic differences in the
distribution of the covariates between both groups. Therefore, the pseudo-R2 after matching
should be fairly low. As the results from Table 2 show, this is true for our estimation.
The results of the F -tests (with degrees of freedom in brackets) point in the same direction
indicating a joint influence before, and no joint influence after matching.
First Results All estimated effects in the later sections of this paper correspond to De-
cember 2002, the last month of our observation period. We are aware of the fact that
consideration of only this month bears some shortcomings for a valuable interpretation of the
programme effects. Since December 2002 is almost three years after programmes have started,
and with respect to the average duration of programmes of twelve months for the majority of
participants almost two years after the programmes have ended, there may be other events
influencing the labour market status of participants and nonparticipants at that time. As we
do not consider further participation and assignment to other ALMP programmes explicitly
in our estimation, possible influences have to be mentioned. Apart from that criticism, our
analysis focusses on the mid-term effects of job creation schemes and therefore requires this
time horizon.
< Include figure 1 about here. >
To give an idea of the time path of the effects, figure 1 presents the estimated effects for
the four main groups between February 2000 and December 2002. At the beginning of the
observation period, the programme effect is expected to be overlayed by so-called ‘locking-in’-
effects (van Ours, 2004) due to a reduced search intensity of the participants. This reduced
15
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search intensity is plausible for participants, since they are occupied by participation and
spend less time on job search. Thus, a valid interpretation of the programme effects on the
employment rates should start after the majority of participants has left the programmes, i.e.
after twelve months. Since the purpose of JCS is to stabilise and qualify unemployed persons
for the re-integration into regular employment, we would expect increasing employment rates
after the programmes have ended. We find these ‘locking-in’-effects for all groups (see figure
1). After this initial fall there is a clear rising tendency for the groups in West Germany and
a moderate rising tendency for the groups in East Germany. For the smallest group, women
in West Germany, there is the strongest rise in the employment rates with significant positive
effects at the end of the observation period in December 2002. The effects for men in West
Germany are also rising, but the effects are insignificant in the end, i.e. an increase in the
employability by participation cannot be established. While the effects in West Germany are
clearly rising, we find a stepwise increase with relatively constant levels over one-year-periods
in East Germany. Besides that, the ‘locking-in’-effects during the first year after programmes
start are not as strong as in the West. This finding can be interpreted as an indication of
worse outside options for the nonparticipants.
Although the effects show a rising tendency for all groups, a significant increase of the
employment rates due to participation can only be stated for women in West Germany, who
have a significant positive effect of 4.6 percent in December 2002. For men in West Germany
we do not find any significant effects in December 2002, whereas men in East Germany have
a significant negative effect of -2.9 percent. For women in East Germany the effect is slightly
better but still significantly negative at -1.4 percent. So it seems that JCS rather decrease than
increase the employment prospects of participants. Of course, due to the strong ‘locking-in’-
effects, the starting position for the participants is on average lower than for nonparticipants.
However, since we observe the outcomes until 35 months after start of the programmes and
16
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almost two years after the majority of the individuals has left the programmes, a successful
programme should overcompensate for this initial fall.
6 Targeting
Clearly, as already mentioned, one possible explanation for the discouraging results in the
previous section may be the poor quality of the programmes in conjunction with stigma- and
‘locking-in’-effects. Another possible cause might be an inefficient allocation of participants.
Since programme effects are heterogeneous (Manski, 1997 and 2000), the average effects
depicted in the above section must not apply to all strata of the population. Negative mean
impact results may be acceptable if the majority of participants gains from the programme
(Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith, 1999). Abandoning the ‘common effect’ assumption of
treatment effects and identifying the individuals that benefit from the programmes is an
obvious opportunity to improve the future efficiency of ALMP. If we are able to identify
the individual characteristics, which are responsible for the effect heterogeneity in individual
impacts, we can use this knowledge to suggest allocation rules for a better future allotment
of programme participants.
The potential improvement of allocation mechanisms is a much discussed topic in the
recent evaluation literature (see for example Lechner and Smith (2005), Fro¨lich, Lechner,
and Steiger (2003) and Fro¨lich (2001)). An optimal allocation should guarantee the best
results according to the underlying programme goal, where two goals - efficiency and equity -
can be distinguished. If the goal is efficiency, programmes target at the maximisation of the
impacts of the outcome of interest. If the goal is equity, treatment is administered to those
individuals identified as ‘neediest’, i.e. for example those individuals with the lowest predicted
re-employment probabilities (Plesca and Smith, 2002). Fro¨lich, Lechner, and Steiger (2003)
17
Page 63 of 113
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
distinguish between statistical and non-statistical allocation mechanisms.
Caseworker discretion is the most common non-statistical allocation mechanism. Poten-
tial programme participants are interviewed by their personal caseworker and allocation to
programmes depends on the caseworker’s evaluation of the unemployed person’s capabilities,
the individual’s interests and the availability of slots in the particular programmes. The cru-
cial feature of the caseworker allocation mechanism for an optimal allocation of unemployed
persons to programmes is the knowledge of the characteristics of the unemployed person, the
situation on the local labour market and the programme providers as well as the professional
expertise of the caseworker (Lechner and Smith, 2005). There are only a few studies that
examine the quality of caseworker allocation in Europe. Fro¨lich (2001) analyses the effects
of caseworker allocation in Sweden; Lechner and Smith (2005) and Fro¨lich, Lechner, and
Steiger (2003) evaluate the effectiveness of Swiss caseworkers in comparison to a simulated
targeting system. The results indicate that caseworker allocation lacks the ability to achieve
the expected programme goals. Reasons for the ineffectiveness of the caseworker allocation
may be lack of knowledge of caseworkers regarding the effectiveness of certain programmes.
Caseworkers have to build expectations about impacts of programmes on a very uncertain
basis. Additionally, the broad variety of available programmes makes it difficult to select an
optimal strategy for a specific person (Fro¨lich, Lechner, and Steiger, 2003). Another issue
concerns possible ‘cream-skimming’. The experiences from the Job Training Partnership Act
(JTPA) showed that tying the funding to the performance of local programmes as measured
by job placement rates creates the incentive to serve the most able applicants, without re-
garding how much different groups might have benefited from programmes (see for example
Bell and Orr (2002)).
Statistical allocation mechanisms avoid these possible problems by relying on some model
indicating the individual gains of participation in a specific programme. Up to now, there is
18
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no consistent classification of statistical treatment rules. OECD (2002) defines ‘profiling’ as
‘a procedure where a numerical score, calculated on the basis of multivariate information, de-
termines the referral of a job-seeker to further employment services’. Based on this definition,
we will present three approaches to identify potential sources of effect heterogeneity, which
could be used, if successful, for a better targeting in future. At first, we will select target
groups with disadvantages on the labour market, e.g. long-term unemployed persons. In a
second step, we will use these definitions and build a simple index that we call ‘target score’.
The target score simply sums up the number of individual disadvantages. If programmes
are tailored to the needs of the most disadvantaged on the labour market, we would expect
higher impacts for persons with higher target scores. For the evaluation of the effects in
the target groups and for the target scores, we estimate separate propensity scores for each
group and category considered.14 Finally, we test whether the effects differ corresponding to
different participation probabilities. To do so, we stratify our sample in 20 sub-samples along
the propensity score of the participants and use a stratification matching estimator.
6.1 Effects for Selected Target Groups
Identifying groups of participants who benefit from programmes is a central purpose of pro-
gramme evaluation. Recent evaluation studies of JCS in Germany (Hujer, Caliendo, and
Thomsen, 2004) and experiences from abroad (Martin and Grubb, 2001) recommend a tighter
targeting of programmes to individuals with disadvantages on the labour market. Selecting
persons that are supposed to have a below average employability is a sensible first approach
to identify possible effect heterogeneity due to personal characteristics. Several groups of
individuals who should be promoted predominantly are defined in Social Code III. These are
long-term unemployed persons, individuals with health restrictions or persons who aspire for
14 The results of these estimations and the standardised biases before and after matching are available on
request by the authors.
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vocational rehabilitation.15 Further target groups are young ond older unemployed as well as
workers without any professional training. In addition, JCS should be particularly applied
to individuals with special placement restrictions.
Our selection is oriented on these legal definitions. We estimate the effects for participants
younger than 25 years and for participants older than 50 years respectively. Further groups
are long-term (more than one year when programmes start) unemployed persons, individuals
with special placement restrictions due to health restrictions and aspirants for vocational
rehabilitation. Additionally, we select four groups of persons who are hard-to-place. The
first group contains individuals with more than five (unsuccessful) placement propositions
by the local labour offices, the second group are persons who have already participated
in an ALMP programme before unemployment. Group three contains individuals without
professional training and the last group are people without any work experience.
< Include table 3 about here. >
Table 3 contains the shares of individuals in each of the selected groups differentiated by
treatment status. For most of the groups, the results show significant differences of the shares
between treatment and comparison group. Thus, one can assume that these characteristics
affect the allocation decision to some extent. Surprisingly, long-term unemployment (more
than 52 weeks) which is expected to be an important selection criterion (in accordance to
the law), differs only for men in East Germany. Additionally, the shares of aspirants for
vocational rehabilitation of this group and the proportions of men and women without work
experience in the region are approximately equal for participants and nonparticipants. This
shows once again the different purpose of JCS in East and West Germany.
Further notable findings are the different proportions of participants between the regions.
15 This are especially persons who are no more able to work in their profession due to health restrictions,
and therefore should receive a promotion for vocational rehabilitation.
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While the share of younger unemployed (below 25 years) in West Germany is clearly larger
in the participants’ group, the situation in East Germany is the other way round. Older
unemployed are more likely to participate here. These differences have to be interpreted in
light of the different labour market situation in East and West Germany and the consequently
different purpose of JCS in both regions. Placing a larger share of young unemployed into
programmes in West Germany complies to the law that postulates stabilising efforts for later
re-integration. In East Germany, JCS are used to relieve the labour market and therefore
older unemployed are more likely to participate than younger ones.
Besides the age differences, it has to be mentioned that persons with a larger number of
placement propositions or who have participated in an ALMP programme before unemploy-
ment are more frequent in the participating group. This agrees with the expectation as the
number of successless placement propositions directly indicates the placement difficulties.
Furthermore, earlier participation may identify to so-called ‘programme careerists’, who are
assigned to ALMP programmes subsequently, interrupted by unemployment spells only.
Table 4 presents the employment effects in December 2002 for these nine groups with fur-
ther distinction for gender and region as above. It becomes obvious that programme effects
are heterogeneous across the selected groups. Whereas the results for the four main groups
showed insignificant effects for men in West Germany, men and women in East Germany suf-
fered from participation and women in West Germany benefited on average from programmes.
Consideration of the effects for the selected groups of male participants in West Germany
shows, that the effects are for almost all groups insignificant, too, but with one exception.
The group of long-term unemployed men benefits from participation and has an employment
rate which is 5.03 percent higher compared to the rate of matched nonparticipants in De-
cember 2002. The female counterparts in that region are the only group who benefited on
average from participation. With regard to the results in table 4, it becomes clear that this
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finding does not hold for all groups. While three groups clearly gain from participation, i.e.
older unemployed (12.67 percent), long-term unemployed (11.25 percent), and hard-to-place
women indicated by the number of placement propositions (7.79 percent), the others do not
experience any enhancement of the employability. Anyhow, the three significant effects are
above the effects for the whole sample of females in West Germany.
< Include table 4 about here.>
Turning to the estimates for the East German groups reveals a quite similar picture. Again,
most of the estimates are statistically insignificant and participants do neither suffer nor
benefit form participation at all in December 2002. Whereas the results for men in this
region have been significantly negative on average, this finding is confirmed by the result of
one group only, namely participants who have participated in an ALMP programme before
(-3.36 percent). All other estimates do not show significant differences to the nonparticipants’
outcomes. Regarding women, we find long-term unemployed to benefit from participation
(2.45 percent). No significant differences in the employment rates can be established for the
remaining groups.
Together with the results for the West German groups, especially long-term unemployed
participants seem to benefit from programmes (except men in East Germany). This finding is
somewhat satisfactory since JCS are especially arranged for this group. Although the effects
refer to one single month only, the results are plausible. Since occupations in JCS have to be
additional in nature, i.e. they do not compete with regular jobs to avert substitution effects,
the qualifying elements for market-competitive jobs have to be assumed to be negligible.
Thus, the stabilising elements in the design of JCS (to keep in touch with the labour market)
may be more important for this group. Furthermore, participation in JCS comes along with
a stigmatisation of the participant if potential employers suspect a reduced productivity.
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However, long-term unemployment is a stigma itself and hence the additional stigma-effect
of JCS might be of minor importance. To the contrary, for these groups participation must
be seen as an indicator for individual motivation to change the personal situation. Hence,
the stigma-effect of JCS may be more important for short-term unemployed and younger
persons.
Summarising the findings for the selected target groups leads us to three recommendations.
First, due to the unsatisfactory results for most of the groups where no differences in the
employment rates between participants and nonparticipants could be established, JCS have
to be reviewed critically in terms of their goals. Nevertheless, they are no complete failure
for some participants as the results especially for long-term unemployed indicate. Second,
a tighter targeting of programmes to persons for whom the possible negative aspects (like
stigmatisation, lack of human capital transfer etc.) are only of minor importance for the
individual labour market prospects, should help to increase programme efficiency. Third,
since long-term unemployed persons are not the majority of unemployed in Germany, the
number of promotions should be reduced significantly. JCS are definitely sensible for the
most disadvantaged workers, but no means for reducing unemployment permanently for all
unemployed persons.
6.2 Effects for Target Groups Using Target Scores
The results in the previous section show that JCS do not work for most of the analysed
groups. Nevertheless, as the estimates are significantly positive especially for the most disad-
vantaged persons, the long-term unemployed, the question arises whether a higher number of
explicit labour market disadvantages correlates with gains from participation. To answer this
question, we build a simple index which we call ‘target score’ as the sum of the individual
number of disadvantages from section 6.1. Without any particular weighting, each disadvan-
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tage adds one point to the target score. Persons who do not belong to any of the categories
in section 6.1, have a target score of zero. The maximum level is eight, since the categories
for the age groups are mutually exclusive. For example, if an individual is below 25 years
old and has no professional training, she is assigned a target score of two. If an individual
belongs to three of the target groups, the target score is three, and so on. Due to a small
number of individuals with a target score of more than five, we summarise these persons in
one group, i.e. target score five (and more); the other categories refer to the actual number
of disadvantages. We estimate the programme effect on the employment rates in December
2002 within each category of the target score.
< Include table 5 about here.>
If programmes are tailored to the needs of the most disadvantaged and if a higher target
score indicates higher need of assistance than we would expect better outcomes for higher
scores. The estimates of the effects in December 2002 are given in table 5. Ignoring the
significance of the estimates at first, the results show non-negative effects for all groups in
West Germany with a target score greater or equal three. For the lower target score groups,
the picture is not that homogeneous. While men in West Germany with a target score of one
or two are harmed, women with the same score seem to benefit. In East Germany, groups
with a target score of less than three have reduced employment rates in December 2002. For
women with more disadvantages there seems to be no effect, while for men the estimates tend
to be negative except for a target score of three.
The tendencies in the results for West Germany support the hypothesis that a higher
target score coincides with a higher need of assistance and a better fit of programmes for
those groups, but a clear statement is hampered due to the insignificant estimates for most
groups. It is self-evident that our construction of the target score is very simple and is not
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guided by some strong theory. First, the different targeting criteria are included with the
same weights and clearly may not have the same importance for the individual employability.
Second, the selection of groups is incomplete. There are other characteristics that increase or
decrease the individual employability. Third, the construction of the target score leaves room
for further effect heterogeneity. The target score just notes the number of single targets, but
does not identify clear sets of disadvantages where participation improves the employability.
Unfortunately, considering the significance of the results shows that our assumption cannot
be empirically approved. For each of the West German groups only one estimate for the
higher target scores is significant. For men with a target score of five, i.e. five or more
disadvantage criteria on the labour market, the employment rates increase by 14.49 percent
after participation, for women with a target score of four by 11.76 percent. For the other
groups the estimates are insignificant, i.e. no clear increase or decrease in the employment
rates by participation can be established. The estimates for East Germany show a slightly
different picture. The results illustrate that allocating individuals without any of the selected
targeting criteria and therefore a target score of zero to programmes, reduces the employment
rates in December 2002 by 10.14 for men and 8.12 percent for women. Analogously to the
finding for West Germany, there are no further significant results. Since our construction of
the target score is very simple, it has to be reviewed, whether incorporation of further selection
criteria and/or a different weighting of the single targets may improve the significance of the
estimates. Although the estimates are unsatisfying yet, the usage of the target score provides
some practical utility to identify possible sources for effect heterogeneity.
6.3 Targeting by Stratification Matching
The estimated propensity score reflects the individual participation probability conditional
on the relevant observable characteristics. If allocation to the programme is target-oriented,
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a higher participation probability should also correlate with a higher impact of treatment.
Clearly, this argument only holds, if the programmes are tailored according to the needs
of the participants. If this is not the case, i.e. if the programmes have the same effects
for all participants, individuals with low participation probabilities may benefit more since
a high participation probability can to some extent be interpreted as an indicator for bad
labour market prospects. Furthermore, an interesting opportunity arises, if the empirical
evidence supports a positive relationship between a higher participation probability and a
higher impact of treatment. If this is the case, the estimated participation probability could
be used as an allocation instrument, i.e. persons with higher propensity score values should
be primarily allocated to programmes.
An intuitively appealing method to check this hypothesis is stratification matching, also
known as blocking or subclassification. The idea is to divide the sample of participants
and nonparticipants conditional on the propensity score into several strata. Within these
strata, participants and nonparticipants should have approximately the same probability of
treatment. The average treatment effect is estimated within each stratum as if random as-
signment holds. Estimation of the treatment effect for the treated is carried out by weighting
the within-strata average treatment effects by the number of treated units. Stratification
matching can be interpreted as a crude form of non-parametric regression where the un-
known function is approximated by a step function with fixed jump points (Imbens, 2004).
An important issue in employing this estimator is to make sure that the covariates are bal-
anced within each stratum. The distribution among the treatment and comparison group
should be balanced, if the true propensity score is constant. Comparison of the distribution
of covariates of both groups within strata yields a possibility to assess the adequacy of the
statistical model.
To check our hypothesis whether a higher participation probability correlates with a higher
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programme impact, we divide our samples into twenty subclasses each. This division is based
on the estimated propensity scores of the participants.16 Therefore, we have the same number
of participants in each stratum, but different numbers of nonparticipants with approximately
the same scores as the participants. Individuals with the lowest participation probabilities
are placed in stratum 1, persons with the highest participation probabilities are placed in
stratum 20. It can be seen that this stratification leaves meaningful numbers of observations
in each stratum except women in West Germany.
< Include tables 6 and 7 about here. >
The estimated treatment effects for each stratum are presented in table 6 for East Germany
and in table 7 for West Germany. The effectiveness of the programmes can be estimated
by comparing the employment rates of participants and nonparticipants in December 2002
given by E(Y1) and E(Y0) in the tables. The average treatment effect within each stratum,
i.e. the difference of the mean outcomes of the participants and the nonparticipants is also
given (∆). The last lines of the tables provide the average treatment effect on the treated.
Obviously, these effects are similar to those estimated with the NN-matching estimators in
section 5. In addition to the mean outcomes and the effects, the tables also present the
results of the hypothesis testing of equal propensity scores in the treatment and comparison
group. We tested the null hypothesis (H0) that the difference of the mean propensity scores
in both groups is zero. Therefore, the alternative hypothesis (HA) imposes inequality of the
propensity score. The p-values of the HA are given in the tables; if we reject the hypothesis
due to a larger value than 0.05, we assume equality of the propensity scores and therefore
16 Due to the large number of observations in our samples, using the whole range of the propensity scores of
participants and nonparticipants leads to a skewed stratification. Hence, we refer to the propensity scores of
the participants only to reduce this skewness. The choice of twenty strata for each of the four groups emerged
from balancing tests of the propensity score among treated and comparison persons using a smaller number
of blocks.
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balancing of the covariates among both groups.17
The results of the hypothesis tests show that the division into twenty strata provides
approximately equal propensity scores for most groups. The equality is hampered only for
the groups at the borders of the propensity score range. For men in West Germany, strata
1, 5, 7 and 20 are imbalanced, for women in the same region so are strata 1, 17 and 19. In
East Germany the strata with lower participation probabilities are imbalanced. For women
the propensity scores are not balanced in 1 and 2, for men in 1 and 3, but also in stratum 19.
Although we find significant treatment effects for several strata, these findings do not assist
our hypothesis. Taking a look at the results for East Germany (table 6), we find that for the
first four strata (except for women in stratum 1) allocation of persons with a low participation
probability has a tendential n gative influence on the employment chances in December 2002.
For men in this region, this tendency is stable for participants up to stratum 14; from stratum
15 onwards the direction of the effects changes to positive. For women we could not establish a
clear distinction, since most of the effects are insignificant. For participants in West Germany
(table 7) our hypothesis cannot be empirically approved either. One can loosely see that
higher participation probabilities correlate with higher impacts, but these findings may be
inconsistent as the balancing tests above show. It seems that the participation probability
is no adequate measure for effect heterogeneity here and successful integration into regular
employment depends on different compositions of the individual characteristics than selection
into programmes.
17 We also checked the balancing property of stratification by comparing the means of the incorporated vari-
ables in the logit models for participants and nonparticipants within each stratum as suggested by Rosenbaum
and Rubin (1983). The results for selected variables are available on request by the authors.
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7 Conclusion
Previous empirical studies of JCS in Germany have shown that the average effects for par-
ticipating individuals are negative. Whereas this inefficiency may be due to the poor quality
of programmes, it may be also driven by an inefficient allocation of potential participants
to programmes. Allocation of individuals into programmes in Germany is accomplished by
caseworker discretion. On the one hand, a positive aspect of this mechanism is that de-
cisions are based on personal contact. On the other hand, since ALMP consist of very
different programmes, caseworkers may lack knowledge regarding programme impacts. Since
this problem is not specific to Germany, the topic of a potential improvement of allocation
mechanisms has become important in recent literature. Broadly, two categories can be dis-
tinguished: Non-statistical allocation mechanisms like caseworker discretion and statistical
allocation mechanisms called profiling or targeting. Since statistical allocation systems are
not introduced in the German labour market yet, there is no empirical evidence for their
effectiveness.
In this paper we estimate the average treatment effects for men and women in East and
West Germany participating in JCS. Following that we use three strategies to identify possible
effect heterogeneity. We use data on all participants, who started a JCS in February 2000,
and on nonparticipants from January 2000, who were eligible to participate, but did not
enter those schemes in February. The employment effects of JCS are evaluated in December
2002. The results show positive effects for women in West Germany and negative effects for
men and women in East Germany, men in West Germany do neither suffer nor benefit from
participation.
For the three approaches used to analyse effect heterogeneity, we select target groups with
disadvantages on the labour market oriented by the definition of the legal basis in a first
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step. Our findings show that JCS do neither harm nor improve the labour market chances
for most of the groups. Exceptions are long-term unemployed men in West Germany, long-
term unemployed women in both regions, older women and women who are hard-to-place in
West Germany, who benefit from participation. Given these results and remembering that
(re-)integration into regular employment is the main purpose, it has to be recommended that
JCS should be targeted to those benefiting groups and should not be used on large scale. In a
second step, we use these definitions to build up a simple indicator (target score) as the sum of
the individual number of disadvantages. If programmes are tailored to the needs of the more
disadvantaged persons on the labour market, we expect positive impacts for groups with a
higher score. Unfortunately, most of the estimates are insignificant and although the expected
tendency is observable, one has to be cautious with interpretation. Finally, we implement
stratification matching to analyse if a higher participation probability also correlates with
higher impacts. No clear picture can be revealed. The estimated participation probability
is no adequate measure for effect heterogeneity here and successful integration into regular
employment is determined by different compositions of the individual attributes than selection
into programmes. Even though the results could not confirm some of our hypotheses, they
show that heterogeneity in treatment effects is an important topic which has to be considered
more accurately in further research. We have also shown that this might be a way to improve
efficiency of ALMP and hence to allocate scarce resources more effectively.
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Tables
Tab. 1: Estimation Results of the Logit-Models for the Propensity Score
West Germany East Germany
Men Women Men Women
Variable Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
Constant -1.1739 0.2731 -3.1254 0.4533 -5.7880 0.3659 -8.0021 0.3944
Socio-Demographic Variables
Age -0.0599 0.0145 -0.0067 0.0235 0.0901 0.0141 0.1702 0.0136
Age(squared) 0.0004 0.0002 -0.0003 0.0003 -0.0008 0.0002 -0.0019 0.0002
Married -0.1676 0.0612 -0.4483 0.0761 0.2683 0.0506 0.1145 0.0344
Number of children 0.0653 0.0281 -0.0183 0.0439 -0.0335 0.0266 -0.0238 0.0184
German 0.4402 0.0683 0.2825 0.1211 0.6284 0.1966 0.7082 0.2432
Health restrictions
No health restrictions Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Acc. DoR1, 80% and over 0.9160 0.1826 1.3404 0.2578 0.5491 0.2758 1.1375 0.2442
Acc. DoR, 50% to under 80% 0.8052 0.1267 0.6433 0.1978 0.4991 0.1270 0.6032 0.1242
Acc. DoR, 30% to under 50% 1.1190 0.3658 1.9871 0.4246 0.5691 0.1925 0.7999 0.1954
Acc. DoR, 30% to under 50%, no equalis.2 0.2757 0.1570 0.0651 0.2685 -0.0708 0.1721 -0.0725 0.1826
Other health restrictions -0.0472 0.0892 -0.0751 0.1390 -0.1918 0.0716 -0.1422 0.0608
Qualification Variables
Professional training
Without compl. prof. training, no CSE Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Without compl. prof. training, with CSE -0.3364 0.0622 0.2294 0.1334 0.1015 0.0823 0.3428 0.0865
Industrial training -0.6738 0.0692 -0.0808 0.1399 -0.1777 0.0748 0.3315 0.0820
Full-time vocational school -0.7639 0.2685 -0.0734 0.2432 -0.3223 0.2594 0.8588 0.1384
Technical school -0.0987 0.1756 0.7183 0.1927 0.2227 0.1231 1.0166 0.0977
Polytechnic 0.3534 0.2009 1.4983 0.2144 -0.0135 0.2058 1.0388 0.1794
College, University 0.2399 0.1577 1.0221 0.1869 0.0810 0.1354 0.9004 0.1272
Occupational group
Plant cultivation, breeding, fishery 0.2222 0.0927 0.2628 0.2501 0.0092 0.0828 0.2370 0.0670
Mining, mineral extraction -0.5605 0.4657 – – -0.7494 0.5154 – –
Manufacturing Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Technical professions -0.5810 0.1544 -0.1609 0.2605 -0.1954 0.0999 0.2149 0.0819
Service professions -0.3077 0.0544 0.3167 0.0995 -0.1739 0.0478 0.0127 0.0406
Other professions 0.1023 0.1533 0.3933 0.2628 -1.1891 0.2170 -1.2092 0.2860
Professional rank
Worker, not skilled worker Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Worker, skilled worker -0.5499 0.0982 -0.1637 0.1944 -0.1811 0.0597 0.0657 0.0525
White-collar worker, simple occupations 0.0163 0.1152 0.1490 0.1256 0.1809 0.1067 0.2197 0.0605
White-collar worker, advanced occupations 0.0877 0.1536 0.5131 0.1624 -0.2838 0.1662 -0.0404 0.1215
Other -0.0112 0.0563 0.1512 0.1054 0.0345 0.0528 0.1004 0.0437
Qualification (with work experience) -0.3397 0.0745 -0.3139 0.1017 -0.2279 0.0695 -0.1175 0.0527
Career Variables
Duration of last employment (months) -0.0046 0.0005 -0.0033 0.0007 -0.0038 0.0004 -0.0028 0.0003
Duration of unemployment (weeks)
Up to 13 weeks Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Between 13 and 52 weeks 0.2055 0.0616 0.0698 0.0889 0.4673 0.0561 0.2509 0.0511
More than 52 weeks 0.3087 0.0678 0.0888 0.0974 0.4498 0.0599 0.1694 0.0509
Number of placement propositions 0.0494 0.0028 0.0530 0.0042 0.0610 0.0030 0.0919 0.0031
Last contact to job center (weeks) -0.0013 0.0125 0.0520 0.0177 -0.1204 0.0114 -0.0644 0.0085
Rehabilitation attendant -0.1533 0.1185 0.0696 0.2039 0.2958 0.0939 0.1535 0.1024
Placement restrictions -0.3396 0.0989 -0.2654 0.1546 -0.3164 0.0870 -0.3000 0.0825
Programme before unemployment
No further education or programme Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Further education compl., cont. education 0.2292 0.0801 0.5301 0.1043 0.4830 0.0628 0.5263 0.0422
Further education compl., voc. adjustment 0.6479 0.2286 0.4613 0.4466 0.6545 0.0893 0.5634 0.0746
Job-preparative measure -0.4764 1.0285 2.6387 0.5245 1.1431 0.4289 0.3364 0.5250
Job creation scheme 2.1463 0.0777 3.0671 0.1141 1.7272 0.0546 1.5382 0.0418
Rehabilitation measure -0.0929 0.2706 0.9368 0.3406 0.4232 0.2273 0.3780 0.2720
Regional Context Variables3
Cluster Ia – – – – -0.1040 0.1291 0.1421 0.1238
Cluster Ib – – – – -0.3077 0.1248 -0.0242 0.1210
Cluster Ic – – – – -0.2838 0.1361 -0.1841 0.1292
Cluster II -0.2225 0.0730 -0.5666 0.0960 Ref. Ref.
Cluster III -0.1841 0.0722 -0.4601 0.0917 – – – –
Cluster IV -0.0080 0.1002 -0.4530 0.1423 – – – –
Cluster V Ref. Ref. – – – –
No. of Part. 2,140 1,052 2,924 5,035
No. of Nonpart. 44,095 34,227 64,788 76,512
Bold letters indicate significance at the 1% level. Italic letters refer to the 5% level. Ref. denotes the reference category.
– not included in the estimation/ no observations.
1 DoR = Degree of restriction
2 People with accepted degree of restriction, but no equalisation to other persons with the same DoR.
3 See appendix C for further information. 35
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Tab. 2: Some Quality Indicators
West Germany East-Germany
Men Women Men Women
Before Matching
Observations1 46,235 35,271 67,712 81,505
Hit-Rate2 70.6 75.7 74.2 72.2
Pseudo R2 0.1389 0.1775 0.1225 0.1144
F -Test 2,406.8 (41) 1,679.4 (40) 2,951.3 (41) 4,323.3 (40)
Mean of Standardised Bias (in percent)3 14.62 16.08 12.01 10.83
After Matching
Observations4 4,246 1,960 5,846 10,054
Pseudo-R2 0.006 0.009 0.004 0.003
F -Test 38.0 (41) 23.4 (40) 35.3 (41) 39.2 (40)
Mean of Standardised Bias (in percent)3 2.51 3.20 1.78 1.60
1 Observations are the sum of participating and nonparticipating individuals.
2 Hit-rates are computed as follows: If the estimated propensity score is larger than the sample proportion of
persons taking treatment, i.e. Pˆ (X) > P¯ , observations are classified as ‘1’. If Pˆ (X) ≤ P¯ observations are
classified as ‘0’.
3 Mean of Standardised Bias calculated as mean of the single characteristics’ standardised biases.
4 Since we apply NN-matching without replacement and a caliper of 0.02 the number of treated individuals is
reduced after matching by observations off support. The numbers of the treated individuals can be calculated
by dividing the number of observations by 2.
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Tab. 3: Descriptive Statistics for the Selected Target Groups (Partic-
ipants and NonParticipants)
West Germany Men Women
Part. Nonpart. Part. Nonpart.
Variable Shares in percent1
Age < 25 years 21.40 9.30 17.30 7.14
Age > 50 years 16.12 37.27 15.30 35.21
Without professional training 62.62 49.12 45.25 49.94
Without work experience 12.76 7.44 15.11 7.44
Long-term unemployed (more than 52 weeks)2 39.16∗ 40.79∗ 39.16∗ 42.16∗
More than 5 placement propositions 49.21 21.21 42.49 17.05
Vocational rehabilitation3 5.19 6.27 4.18 3.11
Placement restrictions4 16.54 21.58 14.07 17.51
Participation in ALMP before unemployment 28.55 10.05 33.17 8.86
East Germany Men Women
Part. Nonpart. Part. Nonpart.
Variable Shares in percent1
Age < 25 years 8.21 13.49 2.94 6.36
Age > 50 years 38.06 31.05 30.69 35.71
Without professional training 28.63 23.10 22.26 25.85
Without work experience 10.02∗ 10.84∗ 9.89∗ 10.38∗
Long-term unemployed (more than 52 weeks)2 37.55 30.75 49.45 48.89
More than 5 placement propositions 41.24 17.87 37.28 15.32
Vocational rehabilitation3 7.46∗ 7.48∗ 3.10 4.60
Placement restrictions4 13.47 16.16 7.47 11.92
Participation in ALMP before unemployment 47.16 17.08 57.28 27.85
∗ Denotes approximate equality of shares between treatment and comparison group (5% significance
level).
1 Shares are computed with respect to the number of participating/nonparticipating individuals in
the according main group.
2 Unemployment duration for participants and nonparticipants at end of January 2000.
3 Persons in vocational rehabilitation are no more able to work in their profession and have to be
qualified for a new profession.
4 Placement restrictions refer to the assessment of the caseworker that health restrictions of the
job-seeker reduce the number the job opportunities.
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Tab. 4: Effects for Selected Target Groups in December 2002
West Germany Men Women
Group Effect Std. Err. No. of
Partici-
pants
Effect Std. Err. No. of
Partici-
pants
Age < 25 years -0.0276 0.0326 440 -0.0679 0.0573 161
Age > 50 years 0.0262 0.0241 344 0.1267 0.0562 159
Without professional training -0.0046 0.0169 1,323 0.0425 0.0297 451
Without work experience -0.0040 0.0414 256 -0.0703 0.0595 128
Long-term unemployed (more than 52 weeks) 0.0503 0.0169 832 0.1125 0.0326 403
More than 5 placement propositions 0.0300 0.0176 1,039 0.0779 0.0302 400
Vocational rehabilitation1 0.0300 0.0603 106 0.0571 0.0845 36
Placement restrictions2 0.0153 0.0287 335 0.1026 0.0562 130
Participation in ALMP before unemployment -0.0323 0.0217 594 0.0541 0.0313 279
East Germany Men Women
Group Effect Std. Err. No. of
Partici-
pants
Effect Std. Err. No. of
Partici-
pants
Age < 25 years -0.0437 0.0503 240 0.0278 0.0589 148
Age > 50 years -0.0130 0.0079 1,109 -0.0020 0.0093 1,529
Without professional training 0.0120 0.0161 833 -0.0215 0.0156 1,119
Without work experience 0.0069 0.0349 292 0.0225 0.0220 495
Long-term unemployed (more than 52 weeks) -0.0018 0.0093 1,097 0.0245 0.0080 2,487
More than 5 placement propositions -0.0264 0.0145 1,201 -0.0054 0.0108 1,869
Vocational rehabilitation1 -0.0140 0.0369 217 -0.0068 0.0418 154
Placement restrictions2 0.0189 0.0254 394 -0.0166 0.0217 368
Participation in ALMP before unemployment -0.0336 0.0114 1,378 -0.0028 0.0079 2,877
Effects are estimated using 1-NN matching without replacement and caliper of 0.02. Bold letters
indicate significance on a 5% level. Standard errors calculated by bootstrapping with 50 replications.
1 Persons in vocational rehabilitation are no more able to work in their profession and have to be qualified
for a new profession.
2 Placement restrictions refer to the assessment of the caseworker that health restrictions of the job-seeker
reduce the number the job opportunities.
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Tab. 5: Estimated Effects for the Target Scores1 in
December 2002
West Germany Men Women
Target-Score Effect Std. Err. No. of
Partici-
pants
Effect Std. Err. No. of
Partici-
pants
0 0.0182 0.0850 55 -0.0133 0.0789 76
1 -0.0138 0.0363 295 0.0518 0.0401 208
2 -0.0180 0.0212 740 0.0316 0.0474 305
3 0.0256 0.0261 652 0.0276 0.0339 257
4 0.0199 0.0331 274 0.1176 0.0527 100
5 and more 0.1449 0.0591 84 0.0455 0.1033 32
East Germany Men Women
Target-Score Effect Std. Err. No. of
Partici-
pants
Effect Std. Err. No. of
Partici-
pants
0 -0.1014 0.0484 141 -0.0812 0.0333 271
1 -0.0293 0.0198 581 -0.0064 0.0118 1,090
2 -0.0225 0.0155 937 -0.0093 0.0110 1,754
3 0.0013 0.0191 821 0.0112 0.0103 1,289
4 -0.0161 0.0213 322 0.0062 0.0159 508
5 and more -0.0532 0.0448 94 0.0000 0.0393 106
Effects are estimated using 1-NN matching without replacement and
caliper of 0.02. Bold letters indicate significance on a 5% level. Stan-
dard errors calculated by bootstrapping with 50 replications.
1 Target Scores are calculated as the sum of the number of individual dis-
advantages from the selection of the target groups.
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Tab. 6: Results for Stratification Matching in East Germany
Strata Men Women
No. of
Obs.
p-value
for HA
1
E(Y1),
E(Y0)
∆ No. of
Obs.
p-value
for HA
1
E(Y1),
E(Y0)
∆
1 Participants 146 0.1781 251 0.1355
Nonparticipants 16,171
0.0001
0.2366
-0.0585
18,980
0.0002
0.1221
0.0134
2 Participants 146 0.1781 252 0.1032
Nonparticipants 9,532
0.9303
0.2446
-0.0666
11,309
0.0168
0.1267
-0.0235
3 Participants 146 0.1233 252 0.1190
Nonparticipants 7,657
0.0218
0.2130
-0.0897
7,396
0.1633
0.1458
-0.0267
4 Participants 146 0.1575 252 0.0913
Nonparticipants 5,529
0.3283
0.1923
-0.0347
5,641
0.1581
0.1480
-0.0568
5 Participants 147 0.0816 251 0.1633
Nonparticipants 4,432
0.0537
0.1588
-0.0772
5,098
0.2593
0.1497
0.0137
6 Participants 146 0.1233 252 0.1111
Nonparticipants 3,093
0.2077
0.1478
-0.0245
4,298
0.1555
0.1356
-0.0245
7 Participants 146 0.0822 252 0.1627
Nonparticipants 2,727
0.9609
0.1298
-0.0476
3,852
0.5875
0.1449
0.0178
8 Participants 146 0.0685 252 0.1071
Nonparticipants 2,640
0.4523
0.1182
-0.0497
2,804
0.3221
0.1566
-0.0494
9 Participants 146 0.1027 251 0.1036
Nonparticipants 2,116
0.5098
0.1229
-0.0201
2,785
0.2600
0.1645
-0.0609
10 Participants 147 0.1020 252 0.0952
Nonparticipants 2,037
0.7602
0.1193
-0.0173
2,276
0.1690
0.1375
-0.0423
11 Participants 146 0.0616 252 0.1190
Nonparticipants 1,448
0.4703
0.1057
-0.0440
2,228
0.3124
0.1382
-0.0192
12 Participants 146 0.0959 252 0.1508
Nonparticipants 1,592
0.4960
0.1124
-0.0165
1,665
0.9466
0.1375
0.0133
13 Participants 146 0.0411 251 0.1036
Nonparticipants 1,132
0.3424
0.1140
-0.0729
1,651
0.9627
0.1187
-0.0151
14 Participants 146 0.0616 252 0.1310
Nonparticipants 980
0.8348
0.0990
-0.0373
1,471
0.0541
0.0938
0.0371
15 Participants 147 0.1224 252 0.0992
Nonparticipants 948
0.7724
0.0928
0.0296
1,143
0.2967
0.0866
0.0126
16 Participants 146 0.0890 252 0.1071
Nonparticipants 772
0.8285
0.0738
0.0152
1,124
0.9422
0.0907
0.0164
17 Participants 146 0.0753 251 0.0797
Nonparticipants 600
0.9521
0.0500
0.0253
910
0.3790
0.0868
-0.0071
18 Participants 146 0.0822 252 0.0913
Nonparticipants 645
0.4996
0.0419
0.0403
749
0.6872
0.1041
-0.0129
19 Participants 146 0.0548 252 0.1349
Nonparticipants 479
0.0053
0.0355
0.0193
648
0.7600
0.1157
0.0192
20 Participants 147 0.0748 252 0.1548
Nonparticipants 258
0.6655
0.0504
0.0244
442
0.6248
0.1281
0.0267
ATT: -0.0251 -0.0084
Bold letters indicate significance at the 1% level. Italic letters refer to the 5% level. Subgroups are
constructed using the estimated propensity score of the participants from the logit model reported in
Table 1.
1 Testing H0 : P (Z,D = 1) − P (Z,D = 0) = 0. Corresponding HA: P (Z,D = 1) − P (Z,D = 0) 6= 0 in
stratum.
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Tab. 7: Results for Stratification Matching in West Germany
Strata Men Women
No. of
Obs.
p-value
for HA
1
E(Y1),
E(Y0)
∆ No. of
Obs.
p-value
for HA
1
E(Y1),
E(Y0)
∆
1 Participants 107 0.1869 52 0.3846
Nonparticipants 14,220
0.0000
0.1105
0.0764
12,954
0.0005
0.1197
0.2649
2 Participants 107 0.1963 53 0.3585
Nonparticipants 4,913
0.1905
0.2009
-0.0046
4,119
0.1774
0.2391
0.1194
3 Participants 107 0.2336 52 0.3077
Nonparticipants 4,065
0.2521
0.2303
0.0034
2,754
0.5364
0.2876
0.0201
4 Participants 107 0.2150 53 0.3962
Nonparticipants 3,522
0.8130
0.2504
-0.0355
2,782
0.7943
0.2793
0.1169
5 Participants 107 0.2617 53 0.3019
Nonparticipants 2,403
0.0430
0.2339
0.0278
1,742
0.6186
0.3129
-0.0110
6 Participants 107 0.1682 52 0.2692
Nonparticipants 2,384
0.5197
0.2680
-0.0998
1,556
0.7633
0.3033
-0.0341
7 Participants 107 0.2056 53 0.3585
Nonparticipants 2,331
0.0045
0.2540
-0.0484
1,347
0.9023
0.3215
0.0370
8 Participants 107 0.2056 52 0.2885
Nonparticipants 1,748
0.4353
0.2649
-0.0593
1,366
0.6411
0.3192
-0.0307
9 Participants 107 0.2336 53 0.2830
Nonparticipants 1,533
0.2616
0.2701
-0.0364
1,214
0.9991
0.3311
-0.0481
10 Participants 107 0.2804 53 0.3396
Nonparticipants 1,229
0.3627
0.2799
0.0005
841
0.6523
0.3639
-0.0242
11 Participants 107 0.1963 52 0.3269
Nonparticipants 1,049
0.1798
0.2793
-0.0831
611
0.8903
0.3453
-0.0184
12 Participants 107 0.2991 53 0.2830
Nonparticipants 929
0.5893
0.2648
0.0343
733
0.3965
0.3438
-0.0608
13 Participants 107 0.2617 52 0.3846
Nonparticipants 751
0.6554
0.2690
-0.0073
623
0.2097
0.3949
-0.0102
14 Participants 107 0.2617 53 0.3208
Nonparticipants 684
0.3683
0.2529
0.0088
571
0.3294
0.3468
-0.0260
15 Participants 107 0.2056 53 0.4340
Nonparticipants 661
0.5013
0.2723
-0.0667
447
0.2556
0.3154
0.1185
16 Participants 107 0.2430 52 0.3077
Nonparticipants 551
0.4412
0.1978
0.0452
265
0.0935
0.2906
0.0171
17 Participants 107 0.1402 53 0.3208
Nonparticipants 473
0.8646
0.1734
-0.0332
108
0.0282
0.2593
0.0615
18 Participants 107 0.1308 52 0.3654
Nonparticipants 295
0.0955
0.1186
0.0122
78
0.7560
0.1667
0.1987
19 Participants 107 0.2617 53 0.3396
Nonparticipants 191
0.4283
0.1204
0.1413
70
0.0389
0.1714
0.1682
20 Participants 107 0.2710 53 0.3585
Nonparticipants 163
0.0038
0.1104
0.1606
38
0.1637
0.0870
0.2715
ATT: 0.0018 0.0565
Bold letters indicate significance at the 1% level. Italic letters refer to the 5% level. Subgroups are
constructed using the estimated propensity score of the participants from the logit model reported in
Table 1.
1 Testing H0 : P (Z,D = 1) − P (Z,D = 0) = 0. Corresponding HA: P (Z,D = 1) − P (Z,D = 0) 6= 0 in
stratum.
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Figures
Fig. 1: ATT (Employment) between February 2000 and December 2002
West Germany
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A The Matching Estimator
The general form of matching estimators is given by:
∆MAT =
1
N1
∑
i∈I1
[Y 1i −
∑
j∈I0
WN0(i, j)Y
0
j ], (5)
where N0 is the number of observations in the comparison group I0 and N1 is the number of
observations in the treatment group I1. We estimate the effect of treatment for each treated
observation i ∈ I1 in the treatment group, by contrasting her outcome with treatment with a
weighted average of comparison group observations j ∈ I0. Matching estimators differ in the
weights attached to the members of the comparison group (Heckman, Ichimura, Smith, and
Todd, 1998), whereWN0(i, j) is the weight placed on the j-th individual from the comparison
group in constructing the counterfactual for the i-th individual of the treatment group. The
weights always satisfy
∑
jWN0(i, j) = 1, ∀i, that is the total weight of all comparisons sums up
to one for each treated individual. Define a neighbourhood C(Pi) for each i in the participant
sample and denote as neighbours for i those nonparticipants j ∈ I0 for whom Pj ∈ C(Pi).
Individuals matched to i are those people in the set Ai where Ai = {j ∈ I0|Pj ∈ C(Pi)}.
Nearest neighbour (NN) matching sets
CNN (Pi) = min
j
‖Pi − Pj‖, j ∈ N0, (6)
where ‖(.)‖ is obtained through a distance metric. Doing so, the nonparticipant with the
value of Pj that is closest to Pi is selected as the match, therefore:
WNNN0N1(i, j) =

1 if ‖Pi − Pj‖ = minj‖Pi − Pj‖
0 otherwise
. (7)
Several variants of NN matching are proposed, e.g. NN matching ‘with’ and ‘without re-
placement’. In the former case a nonparticipating individual can be used more than once as
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a match, whereas in the latter case it is considered only once. Matching with replacement
involves a trade-off between bias and variance. If we allow replacement, the average quality
of the matching will increase and the bias will decrease. NN matching faces the risk of bad
matches if the closest neighbour is far away. This can be avoided by imposing a tolerance on
the maximum distance ‖Pi−Pj‖ allowed. This form of matching, caliper matching (Cochrane
and Rubin, 1973), imposes the condition:
‖Pi − Pj‖ < ², j ∈ N0, (8)
where ² is a pre-specified level of tolerance. The weights for caliper matching (CM) are given
by:
WCM (i, j) =

1 if ‖Pi − Pj‖ = minj ‖Pi − Pj‖ ∧ ‖Pi − Pj‖ < ²
0 else
. (9)
Treated observations for whom no matches within the neighbourhood C(Pi) = {Pj |‖Pi −
Pj‖ < ²} can be found are excluded from the analysis. Hence, caliper matching is one form
of imposing a common support condition.
B Data Sources and Attributes
Table B.1 gives detailed information of the data sources and the included attributes. A
selection of these attributes is used to estimate the participation probability.
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Tab. B.1: Data Sources and Attributes
Data Source Attributes
MTG1 BewA and ST42 a) Socio-demographic: age, gender, marital status, number
of children, nationality, health restrictions
b) Qualification: graduation, professional training, occupa-
tional group, position in last occupation, work experience, ap-
praisal of qualification by the placement officer
c) Labour market history: duration of unemployment, du-
ration of last occupation, number of job offers, occupational
rehabilitation, programme participation before unemployment
ST11TN3 d) Programme: institution that receives subsidy, activity
sector, time of qualification and/or practical training during
programme, begin and end of programme (payment of the
subsidy), entry and leave of the participant, duration of pro-
gramme
1 Programme participants master data set (Maßnahme-Teilnehmer-Gesamtdatei, MTG)
2 Job-seekers data base (Bewerberangebotsdatei, BewA) and adjusted version for statistical pur-
poses (ST4)
3 Programme participants of subsidised employment data set (ST11TN)
C Regional Context Variables
The classification of the labour office districts was undertaken by a project group of the FEA.
The aim of the project was to enhance the comparability of the labour office districts for a
more efficient allocation of funds. The 181 labour office districts were split into twelve types
of office districts with similar labour market circumstances. The comparability of the office
districts is build upon several labour market characteristics. The most important criteria are
the underemployment quota and the corrected population density. The underemployment
quota is defined as the relation of the sum of unemployed individuals and participants in
several ALMP programmes to the sum of all employed persons and these participants. The
corrected population density is used to improve the comparability of rural labour office dis-
tricts with metropolitan and city areas. In addition to that, the vacancy quota describing the
relation of all reported vacancies at the labour office, the placement quota, that contains the
number of placements to the number of employments, and the quota of people who achieve
maintenance allowance in relation to the underemployment quota are used. Furthermore, an
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indicator for the tertiarisation level built on the number of employed persons in agricultural
occupations and an indicator for the seasonal unemployment are considered.
The twelve types of comparable labour office districts can be summarised into five types for
strategic purposes. Since almost all labour office districts in East Germany belong to the first
of these five strategic types, we use the finer typing of three groups here. For West Germany
we use the remaining four types for strategic purposes. Table C.1 presents the classification
used in the analysis, containing a short description of the clusters and the number of labour
offices in each clusters.
Tab. C.1: Classification of labour office districts in Germany
Cluster Description No.
Ia East German labour office districts with worst labour market conditions 5
Ib East German labour office districts with bad labour market conditions 23
Ic East German labour office districts with high unemployment 5
II Labour office districts dominated by large cities 21
III West German labour office districts with rural elements, medium-sized
industry and average unemployment
63
IV West German centers with good labour market prospects 10
V West German labour office districts with the best labour market
prospects
47
No. describes the number of labour offices in cluster.
Source: Blien et al.(2004)
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Ancillary Appendix
to
Identifying Effect Heterogeneity to Improve the Efficiency of
Job Creation Schemes in Germany
This appendix will not be included in the paper but is available to as additional information.
Contents
This appendix includes the results of the logit estimations for the selected target groups and the target scores in
Tables 1 to 16. In addition, it contains the results of the means of the standardised biases for these groups in
Table 17. Figures 1 to 6 present the checks of the balancing property of our stratification by comparing the means
of the incorporated variables in the logit models for participants and nonparticipants within each stratum.
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1 Results of the Participation Probability Estimation for
Target Groups and Target Scores
Tab. 1: Estimation Results of the Logit-Models for the Propensity Score for Men in West
Germany
Age < 25 Age > 50 Without
professional
training
Without work
experience
Variable Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
Constant 19.2224 5.3552 -43.6753 20.9759 0.4978 0.3218 0.9086 0.7966
Socio-Demographic Variables
Age -1.8352 0.5199 1.5942 0.7585 -0.1449 0.0179 -0.1705 0.0472
Age(squared) 0.0390 0.0125 -0.0156 0.0068 0.0014 0.0002 0.0014 0.0006
Married 0.0387 0.1929 -0.0389 0.1291 -0.1602 0.0800 0.0442 0.2047
Number of children 0.0755 0.1666 -0.0547 0.0774 0.0976 0.0340 0.1014 0.1015
German 0.3141 0.1399 -0.0853 0.1777 0.4157 0.0754 0.0465 0.1798
Health restrictions
No health restrictions Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Acc. DoR1, 80% and over 1.0806 0.5670 0.3597 0.5474 1.0216 0.2378 0.5442 0.5945
Acc. DoR, 50% to under 80% 0.4628 0.5570 0.5372 0.2575 0.7344 0.1806 1.0699 0.4172
Acc. DoR, 30% to under 50% – – 1.2877 0.5559 0.7656 0.6504 3.0225 1.0560
Acc. DoR, 30% to under 50%, no equalis.2 – – 0.0615 0.2890 0.0593 0.2356 0.4056 0.5639
Other health restrictions -0.1973 0.2862 -0.0312 0.1986 -0.1524 0.1221 -0.1985 0.3172
Qualification Variables
Professional training
Without compl. prof. training, no CSE Ref. Ref. – – Ref.
Without compl. prof. training, with CSE -0.5419 0.1213 0.2171 0.2055 – – -0.2807 0.1766
Industrial training -2.0355 0.2144 0.1957 0.2135 – – -1.1182 0.2098
Full-time vocational school – – -0.5766 0.7566 – – -0.9716 0.5937
Technical school – – 0.7335 0.3761 – – -1.4109 0.7459
Polytechnic – – 0.5298 0.4771 – – 0.1760 0.5737
College, University – – 1.2210 0.3538 – – 0.1697 0.3763
Occupational group
Plant cultivation, breeding, fishery -0.0987 0.2409 0.5068 0.2435 0.1700 0.1090 0.2699 0.2992
Mining, mineral extraction -0.3894 0.5229 1.6121 0.8025
Manufacturing Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Technical professions -0.4096 1.0465 -0.2693 0.2824 -0.4265 0.3578 -0.3647 0.3876
Service professions -0.4072 0.1344 -0.4416 0.1363 -0.3708 0.0682 -0.1020 0.1635
Other professions -0.3725 0.2166 -1.7136 1.0186 0.0605 0.1724 -0.0556 0.2798
Professional rank
Worker, not skilled worker Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Worker, skilled worker -0.9983 0.3401 -0.6198 0.2054 -0.2760 0.1456 -0.5143 0.4088
White-collar worker, simple occupations 0.1994 0.3773 -0.2276 0.2518 -0.3988 0.2080 0.6075 0.3716
White-collar worker, advanced occupations 1.4763 1.0867 -0.5604 0.3153 0.0212 0.3928 1.2666 0.4649
Other 0.3160 0.1296 -0.5193 0.1477 -0.0628 0.0665 0.2073 0.1897
Qualification (with work experience) -0.3040 0.1245 0.4182 0.4037 -0.3672 0.0945
Career Variables
Duration of last employment (months) -0.0136 0.0062 -0.0045 0.0007 -0.0048 0.0007 -0.0010 0.0020
Duration of unemployment (weeks)
Up to 13 weeks Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Between 13 and 52 weeks -0.1889 0.1179 0.0003 0.1684 0.0588 0.0761 -0.2072 0.1622
More than 52 weeks 0.7101 0.2177 -0.7455 0.1634 0.3454 0.0853 0.5780 0.2070
Number of placement propositions 0.0609 0.0107 0.0849 0.0077 0.0518 0.0039 0.0690 0.0104
Last contact to job center (weeks) -0.1044 0.0424 0.0725 0.0248 -0.0733 0.0186 -0.0422 0.0436
Rehabilitation attendant 0.4729 0.3783 0.0499 0.2767 -0.4860 0.1826 -0.1064 0.3513
Placement restrictions -0.0452 0.3690 -0.4378 0.2095 -0.1973 0.1389 -0.3973 0.3343
Programme before unemployment
No further education or programme Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Further education compl., cont. education -0.4245 0.3299 0.1782 0.2440 0.0688 0.1108 -0.0664 0.2518
Further education compl., voc. adjustment 1.2458 0.6416 1.2807 0.4213 0.5829 0.3074 – –
Job-preparative measure -0.5547 1.0609 – – -0.6492 1.0378 – –
Job creation scheme 1.6855 0.2160 2.0873 0.1748 1.9736 0.0974 2.0412 0.2784
Rehabilitation measure -0.7142 0.8680 – – 0.1987 0.4158 0.6798 0.4625
Regional Context Variables
Cluster II 0.4709 0.1986 -0.3371 0.1723 -0.0203 0.0972 0.2019 0.2716
Cluster III 0.6413 0.1906 -0.2342 0.1699 -0.0732 0.0981 0.2807 0.2715
Cluster IV 0.9096 0.2530 -0.1870 0.2316 0.0923 0.1329 0.5891 0.3539
Cluster V Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Bold letters indicate significance at the 1% level. Italic letters refer to the 5% level. – not included in the estimation/ no
observations. Ref. denotes the reference category.
1 DoR = Degree of restriction
2 People with accepted degree of restriction, but no equalisation to other persons with the same DoR.
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Tab. 2: Estimation Results of the Logit-Models for the Propensity Score for Men in West
Germany
Long-term
unemployed
More than 5
plac. prop.
Vocational
rehabilitation
Placement
restr.
Variable Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
Constant -3.4319 0.6632 -3.0821 0.5156 -0.2817 1.5120 -1.7075 1.0243
Socio-Demographic Variables
Age 0.1343 0.0322 0.0497 0.0264 -0.0089 0.0785 0.0604 0.0458
Age(squared) -0.0022 0.0004 -0.0006 0.0003 -0.0003 0.0010 -0.0011 0.0005
Married -0.0299 0.0935 0.0156 0.0864 -0.0380 0.2723 -0.2144 0.1507
Number of children 0.0400 0.0416 0.0415 0.0380 -0.1511 0.1534 0.0570 0.0745
German 0.3684 0.1124 0.3881 0.1053 0.0846 0.4137 0.3481 0.2152
Health restrictions
No health restrictions Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Acc. DoR1, 80% and over 0.7115 0.2666 0.8719 0.3054 – – -0.5085 0.4461
Acc. DoR, 50% to under 80% 0.6035 0.1927 1.0262 0.1931 -0.3366 0.3719 -0.5368 0.4159
Acc. DoR, 30% to under 50% 0.7528 0.6132 0.5902 0.6946 0.4220 0.6799 – –
Acc. DoR, 30% to under 50%, no equalis.2 0.4390 0.2075 0.6419 0.2142 -0.8671 0.4378 -1.2335 0.4444
Other health restrictions -0.1283 0.1327 -0.0250 0.1246 -1.3746 0.3405 -1.4093 0.4097
Qualification Variables
Professional training
Without compl. prof. training, no CSE Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Without compl. prof. training, with CSE -0.1748 0.1003 -0.2001 0.0954 -0.0945 0.3512 -0.1272 0.1670
Industrial training -0.2282 0.1082 -0.4294 0.1004 0.0491 0.3290 -0.2994 0.1700
Full-time vocational school -0.4562 0.4059 -0.2681 0.3126 0.9032 0.7261 -0.7384 0.6508
Technical school -0.2446 0.3231 0.0112 0.2594 0.6162 0.7099 0.4007 0.4501
Polytechnic 0.3810 0.3187 0.5062 0.2751 – – 1.0165 1.0994
College, University 0.5130 0.2410 0.1574 0.2472 – – -0.0780 1.0816
Occupational group
Plant cultivation, breeding, fishery 0.2409 0.1515 0.2631 0.1319 0.5692 0.4419 0.0848 0.2380
Mining, mineral extraction -0.4042 0.6084 -0.6981 1.0886 – – – –
Manufacturing Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Technical professions -0.2679 0.2184 -0.4379 0.2124 -0.1689 0.5774 -0.9056 0.5052
Service professions -0.3318 0.0840 -0.3393 0.0791 -0.0619 0.2315 -0.3566 0.1284
Other professions -0.1265 0.3543 -0.3269 0.3786 -0.4286 0.5426 -0.7632 0.3577
Professional rank
Worker, not skilled worker Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Worker, skilled worker -0.3017 0.1592 -0.3710 0.1308 -0.4078 0.4221 -0.2729 0.2407
White-collar worker, simple occupations -0.1964 0.1931 0.1210 0.1582 0.0609 0.6174 0.0401 0.3178
White-collar worker, advanced occupations -0.4424 0.2336 0.2259 0.2207 -0.1126 1.0978 -0.2111 0.6009
Other -0.3765 0.0884 -0.0569 0.0824 -0.2908 0.2805 -0.2594 0.1448
Qualification (with work experience) -0.3806 0.1323 -0.2136 0.1291 -0.1053 0.2895 -0.1547 0.2074
Career Variables
Duration of last employment (months) -0.0041 0.0006 -0.0018 0.0009 -0.0031 0.0023 -0.0045 0.0011
Duration of unemployment (weeks)
Up to 13 weeks – – Ref. Ref. Ref.
Between 13 and 52 weeks – – 0.1815 0.0947 -0.3252 0.2785 -0.2131 0.1642
More than 52 weeks – – 0.0554 0.0983 -0.5193 0.2829 -0.4451 0.1620
Number of placement propositions 0.0376 0.0044 – – 0.0466 0.0129 0.0645 0.0069
Last contact to job center (weeks) 0.0003 0.0157 0.0575 0.0166 0.0195 0.0554 0.0030 0.0296
Rehabilitation attendant -0.4055 0.1786 -0.3357 0.1743 – – -0.2406 0.1419
Placement restrictions -0.4780 0.1442 -0.1814 0.1411 -0.4808 0.2471 – –
Programme before unemployment
No further education or programme Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Further education compl., cont. education 0.1148 0.1231 0.0099 0.1057 0.8633 0.3785 0.3985 0.2114
Further education compl., voc. adjustment 0.3810 0.3328 0.6754 0.2618 0.9562 0.8129 -0.1987 0.6269
Job-preparative measure – – – – – – – –
Job creation scheme 1.2748 0.1195 1.7545 0.1039 2.3799 0.3687 2.4849 0.1771
Rehabilitation measure -0.3715 0.4346 -0.2587 0.4404 0.1933 0.3239 -0.4136 0.4035
Regional Context Variables
Cluster II -0.5906 0.1182 -0.2395 0.1064 -0.7510 0.3158 -0.5914 0.1775
Cluster III -0.5332 0.1211 -0.2596 0.1061 -0.5817 0.2976 -0.4404 0.1707
Cluster IV -0.1169 0.1613 -0.1289 0.1458 0.1469 0.3827 -0.0153 0.2310
Cluster V Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Bold letters indicate significance at the 1% level. Italic letters refer to the 5% level. – not included in the estimation/ no
observations. Ref. denotes the reference category.
1 DoR = Degree of restriction
2 People with accepted degree of restriction, but no equalisation to other persons with the same DoR.
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Tab. 3: Estimation Results of the Logit-Models for the Propensity Score for Men in West
Germany
ALMP part. Target Score=0 Target Score=1 Target Score=2
Variable Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
Constant -1.1523 0.6245 -12.7292 5.2292 -9.5376 1.3108 -3.1125 0.6067
Socio-Demographic Variables
Age 0.0022 0.0318 0.4404 0.2683 0.2551 0.0596 0.0216 0.0308
Age(squared) -0.0001 0.0004 -0.0044 0.0034 -0.0030 0.0007 -0.0007 0.0004
Married -0.0473 0.1167 -1.1781 0.4002 -0.4564 0.1569 -0.0951 0.1049
Number of children -0.0607 0.0569 -0.0085 0.2005 0.1943 0.0653 0.0563 0.0490
German 0.3607 0.1521 -0.7306 0.4188 0.6747 0.2091 0.6053 0.1152
Health restrictions
No health restrictions Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Acc. DoR1, 80% and over 1.2038 0.3569 – – 1.1736 0.5110 0.1174 0.5047
Acc. DoR, 50% to under 80% 0.8403 0.2372 0.8950 1.1553 1.1693 0.3166 0.8766 0.2375
Acc. DoR, 30% to under 50% 1.5702 0.5424 – – 1.4680 1.0473 0.8693 0.6953
Acc. DoR, 30% to under 50%, no equalis.2 0.7426 0.2627 – – 0.0180 0.5254 0.2812 0.3021
Other health restrictions -0.0598 0.1701 -0.2893 0.6209 -0.1991 0.2452 -0.0052 0.1478
Qualification Variables
Professional training
Without compl. prof. training, no CSE Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Without compl. prof. training, with CSE -0.2901 0.1233 – – -0.7805 0.2322 -0.4602 0.1046
Industrial training -0.4386 0.1317 -1.3327 0.7054 0.0507 0.2526 -0.3343 0.1485
Full-time vocational school -1.1618 0.5301 – – 0.2700 0.5206 -0.1708 0.4250
Technical school 0.0174 0.3089 -0.1781 0.8019 0.7426 0.3997 0.2159 0.3149
Polytechnic 0.6798 0.3511 – – 1.0705 0.4461 0.9360 0.3205
College, University 0.4395 0.2963 0.0461 0.7112 0.7425 0.3807 0.7509 0.2749
Occupational group
Plant cultivation, breeding, fishery 0.3444 0.1555 1.1522 0.4853 0.0668 0.2894 0.5773 0.1511
Mining, mineral extraction 0.7208 0.5750 – – – – -0.4393 0.7264
Manufacturing Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Technical professions -1.0490 0.2980 -1.4744 0.8222 -0.9471 0.3448 -0.4577 0.2415
Service professions -0.3799 0.1058 -0.6599 0.3811 -0.2307 0.1433 -0.2812 0.0926
Other professions -0.4823 0.4468 1.2718 1.1861 -0.0689 0.5340 0.2322 0.2657
Professional rank
Worker, not skilled worker Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Worker, skilled worker -0.4017 0.1967 -0.9997 0.4991 -0.6029 0.2295 -0.4647 0.1637
White-collar worker, simple occupations 0.0948 0.2312 -0.1965 0.5315 0.1456 0.2420 -0.2424 0.2119
White-collar worker, advanced occupations 0.0816 0.2888 -0.1395 0.6067 0.3616 0.3252 -0.0408 0.2406
Other -0.7330 0.1050 -0.4018 0.3748 -0.0203 0.1547 -0.0289 0.0936
Qualification (with work experience) -0.0088 0.1505 – – 0.5903 0.4101 0.6133 0.1955
Career Variables
Duration of last employment (months) -0.0059 0.0014 -0.0051 0.0037 -0.0054 0.0013 -0.0040 0.0007
Duration of unemployment (weeks)
Up to 13 weeks Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Between 13 and 52 weeks -0.3224 0.1194 1.0955 0.3335 0.9276 0.1498 -0.0073 0.0994
More than 52 weeks -0.5737 0.1241 0.5773 0.2612 0.0192 0.1414
Number of placement propositions 0.0268 0.0056 0.3188 0.0820 0.0354 0.0095 0.0229 0.0062
Last contact to job center (weeks) 0.0372 0.0225 -0.1381 0.1047 -0.0360 0.0381 0.0174 0.0207
Rehabilitation attendant -0.4080 0.1929 – – -0.8100 1.0488 -0.1955 0.3191
Placement restrictions -0.0933 0.1821 – – -0.9641 0.4065 -0.7972 0.2152
Programme before unemployment
No further education or programme – – – – Ref. Ref.
Further education compl., cont. education – – – – -0.0058 0.3441 -0.0937 0.1750
Further education compl., voc. adjustment – – – – – – 0.1002 0.6361
Job-preparative measure – – – – – – – –
Job creation scheme – – – – 3.5543 0.4890 2.5153 0.2058
Rehabilitation measure – – – – – – -0.2777 0.7435
Regional Context Variables
Cluster II -0.1859 0.1521 0.3537 0.4333 -0.5475 0.1710 -0.2403 0.1240
Cluster III -0.0564 0.1482 0.0459 0.4370 -0.5184 0.1667 -0.1566 0.1220
Cluster IV 0.0737 0.2300 -0.0873 0.7085 -0.5733 0.2596 0.1244 0.1616
Cluster V Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Bold letters indicate significance at the 1% level. Italic letters refer to the 5% level.– not included in the estimation/ no
observations. Ref. denotes the reference category.
1 DoR = Degree of restriction
2 People with accepted degree of restriction, but no equalisation to other persons with the same DoR.
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Tab. 4: Estimation Results of the Logit-Models for the Propensity Score
for Men in West Germany
Target Score=3 Target Score=4 Target Score=5
Variable Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
Constant -2.4589 0.5681 -3.5758 0.9300 -2.1657 1.8925
Socio-Demographic Variables
Age 0.0912 0.0339 0.1577 0.0573 0.1973 0.1109
Age(squared) -0.0016 0.0004 -0.0024 0.0007 -0.0031 0.0014
Married -0.0051 0.1141 0.0522 0.1765 -0.0896 0.3203
Number of children 0.0393 0.0510 0.0397 0.0805 -0.2176 0.1846
German 0.3926 0.1183 0.1095 0.2035 -0.1647 0.3963
Health restrictions
No health restrictions Ref. Ref. Ref.
Acc. DoR1, 80% and over 1.0874 0.2967 0.5722 0.4630 1.2702 0.8358
Acc. DoR, 50% to under 80% 0.5096 0.2459 0.6399 0.3544 0.9301 0.7090
Acc. DoR, 30% to under 50% 0.3038 0.8097 0.7255 1.1258 2.5090 1.0776
Acc. DoR, 30% to under 50%, no equalis.2 0.2459 0.2773 -0.2344 0.4507 1.1759 0.7405
Other health restrictions -0.2496 0.1733 -0.1448 0.2881 0.2110 0.6186
Qualification Variables
Professional training
Without compl. prof. training, no CSE Ref. Ref. Ref.
Without compl. prof. training, with CSE -0.3482 0.1033 0.0280 0.1680 -0.0480 0.2986
Industrial training -0.1975 0.1597 0.5679 0.2581 0.4361 0.4696
Full-time vocational school -1.4002 1.0332 0.2420 0.8111 2.4643 1.4494
Technical school 0.1022 0.4480 -0.0808 1.0874 2.1555 1.1949
Polytechnic -0.3408 0.6082 2.3560 1.1117 – –
College, University 0.5084 0.4149 1.2067 0.7381 – –
Occupational group
Plant cultivation, breeding, fishery -0.0388 0.1810 0.0657 0.2472 -0.0282 0.4276
Mining, mineral extraction -0.4361 0.7592 -0.0155 1.1016 – –
Manufacturing Ref. Ref. Ref.
Technical professions -0.5321 0.3738 0.3709 0.4497 -1.4005 1.2338
Service professions -0.3095 0.0980 -0.3555 0.1573 -0.6175 0.2805
Other professions -0.0743 0.2382 -0.3854 0.5079 -0.4427 0.7944
Professional rank
Worker, not skilled worker Ref. Ref. Ref.
Worker, skilled worker -0.3613 0.1989 -0.0174 0.3152 0.4018 0.5675
White-collar worker, simple occupations 0.2734 0.2302 0.1069 0.3997 -0.6239 1.2415
White-collar worker, advanced occupations -0.1799 0.3804 -1.2395 0.9251 0.2825 1.3117
Other -0.1259 0.1017 -0.0713 0.1661 -0.1103 0.2988
Qualification (with work experience) 0.0637 0.1496 0.4275 0.2307 0.7607 0.3788
Career Variables
Duration of last employment (months) -0.0059 0.0010 -0.0050 0.0017 -0.0013 0.0027
Duration of unemployment (weeks)
Up to 13 weeks Ref. Ref. Ref.
Between 13 and 52 weeks -0.3681 0.1248 -0.0213 0.2392 -1.6015 0.6220
More than 52 weeks -0.6417 0.1526 -1.4310 0.2597 -2.0825 0.4928
Number of placement propositions 0.0211 0.0068 0.0299 0.0098 0.0004 0.0224
Last contact to job center (weeks) -0.0125 0.0218 0.0183 0.0324 -0.0655 0.0633
Rehabilitation attendant -0.5750 0.2396 -1.2044 0.2710 -1.1681 0.3849
Placement restrictions -0.7584 0.2021 -0.6125 0.3177 -1.0170 0.5829
Programme before unemployment
No further education or programme Ref. Ref. Ref.
Further education compl., cont. education -0.5632 0.1636 -0.5002 0.2471 -1.3990 0.5166
Further education compl., voc. adjustment -0.2795 0.4511 0.2555 0.4139 -0.5763 0.7766
Job-preparative measure -0.6283 1.0551 – – – –
Job creation scheme 1.6530 0.1593 1.0649 0.2346 1.1016 0.3930
Rehabilitation measure -0.5505 0.5395 -1.3360 0.6290 -0.7736 0.5631
Regional Context Variables
Cluster II -0.2225 0.1396 -0.2073 0.2278 0.2153 0.5174
Cluster III -0.2891 0.1416 -0.0992 0.2271 0.6268 0.5070
Cluster IV -0.0858 0.1923 0.0780 0.3204 0.9152 0.6355
Cluster V Ref. Ref. Ref.
Bold letters indicate significance at the 1% level. Italic letters refer to the 5% level. – not included in the
estimation/ no observations. Ref. denotes the reference category.
1 DoR = Degree of restriction
2 People with accepted degree of restriction, but no equalisation to other persons with the same DoR.
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Tab. 5: Estimation Results of the Logit-Models for the Propensity Score for Women in
West Germany
Age < 25 Age > 50 Without
professional
training
Without work
experience
Variable Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
Constant 10.6581 7.8807 -111.2167 43.0028 -0.8437 0.5601 -0.7924 1.1611
Socio-Demographic Variables
Age -0.9888 0.7691 4.0834 1.5741 -0.0851 0.0311 -0.1003 0.0656
Age(squared) 0.0184 0.0187 -0.0391 0.0144 0.0005 0.0004 0.0007 0.0009
Married 0.0682 0.2379 -0.5664 0.1796 -0.3669 0.1148 -0.2893 0.2401
Number of children -0.4780 0.3609 0.0783 0.1876 -0.1465 0.0694 -0.2055 0.1641
German -0.0050 0.2242 0.0165 0.3582 0.2934 0.1419 -0.1205 0.2679
Health restrictions
No health restrictions Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Acc. DoR1, 80% and over 2.7825 0.6054 1.5175 0.6174 1.2836 0.3801 1.7312 0.6289
Acc. DoR, 50% to under 80% 1.1635 0.8207 0.1760 0.4324 0.6874 0.2895 1.2989 0.5372
Acc. DoR, 30% to under 50% – – 1.5630 0.8197 1.9682 0.5949 – –
Acc. DoR, 30% to under 50%, no equalis.2 – – 0.1916 0.4326 -0.3593 0.4512 0.1477 1.0737
Other health restrictions 0.8537 0.3558 -0.1662 0.2842 -0.1738 0.2042 0.3157 0.4104
Qualification Variables
Professional training
Without compl. prof. training, no CSE Ref. Ref. – – Ref.
Without compl. prof. training, with CSE -0.3774 0.2346 0.8822 0.5569 – – 0.3371 0.3300
Industrial training -1.4577 0.3249 0.8080 0.5650 – – -0.7344 0.3825
Full-time vocational school -0.9174 0.5927 0.1838 0.8561 – – -0.2524 0.5664
Technical school 0.2209 0.5662 0.6720 0.7545 – – 0.2984 0.5765
Polytechnic – – -0.3876 1.0902 – – 1.6320 0.5228
College, University – – 1.8171 0.6672 – – 1.1050 0.4366
Occupational group
Plant cultivation, breeding, fishery -0.0887 0.5347 – – 0.2196 0.3147 0.3226 0.6791
Mining, mineral extraction – – – – – – – –
Manufacturing Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Technical professions – – 1.5068 0.5151 0.7829 0.4845 -0.2706 0.8026
Service professions -0.1598 0.2175 0.4405 0.2812 0.2270 0.1204 0.5290 0.3048
Other professions -0.2963 0.3708 -0.2078 1.0569 0.2886 0.2952 0.5474 0.4525
Professional rank
Worker, not skilled worker Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Worker, skilled worker -0.2388 0.5168 0.1499 0.4686 -0.3179 0.3433 0.4922 0.5298
White-collar worker, simple occupations -0.0900 0.3411 0.3606 0.3008 -0.0422 0.1846 -0.1878 0.4352
White-collar worker, advanced occupations 0.1511 0.8479 -0.0164 0.4366 0.9614 0.2916 -0.0541 0.5886
Other 0.2885 0.2316 0.0051 0.2773 0.0706 0.1281 0.1383 0.3228
Qualification (with work experience) -0.5454 0.1863 0.4637 0.5544 -0.5000 0.1412 – –
Career Variables
Duration of last employment (months) -0.0093 0.0084 -0.0031 0.0011 -0.0044 0.0012 -0.0071 0.0050
Duration of unemployment (weeks)
Up to 13 weeks Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Between 13 and 52 weeks -0.1991 0.1810 -0.4244 0.2586 -0.0510 0.1269 -0.1168 0.2131
More than 52 weeks 0.3524 0.3344 -0.7664 0.2476 -0.0150 0.1442 -0.1482 0.2824
Number of placement propositions 0.0681 0.0158 0.0869 0.0100 0.0523 0.0068 0.0586 0.0143
Last contact to job center (weeks) 0.0315 0.0592 0.0881 0.0388 0.0311 0.0279 0.0087 0.0557
Rehabilitation attendant 0.7018 0.5635 -0.0673 0.5776 0.1092 0.3094 0.1244 0.5039
Placement restrictions -1.1975 0.4925 -0.3778 0.3115 -0.2301 0.2279 -0.3234 0.4479
Programme before unemployment
No further education or programme Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Further education compl., cont. education 0.4239 0.4510 1.0261 0.2656 0.5548 0.1622 -0.4605 0.3826
Further education compl., voc. adjustment – – 0.7044 1.0477 – – – –
Job-preparative measure 2.5023 0.6643 – – 2.4653 0.5620 2.3640 1.4426
Job creation scheme 2.9243 0.3941 3.0391 0.2624 2.9377 0.1698 3.3938 0.3609
Rehabilitation measure 0.6365 0.9236 2.5011 0.8859 -0.6581 1.0570 1.0536 0.6708
Regional Context Variables
Cluster II -0.4451 0.2672 -0.8248 0.2309 -0.4691 0.1438 -0.4169 0.2842
Cluster III 0.0718 0.2440 -0.6931 0.2260 -0.4339 0.1407 -0.2347 0.2810
Cluster IV -0.1442 0.3898 -1.6149 0.4328 -0.4885 0.2154 -0.4429 0.4665
Cluster V Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Bold letters indicate significance at the 1% level. Italic letters refer to the 5% level. – not included in the estimation/ no observations.
Ref. denotes the reference category.
1 DoR = Degree of restriction
2 People with accepted degree of restriction, but no equalisation to other persons with the same DoR.
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Tab. 6: Estimation Results of the Logit-Models for the Propensity Score for Women in
West Germany
Long-term
unemployed
More than 5
plac. prop.
Vocational
rehabilitation
Placement
restr.
Variable Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
Constant -5.4332 1.0102 -4.5914 0.8809 -1.8893 2.7422 -3.9176 1.5800
Socio-Demographic Variables
Age 0.1365 0.0493 0.0842 0.0437 0.1097 0.1299 0.0602 0.0705
Age(squared) -0.0022 0.0006 -0.0011 0.0005 -0.0020 0.0017 -0.0014 0.0009
Married -0.6957 0.1200 -0.4723 0.1194 -0.0295 0.3923 -0.0755 0.2066
Number of children 0.0570 0.0661 0.0222 0.0669 -0.8314 0.4903 -0.0077 0.1311
German 0.0420 0.1998 0.1781 0.2087 0.8757 1.0601 1.8635 0.7347
Health restrictions
No health restrictions Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Acc. DoR1, 80% and over 0.4078 0.4406 1.3298 0.4492 -2.2439 1.0308 – –
Acc. DoR, 50% to under 80% -0.0672 0.3305 0.7595 0.2962 -1.7208 0.8585 -0.5676 0.3247
Acc. DoR, 30% to under 50% 1.6529 0.6050 2.7754 0.7771 – – 0.8967 0.5438
Acc. DoR, 30% to under 50%, no equalis.2 -0.2535 0.4141 0.2761 0.4160 -2.3093 0.9412 -0.7913 0.4051
Other health restrictions -0.4034 0.2340 -0.1980 0.2209 -2.4023 0.8109 -1.5582 0.3006
Qualification Variables
Professional training
Without compl. prof. training, no CSE Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Without compl. prof. training, with CSE 0.4642 0.2172 0.4938 0.2328 0.4518 0.7319 0.7987 0.3772
Industrial training 0.4573 0.2229 0.3425 0.2370 0.3333 0.7169 0.5703 0.3860
Full-time vocational school -0.0711 0.4482 0.4339 0.3623 -0.5076 1.2884 0.3579 0.7246
Technical school 1.0278 0.3146 1.1603 0.3169 0.2133 1.2935 1.4259 0.5797
Polytechnic 1.5600 0.3580 1.8466 0.3448 3.4128 1.3831 2.4725 0.7054
College, University 1.0214 0.3059 1.4542 0.3259 – – 1.3604 0.7586
Occupational group
Plant cultivation, breeding, fishery 0.0688 0.4333 0.0713 0.4402 – – -0.4686 1.0611
Mining, mineral extraction – – – – – – – –
Manufacturing Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Technical professions 0.1601 0.3686 -0.0266 0.3934 – – -0.0637 0.8109
Service professions 0.2795 0.1511 0.1633 0.1631 0.1029 0.4475 -0.0840 0.2390
Other professions 0.6185 0.4727 1.1656 0.5348 -0.9081 0.9460 -0.4072 0.5664
Professional rank
Worker, not skilled worker Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Worker, skilled worker 0.3060 0.3135 -0.5078 0.3279 0.5353 0.8670 0.0818 0.5019
White-collar worker, simple occupations 0.4173 0.2043 0.1267 0.1871 0.8302 0.6371 0.4694 0.3131
White-collar worker, advanced occupations 0.3429 0.2603 0.2572 0.2482 – – -0.1237 0.5420
Other 0.0718 0.1750 -0.0588 0.1627 -0.4042 0.5535 -0.4823 0.2586
Qualification (with work experience) -0.0452 0.2013 -0.1255 0.1878 -0.5030 0.4526 -0.4411 0.2898
Career Variables
Duration of last employment (months) -0.0032 0.0010 -0.0023 0.0013 -0.0017 0.0033 -0.0045 0.0019
Duration of unemployment (weeks)
Up to 13 weeks – – Ref. Ref. Ref.
Between 13 and 52 weeks – – 0.2079 0.1607 -0.0044 0.5324 -0.2695 0.2631
More than 52 weeks – – 0.2077 0.1612 -0.0536 0.5579 -0.4715 0.2659
Number of placement propositions 0.0487 0.0063 0.0460 0.0242 0.0642 0.0113
Last contact to job center (weeks) 0.0634 0.0225 0.0223 0.0275 0.0028 0.0869 0.0900 0.0428
Rehabilitation attendant 0.1098 0.2976 -0.2131 0.3471 – – 0.0425 0.2476
Placement restrictions 0.0226 0.2502 -0.1526 0.2493 -0.1923 0.4260 – –
Programme before unemployment
No further education or programme Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Further education compl., cont. education 0.4974 0.1658 0.4425 0.1462 -0.2455 1.0999 0.9273 0.3132
Further education compl., voc. adjustment 0.9691 0.5325 0.3913 0.4974 – – – –
Job-preparative measure 1.6544 1.1257 2.0072 1.1866 – – – –
Job creation scheme 2.4785 0.1654 2.5109 0.1638 1.8661 0.6655 2.9205 0.3027
Rehabilitation measure 0.6461 0.5796 1.0948 0.5293 0.7531 0.4639 0.7394 0.4562
Regional Context Variables
Cluster II -0.7261 0.1551 -0.5160 0.1519 -0.8996 0.4734 -0.6045 0.2600
Cluster III -0.7440 0.1540 -0.4901 0.1472 -0.9586 0.4629 -0.7750 0.2595
Cluster IV -0.6171 0.2384 -0.4636 0.2170 -0.5157 0.6559 -0.4691 0.3638
Cluster V Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Bold letters indicate significance at the 1% level. Italic letters refer to the 5% level. – not included in the estimation/ no
observations. Ref. denotes the reference category.
1 DoR = Degree of restriction
2 People with accepted degree of restriction, but no equalisation to other persons with the same DoR.
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Tab. 7: Estimation Results of the Logit-Models for the Propensity Score for Women in
West Germany
ALMP part. Target Score=0 Target Score=1 Target Score=2
Variable Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
Constant -0.3780 0.9678 -11.2637 4.6088 -9.5382 1.8273 -5.6442 0.9976
Socio-Demographic Variables
Age -0.0818 0.0481 0.2730 0.2370 0.2278 0.0860 0.1287 0.0516
Age(squared) 0.0009 0.0006 -0.0030 0.0031 -0.0029 0.0011 -0.0021 0.0007
Married -0.1814 0.1326 -0.9377 0.2660 -0.4296 0.1608 -0.4958 0.1401
Number of children 0.0274 0.0714 0.1895 0.1385 -0.0723 0.0854 -0.0976 0.0835
German 0.3292 0.2466 0.6444 0.7461 0.4824 0.3083 0.3463 0.2104
Health restrictions
No health restrictions Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Acc. DoR1, 80% and over 1.1858 0.4773 2.6820 1.2685 0.6539 1.0585 1.6272 0.4838
Acc. DoR, 50% to under 80% 0.9146 0.3247 – – 1.2478 0.4612 1.1134 0.3590
Acc. DoR, 30% to under 50% 2.8507 1.2929 – – 4.0920 0.9626 2.1872 0.7901
Acc. DoR, 30% to under 50%, no equalis.2 0.8966 0.3932 – – -0.0081 0.7536 -0.1669 0.6085
Other health restrictions -0.0358 0.2497 -0.4295 0.7374 0.1051 0.3006 -0.2467 0.2575
Qualification Variables
Professional training
Without compl. prof. training, no CSE Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Without compl. prof. training, with CSE -0.0392 0.2367 – – 0.3488 0.4219 0.1097 0.2408
Industrial training -0.0557 0.2409 -2.3817 0.4053 0.2694 0.4666 0.3212 0.2853
Full-time vocational school -0.5468 0.4582 -1.6778 0.6302 -0.1841 0.6656 0.9711 0.4073
Technical school 0.2193 0.3608 -1.0572 0.4800 1.1596 0.5136 0.8941 0.3954
Polytechnic 1.0270 0.3876 2.3153 0.5337 1.1810 0.4639
College, University 0.8918 0.3182 -0.6161 0.4352 1.5042 0.5118 1.3939 0.4067
Occupational group
Plant cultivation, breeding, fishery -0.4377 0.4955 2.4877 1.1846 0.3924 0.5811 -0.0812 0.5039
Mining, mineral extraction – – – – – – – –
Manufacturing Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Technical professions -0.9949 0.4736 0.8804 1.2520 -0.5334 0.5576 0.0022 0.5012
Service professions 0.0388 0.1718 1.9242 1.0203 0.4853 0.2570 0.2795 0.1792
Other professions -0.1020 0.6413 – – – – -0.3206 0.6467
Professional rank
Worker, not skilled worker Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Worker, skilled worker -0.3995 0.4043 -0.0885 0.7307 -0.2056 0.4389 0.1312 0.3138
White-collar worker, simple occupations 0.2750 0.2344 0.2360 0.5821 0.2358 0.2997 0.2074 0.2186
White-collar worker, advanced occupations 0.6297 0.2963 0.6928 0.6286 1.0444 0.3384 0.3507 0.3100
Other -0.5500 0.1961 0.4875 0.5532 0.2077 0.2675 0.0516 0.1830
Qualification (with work experience) -0.0092 0.1842 – – 0.0558 0.3767 0.5020 0.2486
Career Variables
Duration of last employment (months) -0.0029 0.0013 -0.0007 0.0023 -0.0028 0.0015 -0.0047 0.0014
Duration of unemployment (weeks)
Up to 13 weeks Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Between 13 and 52 weeks -0.0211 0.1631 0.5010 0.2781 0.1418 0.1783 -0.0596 0.1598
More than 52 weeks -0.0982 0.1687 0.2619 0.3049 -0.4016 0.2158
Number of placement propositions 0.0350 0.0076 0.4197 0.0704 0.0526 0.0140 0.0341 0.0092
Last contact to job center (weeks) 0.1067 0.0270 0.0038 0.0947 0.0701 0.0411 0.0524 0.0324
Rehabilitation attendant -0.2651 0.3145 – – – – 0.3125 0.5072
Placement restrictions -0.1167 0.2672 – – -0.1387 0.4875 -1.1418 0.3454
Programme before unemployment
No further education or programme – – Ref. Ref. Ref.
Further education compl., cont. education – – – – 0.8017 0.3257 -0.4191 0.2585
Further education compl., voc. adjustment – – – – 1.1010 1.1327 – –
Job-preparative measure – – – – – – – –
Job creation scheme – – – – 3.9529 0.4613 3.1186 0.2843
Rehabilitation measure – – – – – – 0.8893 0.8683
Regional Context Variables
Cluster II -0.7062 0.1766 -0.7375 0.3363 -0.2661 0.2119 -0.5907 0.1786
Cluster III -0.3780 0.1634 -0.4186 0.3001 -0.2772 0.2040 -0.3827 0.1684
Cluster IV -0.6868 0.2947 -0.6720 0.5025 0.1992 0.2822 -0.5609 0.2661
Cluster V Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Bold letters indicate significance at the 1% level. Italic letters refer to the 5% level. – not included in the estimation/ no
observations. Ref. denotes the reference category.
1 DoR = Degree of restriction
2 People with accepted degree of restriction, but no equalisation to other persons with the same DoR.
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Tab. 8: Estimation Results of the Logit-Models for the Propensity Score
for Women in West Germany
Target Score=3 Target Score=4 Target Score=5
Variable Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
Constant -2.0677 0.9618 -6.4537 1.6772 -0.8188 3.5259
Socio-Demographic Variables
Age 0.0172 0.0565 0.2522 0.0981 -0.0305 0.1805
Age(squared) -0.0008 0.0007 -0.0038 0.0012 -0.0006 0.0022
Married -0.2870 0.1578 -0.4952 0.2618 0.3636 0.4809
Number of children 0.0930 0.0924 -0.0962 0.1970 0.1728 0.3581
German 0.1469 0.2147 0.1404 0.3961 -0.3164 0.9595
Health restrictions
No health restrictions Ref. Ref. Ref.
Acc. DoR1, 80% and over 1.7470 0.4737 -0.3389 0.9326 1.4437 1.3247
Acc. DoR, 50% to under 80% 0.1768 0.4050 -1.7496 0.9089 3.0112 1.0297
Acc. DoR, 30% to under 50% 1.4298 1.1010 -0.7444 1.3497 5.4024 1.8548
Acc. DoR, 30% to under 50%, no equalis.2 -0.0439 0.4834 -1.9871 1.0439 2.7876 1.2381
Other health restrictions 0.0056 0.2679 -2.0575 0.8473 1.2525 0.9469
Qualification Variables
Professional training
Without compl. prof. training, no CSE Ref. Ref. Ref.
Without compl. prof. training, with CSE 0.0771 0.2088 0.8758 0.3992 0.6153 0.6374
Industrial training 0.3784 0.2713 2.2079 0.5137 -0.1222 0.9341
Full-time vocational school -0.6942 0.6825 1.7334 1.2030 – –
Technical school 0.5980 0.5533 3.7362 0.8643 – –
Polytechnic 1.6924 0.5314 4.3327 1.1994 – –
College, University 1.4155 0.4378 2.8327 0.8348 – –
Occupational group
Plant cultivation, breeding, fishery 0.7099 0.4127 – – – –
Mining, mineral extraction – – – – – –
Manufacturing Ref. Ref. Ref.
Technical professions 0.3265 0.5378 1.1161 0.7589 – –
Service professions 0.1881 0.1786 0.0018 0.2895 0.3875 0.5441
Other professions 0.1099 0.4068 1.5070 0.5877 1.2327 1.1498
Professional rank
Worker, not skilled worker Ref. Ref. Ref.
Worker, skilled worker -0.4886 0.4575 0.6791 0.7294 0.3146 1.9828
White-collar worker, simple occupations 0.1196 0.2591 0.0414 0.4036 0.6139 0.7434
White-collar worker, advanced occupations 0.3046 0.3683 -1.4322 0.7623 0.7520 1.1769
Other 0.1861 0.1967 -0.1531 0.3179 0.5623 0.6279
Qualification (with work experience) -0.0003 0.2187 1.9150 0.4281 -0.4089 0.5603
Career Variables
Duration of last employment (months) -0.0033 0.0014 -0.0019 0.0021 0.0016 0.0047
Duration of unemployment (weeks)
Up to 13 weeks Ref. Ref. Ref.
Between 13 and 52 weeks -0.4308 0.1935 0.1185 0.4791 0.3590 1.3316
More than 52 weeks -0.7119 0.2464 -1.5047 0.5008 -0.5469 1.2949
Number of placement propositions 0.0252 0.0108 0.0003 0.0188 0.0947 0.0297
Last contact to job center (weeks) 0.0666 0.0333 -0.0141 0.0533 0.1204 0.0762
Rehabilitation attendant -0.0367 0.3706 -1.7651 0.5478 -0.7359 0.6378
Placement restrictions -0.5638 0.3129 0.5361 0.8848 -2.1334 0.8297
Programme before unemployment
No further education or programme Ref. Ref. Ref.
Further education compl., cont. education 0.1747 0.2327 -0.9468 0.4170 0.0224 0.7509
Further education compl., voc. adjustment 1.0132 0.6516 -1.5667 1.1074 – –
Job-preparative measure 1.6697 0.7627 1.7796 1.0223 – –
Job creation scheme 2.7217 0.2540 1.3740 0.3775 3.2965 0.7295
Rehabilitation measure 0.6358 0.5649 – – 1.3382 0.8574
Regional Context Variables
Cluster II -0.8182 0.1862 0.1536 0.3822 -1.7147 0.6205
Cluster III -0.7933 0.1810 0.1304 0.3822 -1.7696 0.6427
Cluster IV -0.5212 0.2746 -0.4673 0.5963 -2.3422 1.1663
Cluster V Ref. Ref. Ref.
Bold letters indicate significance at the 1% level. Italic letters refer to the 5% level. – not included in the
estimation/ no observations. Ref. denotes the reference category.
1 DoR = Degree of restriction
2 People with accepted degree of restriction, but no equalisation to other persons with the same DoR.
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Tab. 9: Estimation Results of the Logit-Models for the Propensity Score for Men in East
Germany
Age < 25 Age > 50 Without
professional
training
Without work
experience
Variable Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
Constant 13.5732 7.9058 -238.8922 16.9061 -2.1066 0.5394 -2.6827 1.0429
Socio-Demographic Variables
Age -1.3078 0.7583 8.7264 0.6133 -0.0554 0.0228 0.0149 0.0417
Age(squared) 0.0269 0.0182 -0.0805 0.0056 0.0008 0.0003 -0.0003 0.0006
Married -0.7581 0.5709 0.3589 0.0840 0.3101 0.0988 0.5086 0.1951
Number of children 0.4678 0.2619 -0.0139 0.0658 -0.0173 0.0481 -0.0482 0.1030
German 0.7945 1.0549 -0.0440 0.3721 0.9481 0.3140 1.3789 0.7295
Health restrictions
No health restrictions Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Acc. DoR1, 80% and over 2.0207 0.5844 -0.5481 0.7512 0.2325 0.5445 1.0344 0.5790
Acc. DoR, 50% to under 80% 1.0831 0.6371 -0.1421 0.2377 0.7160 0.2380 0.4732 0.3689
Acc. DoR, 30% to under 50% – – 0.3587 0.2846 0.1333 0.4933 – –
Acc. DoR, 30% to under 50%, no equalis.2 1.4045 0.8426 -0.1966 0.2607 0.1666 0.3529 0.1653 0.4587
Other health restrictions -0.0501 0.3147 -0.3627 0.1162 -0.1197 0.1320 -0.0002 0.2303
Qualification Variables
Professional training
Without compl. prof. training, no CSE Ref. Ref. – – Ref.
Without compl. prof. training, with CSE -0.4693 0.1943 0.2663 0.1672 – – -0.4111 0.2109
Industrial training -1.1019 0.2146 -0.1078 0.1544 – – -0.6138 0.1965
Full-time vocational school – – -0.0837 0.3697 – – – –
Technical school – – 0.1356 0.1975 – – -1.0304 0.6838
Polytechnic – – -0.1202 0.2834 – – 0.0510 0.6065
College, University – – -0.0309 0.2153 – – – –
Occupational group
Plant cultivation, breeding, fishery 0.5612 0.2898 -0.1539 0.1487 0.1625 0.1275 0.0487 0.3003
Mining, mineral extraction – – -1.9224 1.0228 -0.0618 0.7523 – –
Manufacturing Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Technical professions -0.2571 1.0377 -0.3047 0.1356 -0.0833 0.2543 -0.0494 0.4547
Service professions -0.4135 0.2085 -0.3372 0.0809 -0.2137 0.0874 -0.3113 0.1555
Other professions -1.2800 0.4093 -1.1671 0.3980 -1.0285 0.3021 -0.9041 0.4002
Professional rank
Worker, not skilled worker Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Worker, skilled worker -1.0221 0.2752 0.0183 0.0963 -0.1313 0.1219 -0.4685 0.2313
White-collar worker, simple occupations -0.3466 1.0371 0.2383 0.1484 0.1547 0.2836 0.9869 0.4335
White-collar worker, advanced occupations – – 0.0183 0.2063 -0.3857 0.4608 0.1593 1.1088
Other -0.3301 0.1716 -0.1418 0.0967 -0.1544 0.0888 -0.1220 0.1648
Qualification (with work experience) -0.2366 0.1444 0.3674 0.2089 -0.1547 0.1154
Career Variables
Duration of last employment (months) 0.0015 0.0051 -0.0040 0.0004 -0.0037 0.0008 0.0003 0.0012
Duration of unemployment (weeks)
Up to 13 weeks Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Between 13 and 52 weeks 0.3105 0.1576 0.3536 0.0990 0.1483 0.1008 0.0992 0.1585
More than 52 weeks 1.6580 0.2336 0.0397 0.1021 0.2620 0.1099 0.4405 0.1957
Number of placement propositions 0.0721 0.0165 0.0862 0.0066 0.0719 0.0061 0.0511 0.0122
Last contact to job center (weeks) -0.1381 0.0479 -0.1497 0.0193 -0.1904 0.0242 -0.1620 0.0388
Rehabilitation attendant 0.7648 0.3325 0.0510 0.1885 0.2319 0.1790 0.6629 0.2306
Placement restrictions -0.3430 0.3308 -0.4122 0.1493 -0.3244 0.1644 -0.2742 0.2317
Programme before unemployment
No further education or programme Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Further education compl., cont. education 0.3034 0.3269 0.7066 0.1195 0.1444 0.1281 0.3408 0.1986
Further education compl., voc. adjustment 0.9493 0.5581 0.6153 0.1483 0.5512 0.1773 1.0850 0.3200
Job-preparative measure 0.3428 0.5354 – – 0.3456 0.6045 0.7811 0.6154
Job creation scheme 2.0412 0.2293 1.5890 0.0885 1.3481 0.0997 1.7503 0.1937
Rehabilitation measure -0.3730 0.7565 0.2735 1.0474 -1.2114 1.0192 0.1776 0.3833
Regional Context Variables
Cluster Ia -1.4758 0.2578 0.1526 0.2292 -0.7788 0.1977 -1.6941 0.2777
Cluster Ib -1.7657 0.2366 -0.0174 0.2210 -0.9016 0.1856 -1.6751 0.2605
Cluster Ic -1.3678 0.2889 -0.1565 0.2432 -0.7590 0.2097 -1.4147 0.3041
Cluster II Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Bold letters indicate significance at the 1% level. Italic letters refer to the 5% level. – not included in the estimation/ no observations.
Ref. denotes the reference category.
1 DoR = Degree of restriction
2 People with accepted degree of restriction, but no equalisation to other persons with the same DoR.
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Tab. 10: Estimation Results of the Logit-Models for the Propensity Score for Men in
East Germany
Long-term
unemployed
More than 5
plac. prop.
Vocational
rehabilitation
Placement
restr.
Variable Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
Constant -5.9168 0.7221 -4.9170 0.6898 -1.4614 1.1090 -4.3694 1.3654
Socio-Demographic Variables
Age 0.1591 0.0293 0.0800 0.0271 -0.0120 0.0520 0.0617 0.0401
Age(squared) -0.0020 0.0003 -0.0005 0.0003 0.0001 0.0007 -0.0008 0.0005
Married 0.3925 0.0807 0.2883 0.0778 0.2902 0.1863 0.3837 0.1341
Number of children -0.0526 0.0417 -0.0224 0.0399 0.0532 0.0923 -0.0683 0.0727
German 0.4366 0.2926 -0.1056 0.2911 – – 0.8685 1.0224
Health restrictions
No health restrictions Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Acc. DoR1, 80% and over -0.1608 0.5295 0.3180 0.6840 – – – –
Acc. DoR, 50% to under 80% -0.1127 0.2237 0.7183 0.2319 -0.0707 0.4813 -0.0690 0.3126
Acc. DoR, 30% to under 50% -0.4211 0.4022 0.8056 0.3024 -0.2961 0.5867 -0.0067 0.3811
Acc. DoR, 30% to under 50%, no equalis.2 -0.5038 0.2755 0.0957 0.3228 -0.8062 0.5362 -0.7772 0.3661
Other health restrictions -0.4426 0.1145 -0.3411 0.1163 -0.6332 0.4507 -0.6473 0.2944
Qualification Variables
Professional training
Without compl. prof. training, no CSE Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Without compl. prof. training, with CSE 0.1208 0.1268 -0.0052 0.1391 -0.2495 0.3086 0.0710 0.2214
Industrial training -0.0439 0.1133 -0.1906 0.1243 -0.0820 0.2646 -0.0142 0.1984
Full-time vocational school 0.0365 0.3729 -0.2389 0.3338 0.7135 0.7082 0.1636 0.5937
Technical school 0.2924 0.2018 -0.0869 0.2028 – – -0.7370 0.5265
Polytechnic 0.1120 0.3498 -0.2883 0.3236 – – -1.0257 1.0923
College, University 0.1630 0.2297 -0.4449 0.2321 – – -0.3160 0.5791
Occupational group
Plant cultivation, breeding, fishery 0.1972 0.1263 0.1527 0.1455 0.6934 0.3243 0.4980 0.2249
Mining, mineral extraction -1.0655 0.7196 – – – – 0.3790 1.0674
Manufacturing Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Technical professions -0.3399 0.1708 0.1450 0.1568 0.6047 0.4503 0.3676 0.3206
Service professions -0.2181 0.0747 -0.0764 0.0764 0.0848 0.1781 0.0167 0.1246
Other professions -1.1442 0.3446 -1.6202 0.4620 -1.4704 0.4833 -1.1446 0.2997
Professional rank
Worker, not skilled worker Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Worker, skilled worker 0.1281 0.0966 -0.1348 0.0935 -0.4500 0.2732 -0.3090 0.1832
White-collar worker, simple occupations -0.0490 0.1830 0.4488 0.1745 0.8930 0.5462 0.9444 0.2966
White-collar worker, advanced occupations -0.6612 0.2746 0.1608 0.2631 0.6932 1.1194 -0.3722 0.7656
Other -0.1765 0.0844 -0.1627 0.0837 -0.1348 0.1977 -0.3282 0.1403
Qualification (with work experience) -0.1601 0.1188 -0.0097 0.1251 -0.3903 0.1775 -0.2143 0.1531
Career Variables
Duration of last employment (months) -0.0036 0.0004 -0.0031 0.0009 -0.0019 0.0014 -0.0040 0.0010
Duration of unemployment (weeks)
Up to 13 weeks – – Ref. Ref.
Between 13 and 52 weeks – – 0.0494 0.0874 0.0180 0.2119 -0.0066 0.1530
More than 52 weeks – – -0.0787 0.0927 -0.4262 0.2262 -0.3274 0.1593
Number of placement propositions 0.0443 0.0051 – – 0.0605 0.0134 0.0494 0.0092
Last contact to job center (weeks) -0.0922 0.0158 -0.1120 0.0185 -0.1544 0.0450 -0.1693 0.0339
Rehabilitation attendant 0.0091 0.1478 0.0624 0.1791 – – 0.3212 0.1154
Placement restrictions -0.2586 0.1398 -0.2112 0.1496 0.0884 0.1869 – –
Programme before unemployment
No further education or programme Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Further education compl., cont. education 0.1706 0.1017 0.4341 0.0909 0.3133 0.3342 0.7741 0.1874
Further education compl., voc. adjustment 0.0241 0.1429 0.5085 0.1252 -0.2150 0.5447 0.5275 0.2675
Job-preparative measure – – 1.2273 0.7541 1.7065 0.8205 1.6120 1.1051
Job creation scheme 0.7989 0.0919 1.3695 0.0847 1.6557 0.2041 1.4924 0.1509
Rehabilitation measure -0.0621 0.4301 0.9425 0.3869 0.0411 0.2647 0.4731 0.2598
Regional Context Variables
Cluster Ia 0.2545 0.2270 0.6670 0.2733 -0.3128 0.4634 0.0172 0.3905
Cluster Ib 0.0321 0.2211 0.3889 0.2662 -0.1557 0.4389 0.2081 0.3741
Cluster Ic 0.3036 0.2364 0.4589 0.2774 -0.2369 0.4866 0.3785 0.3946
Cluster II Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Bold letters indicate significance at the 1% level. Italic letters refer to the 5% level. – not included in the estimation/ no
observations. Ref. denotes the reference category.
1 DoR = Degree of restriction
2 People with accepted degree of restriction, but no equalisation to other persons with the same DoR.
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Tab. 11: Estimation Results of the Logit-Models for the Propensity Score for Men in
East Germany
ALMP part. Target Score=0 Target Score=1 Target Score=2
Variable Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
Constant -5.0989 0.6654 -7.7446 3.2242 -10.8623 1.1611 -9.9124 0.7484
Socio-Demographic Variables
Age 0.1227 0.0244 0.0226 0.1536 0.2931 0.0459 0.2748 0.0298
Age(squared) -0.0011 0.0003 0.0005 0.0020 -0.0031 0.0006 -0.0032 0.0004
Married 0.2217 0.0741 0.1126 0.2091 0.1898 0.1092 0.3323 0.0917
Number of children -0.0429 0.0393 0.0771 0.0977 -0.0021 0.0547 -0.0405 0.0478
German 0.4753 0.3544 – – 0.5132 0.3358 0.9348 0.3905
Health restrictions
No health restrictions Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Acc. DoR1, 80% and over 0.7351 0.4746 3.0140 1.2926 -0.1103 1.0487 -0.3938 0.7343
Acc. DoR, 50% to under 80% 0.8839 0.1847 1.2876 0.6372 0.6629 0.3538 0.1097 0.2670
Acc. DoR, 30% to under 50% 0.9190 0.2500 3.3576 0.9152 0.4727 0.6344 0.4030 0.3962
Acc. DoR, 30% to under 50%, no equalis.2 0.2166 0.2662 1.9122 0.6655 -0.5096 0.6004 -0.0596 0.3188
Other health restrictions -0.0369 0.1019 -0.1425 0.3597 -0.3453 0.1726 -0.3539 0.1307
Qualification Variables
Professional training
Without compl. prof. training, no CSE Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Without compl. prof. training, with CSE -0.0412 0.1224 – – -0.1720 0.3116 0.1684 0.1650
Industrial training -0.0906 0.1070 -0.9326 0.8010 -0.0392 0.2970 0.5971 0.1667
Full-time vocational school -0.4836 0.3778 – – -0.2246 0.6629 0.6243 0.4585
Technical school 0.2067 0.1728 0.1624 0.8212 0.6499 0.3649 0.8531 0.2334
Polytechnic 0.2536 0.2717 – – -0.1038 0.5720 0.7773 0.3485
College, University 0.1727 0.1827 0.0778 0.8267 0.2896 0.3900 0.8098 0.2471
Occupational group
Plant cultivation, breeding, fishery 0.1965 0.1170 -1.4060 0.7412 -0.2877 0.2038 0.2781 0.1410
Mining, mineral extraction -0.6182 0.7379 – – 0.2509 0.7387 -1.4235 1.0175
Manufacturing Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Technical professions -0.3458 0.1397 -0.1144 0.4372 -0.3830 0.2333 -0.2837 0.1710
Service professions -0.0887 0.0717 0.0330 0.2023 -0.3312 0.1094 -0.1326 0.0845
Other professions -1.4777 0.4609 – – -2.2040 1.0094 -1.4322 0.5112
Professional rank
Worker, not skilled worker Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Worker, skilled worker -0.1216 0.0908 -0.6658 0.2648 -0.1169 0.1256 0.0345 0.1037
White-collar worker, simple occupations 0.4489 0.1568 -0.2116 0.4530 0.0834 0.2420 0.1819 0.1802
White-collar worker, advanced occupations 0.2560 0.2268 -0.8872 1.0821 -0.3469 0.4238 -0.2334 0.2611
Other -0.4202 0.0719 0.3472 0.2302 0.0380 0.1169 0.0027 0.0945
Qualification (with work experience) 0.0032 0.1064 – – 0.1907 0.3619 0.8908 0.1861
Career Variables
Duration of last employment (months) -0.0050 0.0009 -0.0011 0.0016 -0.0055 0.0009 -0.0036 0.0005
Duration of unemployment (weeks)
Up to 13 weeks Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Between 13 and 52 weeks -0.2765 0.0799 1.6114 0.2328 0.6552 0.1102 -0.0994 0.0975
More than 52 weeks -0.6797 0.0871 – – 1.2364 0.1712 -0.4695 0.1233
Number of placement propositions 0.0463 0.0046 0.3232 0.0522 0.0496 0.0091 0.0209 0.0071
Last contact to job center (weeks) -0.1133 0.0163 -0.0743 0.0567 -0.1167 0.0277 -0.1108 0.0196
Rehabilitation attendant 0.1646 0.1437 – – 0.8126 0.4715 -0.5639 0.2709
Placement restrictions -0.3297 0.1294 – – -0.0946 0.3216 -0.7430 0.1937
Programme before unemployment
No further education or programme – – Ref. Ref. Ref.
Further education compl., cont. education – – – – 0.2679 0.2048 -0.1562 0.1332
Further education compl., voc. adjustment – – – – 0.5768 0.2944 -0.1245 0.1832
Job-preparative measure – – – – – – – –
Job creation scheme – – – – 2.2036 0.1922 1.2987 0.1220
Rehabilitation measure – – – – 2.3296 1.1037 – –
Regional Context Variables
Cluster Ia 0.2448 0.2372 1.3894 1.0294 0.2169 0.3002 -0.0223 0.2308
Cluster Ib -0.0903 0.2316 1.2162 1.0198 -0.0967 0.2936 -0.1868 0.2233
Cluster Ic 0.0775 0.2429 0.5121 1.0770 -0.2939 0.3271 -0.2013 0.2453
Cluster II Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Bold letters indicate significance at the 1% level. Italic letters refer to the 5% level. – not included in the estimation/ no
observations. Ref. denotes the reference category.
1 DoR = Degree of restriction
2 People with accepted degree of restriction, but no equalisation to other persons with the same DoR.
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Tab. 12: Estimation Results of the Logit-Models for the Propensity Score
for Men in East Germany
Target Score=3 Target Score=4 Target Score=5
Variable Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
Constant -5.7408 0.6956 -4.8684 1.4002 0.9850 2.4444
Socio-Demographic Variables
Age 0.2167 0.0310 0.2325 0.0512 0.0453 0.0953
Age(squared) -0.0025 0.0004 -0.0030 0.0006 -0.0009 0.0012
Married 0.2317 0.0992 0.5990 0.1589 0.7314 0.2955
Number of children 0.0518 0.0506 -0.2144 0.0956 -0.0934 0.1705
German 0.0073 0.3647 0.9497 1.0661 -2.9748 1.5415
Health restrictions
No health restrictions Ref. Ref. Ref.
Acc. DoR1, 80% and over 0.5874 0.4630 0.7115 0.6061 -0.0150 0.9522
Acc. DoR, 50% to under 80% 0.6210 0.2295 0.3372 0.3259 -0.1112 0.6539
Acc. DoR, 30% to under 50% 0.6467 0.3389 0.0896 0.4346 -0.5540 0.9318
Acc. DoR, 30% to under 50%, no equalis.2 -0.2788 0.3406 0.0343 0.3994 -0.5374 0.7698
Other health restrictions -0.2746 0.1326 -0.1540 0.2246 -0.6321 0.5269
Qualification Variables
Professional training
Without compl. prof. training, no CSE Ref. Ref. Ref.
Without compl. prof. training, with CSE -0.0123 0.1350 -0.1723 0.1800 -0.3596 0.3057
Industrial training 0.5892 0.1473 0.2597 0.2175 0.2669 0.3701
Full-time vocational school 0.3653 0.4439 0.6573 0.8598 0.0300 1.2223
Technical school 0.8203 0.2395 -0.0111 0.4376 – –
Polytechnic 0.6428 0.3884 0.3720 0.7452 – –
College, University 0.7710 0.2656 -0.5230 0.6143 – –
Occupational group
Plant cultivation, breeding, fishery 0.0805 0.1584 0.3512 0.2337 -0.4037 0.6117
Mining, mineral extraction – – 0.5523 1.1274 – –
Manufacturing Ref. Ref. Ref.
Technical professions -0.0706 0.1864 0.1261 0.3241 0.3841 0.8423
Service professions -0.1788 0.0923 -0.1476 0.1437 0.2998 0.2796
Other professions -0.8137 0.3046 -1.1322 0.4757 -1.8930 1.0448
Professional rank
Worker, not skilled worker Ref. Ref. Ref.
Worker, skilled worker -0.0726 0.1199 -0.0011 0.2035 -0.0044 0.3957
White-collar worker, simple occupations 0.1425 0.2188 0.8663 0.3565 0.9885 0.7354
White-collar worker, advanced occupations -0.1973 0.3152 -0.0360 0.5586 1.8340 1.2481
Other -0.2122 0.1013 -0.3035 0.1556 0.0027 0.2933
Qualification (with work experience) 0.5822 0.1426 0.8357 0.2087 0.2454 0.3230
Career Variables
Duration of last employment (months) -0.0042 0.0008 -0.0019 0.0011 -0.0049 0.0035
Duration of unemployment (weeks)
Up to 13 weeks Ref. Ref. Ref.
Between 13 and 52 weeks -0.2989 0.1166 -0.2562 0.2153 -0.2725 0.5222
More than 52 weeks -1.1749 0.1346 -1.4876 0.2342 -0.8675 0.5236
Number of placement propositions 0.0155 0.0080 0.0166 0.0127 0.0468 0.0212
Last contact to job center (weeks) -0.1105 0.0207 -0.1611 0.0361 -0.2678 0.0762
Rehabilitation attendant -0.2666 0.1792 -0.6217 0.2237 -0.2308 0.3561
Placement restrictions -1.2543 0.1713 -0.8460 0.2498 -0.3965 0.5029
Programme before unemployment
No further education or programme Ref. Ref. Ref.
Further education compl., cont. education -0.5229 0.1428 -0.4673 0.2356 -0.0503 0.4116
Further education compl., voc. adjustment -0.5068 0.1750 -0.1613 0.2666 -0.2973 0.5278
Job-preparative measure 0.3547 0.5584 -1.2863 1.0505 -0.0529 1.1475
Job creation scheme 0.4971 0.1318 0.3609 0.2141 0.9353 0.3627
Rehabilitation measure -0.7411 0.4791 -0.0987 0.3616 -0.6435 0.5650
Regional Context Variables
Cluster Ia -0.1688 0.2543 -1.2811 0.3329 1.0778 1.1091
Cluster Ib -0.4185 0.2447 -1.1692 0.3033 0.7015 1.0855
Cluster Ic -0.0703 0.2619 -0.9552 0.3333 0.2774 1.1287
Cluster II Ref. Ref. Ref.
Bold letters indicate significance at the 1% level. Italic letters refer to the 5% level. – not included in the
estimation/ no observations. Ref. denotes the Ref. category.
1 DoR = Degree of restriction
2 People with accepted degree of restriction, but no equalisation to other persons with the same DoR.
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Tab. 13: Estimation Results of the Logit-Models for the Propensity Score for Women in
East Germany
Age < 25 Age > 50 Without
professional
training
Without work
Experience
Variable Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
Constant 17.7318 9.5714 -193.6120 15.2633 -4.6508 0.6740 -5.4542 0.9700
Socio-Demographic Variables
Age -1.8032 0.9166 7.0812 0.5562 0.0797 0.0244 0.1079 0.0376
Age(squared) 0.0422 0.0218 -0.0659 0.0051 -0.0009 0.0003 -0.0012 0.0005
Married -0.4856 0.3740 0.1752 0.0692 0.0945 0.0702 0.3683 0.1144
Number of children -0.0545 0.2476 0.0457 0.0767 -0.0394 0.0368 -0.0219 0.0608
German – – 0.7526 0.6024 0.8813 0.4577 0.7561 0.6046
Health restrictions
No health restrictions Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Acc. DoR1, 80% and over 2.3752 0.9162 0.5872 0.5431 0.7035 0.6256 1.0744 0.6614
Acc. DoR, 50% to under 80% 0.9588 0.8022 0.4074 0.2084 -0.0186 0.3095 0.6111 0.3954
Acc. DoR, 30% to under 50% – – 0.8819 0.3079 1.2322 0.3669 1.0275 0.6575
Acc. DoR, 30% to under 50%, no equalis.2 – – -0.1752 0.2989 -0.4625 0.4311 -0.2475 0.6249
Other health restrictions -0.4905 0.4813 -0.1709 0.1031 -0.3287 0.1251 -0.2220 0.1994
Qualification Variables
Professional training
Without compl. prof. training, no CSE Ref. Ref. – – Ref.
Without compl. prof. training, with CSE 0.5163 0.4127 0.0627 0.1480 – – 0.2847 0.2837
Industrial training -0.4776 0.4265 0.1293 0.1414 – – -0.0254 0.2743
Full-time vocational school 0.4411 0.8352 0.7855 0.2416 – – -0.4208 0.5562
Technical school 1.7244 0.5621 0.5129 0.1708 – – 0.8702 0.3413
Polytechnic 1.5520 1.1829 0.8068 0.2879 – – 1.0921 0.8527
College, University – – 0.9729 0.2282 – – 0.3168 0.4883
Occupational group
Plant cultivation, breeding, fishery 0.0411 0.3944 0.2139 0.1444 0.2184 0.1225 0.2822 0.2079
Mining, mineral extraction – – – – – – – –
Manufacturing Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Technical professions -0.1679 0.6728 0.4442 0.1411 0.3228 0.2129 -0.1591 0.3262
Service professions -0.2629 0.2527 -0.0386 0.0788 -0.0885 0.0757 0.0212 0.1359
Other professions -0.9534 0.5810 -0.8607 0.4697 -0.8312 0.4251 -0.5124 0.4853
Professional rank
Worker, not skilled worker Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Worker, skilled worker -0.3429 0.3390 0.1272 0.0940 0.2160 0.1172 0.0958 0.1917
White-collar worker, simple occupations 0.2204 0.4453 0.1466 0.1057 0.3840 0.1449 0.1484 0.2504
White-collar worker, advanced occupations – – -0.0759 0.1901 0.2284 0.3235 -0.0432 0.5182
Other -0.1266 0.2596 -0.0040 0.0831 0.0512 0.0829 0.2369 0.1486
Qualification (with work experience) -0.0505 0.1844 -0.1479 0.1408 -0.2728 0.1058 – –
Career Variables
Duration of last employment (months) -0.0091 0.0074 -0.0019 0.0003 -0.0029 0.0006 -0.0019 0.0010
Duration of unemployment (weeks)
Up to 13 weeks Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Between 13 and 52 weeks -0.0076 0.2087 0.0088 0.0983 0.0718 0.1077 -0.1255 0.1456
More than 52 weeks 0.9603 0.2867 -0.4272 0.0955 -0.0147 0.1065 0.0708 0.1482
Number of placement propositions 0.0463 0.0200 0.1470 0.0074 0.0959 0.0071 0.1023 0.0094
Last contact to job center (weeks) -0.0470 0.0582 -0.1242 0.0166 -0.1739 0.0215 -0.0201 0.0259
Rehabilitation attendant 0.4309 0.5532 0.3754 0.1851 0.3001 0.2189 0.0278 0.2592
Placement restrictions -0.5051 0.5328 -0.3492 0.1398 -0.5766 0.1792 -0.3118 0.2452
Programme before unemployment
No further education or programme Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Further education compl., cont. education 0.6073 0.3367 0.6793 0.0852 0.4857 0.0898 0.4726 0.1269
Further education compl., voc. adjustment 0.0705 0.7552 0.9768 0.1289 0.4891 0.1751 0.6610 0.2677
Job-preparative measure 0.6113 0.6196 – – 0.0680 1.0234 0.4889 0.7493
Job creation scheme 2.4487 0.3042 1.8564 0.0754 1.2749 0.0858 1.5513 0.1477
Rehabilitation measure 1.3329 0.6570 – – 0.4775 0.6269 0.9370 0.4448
Regional Context Variables
Cluster Ia -1.8211 0.3194 0.0610 0.2301 -0.4112 0.2034 -1.1810 0.2736
Cluster Ib -2.2639 0.2936 -0.0167 0.2241 -0.6813 0.1955 -1.2800 0.2635
Cluster Ic -2.1955 0.3935 -0.0874 0.2382 -0.7156 0.2149 -1.2981 0.3017
Cluster II Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Bold letters indicate significance at the 1% level. Italic letters refer to the 5% level. – not included in the estimation/ no observations.
Ref. denotes the reference category.
1 DoR = Degree of restriction
2 People with accepted degree of restriction, but no equalisation to other persons with the same DoR.
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Tab. 14: Estimation Results of the Logit-Models for the Propensity Score for Women in
East Germany
Long-term
unemployed
More than 5
plac. prop.
Vocational
rehabilitation
Placement
restr.
Variable Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
Constant -8.5335 0.6292 -5.9804 0.7889 -3.4940 1.5118 -5.9015 1.6294
Socio-Demographic Variables
Age 0.2325 0.0225 0.1161 0.0254 0.0479 0.0672 0.1325 0.0505
Age(squared) -0.0028 0.0003 -0.0011 0.0003 -0.0004 0.0008 -0.0016 0.0006
Married 0.0804 0.0478 0.0992 0.0571 0.3322 0.2017 0.5260 0.1325
Number of children -0.0364 0.0254 0.0129 0.0305 -0.1086 0.1168 -0.1138 0.0754
German 0.5473 0.3466 0.4379 0.5385 – – 0.2362 1.1186
Health restrictions
No health restrictions Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Acc. DoR1, 80% and over 0.5178 0.4759 1.4518 0.5573 – – – –
Acc. DoR, 50% to under 80% 0.4365 0.1969 0.5807 0.2347 -1.4326 0.5567 -0.7914 0.2946
Acc. DoR, 30% to under 50% 0.4529 0.3158 0.7554 0.3569 -0.2376 0.6014 -0.5929 0.3551
Acc. DoR, 30% to under 50%, no equalis.2 -0.3667 0.2868 0.2628 0.3228 -1.5368 0.5986 -1.4669 0.3575
Other health restrictions -0.1379 0.0829 -0.2702 0.1102 -1.4582 0.4757 -1.4201 0.2704
Qualification Variables
Professional training
Without compl. prof. training, no CSE Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Without compl. prof. training, with CSE 0.2601 0.1111 0.3509 0.1640 0.5223 0.5107 0.6162 0.3679
Industrial training 0.3229 0.1042 0.4682 0.1550 0.7740 0.4846 1.0380 0.3500
Full-time vocational school 0.8186 0.1923 1.0866 0.2239 1.5601 0.8076 1.1518 0.5658
Technical school 0.8768 0.1338 1.0290 0.1791 0.9645 0.6850 1.6763 0.4136
Polytechnic 1.1698 0.2657 0.6220 0.3315 – – 1.4532 0.8711
College, University 0.7909 0.1961 0.9003 0.2259 2.0844 1.0417 1.7580 0.5851
Occupational group
Plant cultivation, breeding, fishery 0.2647 0.0959 0.1891 0.1247 0.4605 0.4937 -0.0783 0.3578
Mining, mineral extraction – – – – – – – –
Manufacturing Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Technical professions 0.3947 0.1165 0.1993 0.1373 1.1130 0.5869 0.6039 0.3457
Service professions -0.0181 0.0548 0.0205 0.0718 0.1787 0.2438 0.1047 0.1530
Other professions -1.2045 0.4590 -1.6496 0.7227 -1.1534 0.5723 -1.1029 0.3940
Professional rank
Worker, not skilled worker Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Worker, skilled worker 0.1086 0.0749 0.0792 0.0900 0.4266 0.3127 0.1689 0.2051
White-collar worker, simple occupations 0.1047 0.0865 0.2467 0.1020 0.8961 0.4137 0.3767 0.2532
White-collar worker, advanced occupations -0.2570 0.1618 -0.0078 0.2035 0.6756 1.1003 0.7158 0.4599
Other -0.0286 0.0602 0.0828 0.0762 -0.1914 0.2424 -0.0977 0.1621
Qualification (with work experience) -0.1475 0.0757 -0.1722 0.0869 0.0118 0.2266 -0.0730 0.1759
Career Variables
Duration of last employment (months) -0.0023 0.0003 -0.0022 0.0006 -0.0036 0.0015 -0.0030 0.0008
Duration of unemployment (weeks)
Up to 13 weeks – – Ref. Ref. Ref.
Between 13 and 52 weeks – – 0.1092 0.0858 -0.1973 0.2680 0.0806 0.1775
More than 52 weeks – – -0.0971 0.0853 -0.4276 0.2680 -0.2595 0.1770
Number of placement propositions 0.0751 0.0044 0.1030 0.0194 0.1177 0.0119
Last contact to job center (weeks) -0.0548 0.0113 -0.0448 0.0145 -0.2311 0.0587 -0.0845 0.0308
Rehabilitation attendant 0.0394 0.1473 0.0743 0.2060 – – 0.3679 0.1259
Placement restrictions -0.4019 0.1179 -0.0938 0.1520 0.0799 0.2267 – –
Programme before unemployment
No further education or programme Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Further education compl., cont. education 0.3857 0.0589 0.3756 0.0687 0.2770 0.4142 0.5584 0.1756
Further education compl., voc. adjustment 0.6921 0.1017 0.3540 0.1173 0.2049 0.6470 0.5412 0.3001
Job-preparative measure 0.7818 0.6239 0.8678 0.6220 – – – –
Job creation scheme 1.1226 0.0590 1.3201 0.0706 1.3785 0.2465 1.5575 0.1570
Rehabilitation measure 0.2434 0.4755 -0.0416 0.6348 0.5243 0.2984 -0.2402 0.4080
Regional Context Variables
Cluster Ia 0.4612 0.1952 0.5028 0.2108 -0.1445 0.5643 -0.3686 0.3380
Cluster Ib 0.3262 0.1920 0.0424 0.2053 0.1129 0.5345 -0.4145 0.3203
Cluster Ic 0.1912 0.2033 -0.0727 0.2160 0.3546 0.5734 -0.0070 0.3423
Cluster II Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Bold letters indicate significance at the 1% level. Italic letters refer to the 5% level.– not included in the estimation/ no
observations. Ref. denotes the reference category.
1 DoR = Degree of restriction
2 People with accepted degree of restriction, but no equalisation to other persons with the same DoR.
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Tab. 15: Estimation Results of the Logit-Models for the Propensity Score for Women in
East Germany
ALMP part. Target Score=0 Target Score=1 Target Score=2
Variable Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
Constant -7.3543 0.6275 -3.7688 2.2948 -9.7937 1.0491 -10.3091 0.7327
Socio-Demographic Variables
Age 0.1833 0.0203 -0.0896 0.1151 0.2138 0.0405 0.3020 0.0273
Age(squared) -0.0019 0.0002 0.0016 0.0015 -0.0026 0.0005 -0.0036 0.0003
Married 0.1552 0.0465 0.0821 0.1429 0.1024 0.0725 0.0391 0.0584
Number of children -0.0450 0.0256 0.1926 0.0684 -0.0315 0.0357 -0.0400 0.0314
German 0.9316 0.3952 – – 0.1887 0.3497 0.6934 0.4241
Health restrictions
No health restrictions Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Acc. DoR1, 80% and over 1.3778 0.4208 – – 1.5039 0.5690 1.1216 0.4316
Acc. DoR, 50% to under 80% 0.6615 0.1877 2.1834 0.6706 0.8030 0.3261 0.8575 0.2086
Acc. DoR, 30% to under 50% 0.8842 0.2807 – – 0.2386 0.6536 0.6925 0.3656
Acc. DoR, 30% to under 50%, no equalis.2 -0.1998 0.2955 0.3870 1.0712 -0.1905 0.5179 0.2908 0.3040
Other health restrictions -0.0561 0.0851 0.1333 0.2646 -0.2037 0.1386 -0.0568 0.0987
Qualification Variables
Professional training
Without compl. prof. training, no CSE Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Without compl. prof. training, with CSE 0.2187 0.1173 – – 0.1501 0.3331 0.4983 0.1725
Industrial training 0.2450 0.1103 -0.9665 0.6323 0.3714 0.3276 0.9045 0.1751
Full-time vocational school 0.7326 0.1877 -0.7729 0.8146 0.9874 0.3941 1.4513 0.2508
Technical school 0.9459 0.1305 -0.0033 0.6451 1.3011 0.3420 1.4696 0.1968
Polytechnic 0.8606 0.2319 – – 1.0864 0.4466 1.9362 0.3069
College, University 0.8461 0.1719 -0.5305 0.6951 1.2193 0.3662 1.5150 0.2475
Occupational group
Plant cultivation, breeding, fishery 0.4204 0.0880 0.0045 0.2898 0.4083 0.1364 0.3249 0.1119
Mining, mineral extraction – – – – – – – –
Manufacturing Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Technical professions 0.2151 0.1065 0.0668 0.3529 0.2143 0.1693 0.0291 0.1425
Service professions 0.1150 0.0564 0.1345 0.1737 0.0710 0.0869 -0.0484 0.0684
Other professions -2.4967 1.0079 – – -2.0183 1.0131 -1.2813 0.5147
Professional rank
Worker, not skilled worker Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Worker, skilled worker 0.1685 0.0713 -0.0391 0.1964 -0.1836 0.1092 0.1638 0.0898
White-collar worker, simple occupations 0.3703 0.0820 0.0097 0.2411 0.2255 0.1242 0.2516 0.1027
White-collar worker, advanced occupations -0.0948 0.1713 0.0304 0.5593 0.1391 0.2542 -0.2057 0.2107
Other -0.3845 0.0532 0.0766 0.1690 0.0276 0.0894 0.0692 0.0756
Qualification (with work experience) -0.1155 0.0697 – – 0.4064 0.2432 0.6318 0.1246
Career Variables
Duration of last employment (months) -0.0028 0.0004 -0.0032 0.0015 -0.0030 0.0006 -0.0027 0.0004
Duration of unemployment (weeks)
Up to 13 weeks Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Between 13 and 52 weeks -0.1212 0.0694 0.7815 0.1627 0.3235 0.0962 -0.0874 0.0851
More than 52 weeks -0.3214 0.0691 – – 0.5843 0.1402 -0.6910 0.1028
Number of placement propositions 0.0806 0.0043 0.4758 0.0376 0.0899 0.0099 0.0491 0.0070
Last contact to job center (weeks) -0.0500 0.0108 0.0289 0.0381 -0.0306 0.0186 -0.0624 0.0142
Rehabilitation attendant 0.1415 0.1571 – – -0.1721 0.7493 -0.2613 0.2432
Placement restrictions -0.3044 0.1220 – – -0.2999 0.2976 -0.8847 0.1649
Programme before unemployment
No further education or programme – – Ref. Ref. Ref.
Further education compl., cont. education – – – – 0.3056 0.1396 0.0264 0.0963
Further education compl., voc. adjustment – – – – -0.0498 0.2367 -0.1040 0.1456
Job-preparative measure – – – – – – – –
Job creation scheme – – – – 1.5409 0.1390 1.0577 0.0936
Rehabilitation measure – – – – – – -0.7858 1.0412
Regional Context Variables
Cluster Ia 0.2586 0.2121 0.3204 0.5300 1.0593 0.3699 0.2173 0.2188
Cluster Ib 0.0624 0.2089 0.1852 0.5200 0.9867 0.3658 0.0349 0.2143
Cluster Ic -0.1564 0.2171 -0.4020 0.5754 0.8377 0.3803 -0.1919 0.2290
Cluster II Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Bold letters indicate significance at the 1% level. Italic letters refer to the 5% level. – not included in the estimation/ no
observations. Ref. denotes the reference category.
1 DoR = Degree of restriction
2 People with accepted degree of restriction, but no equalisation to other persons with the same DoR.
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Tab. 16: Estimation Results of the Logit-Models for the Propensity Score
for Women in East Germany
Target Score=3 Target Score=4 Target Score=5
Variable Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
Constant -9.4019 0.9522 -8.2956 0.9689 -3.4244 2.3470
Socio-Demographic Variables
Age 0.3279 0.0300 0.3380 0.0480 0.1438 0.1008
Age(squared) -0.0040 0.0004 -0.0040 0.0006 -0.0018 0.0012
Married 0.2165 0.0704 0.2306 0.1132 0.2905 0.2556
Number of children -0.0684 0.0409 -0.0369 0.0706 -0.2178 0.1927
German 1.1553 0.7320 – – -0.9381 1.2628
Health restrictions
No health restrictions Ref. Ref. Ref.
Acc. DoR1, 80% and over 0.5004 0.5222 1.4642 0.5994 0.5876 1.1427
Acc. DoR, 50% to under 80% 0.1031 0.2542 0.4059 0.3297 -0.7586 0.8327
Acc. DoR, 30% to under 50% 0.7089 0.3768 1.0000 0.4307 -0.2938 0.9879
Acc. DoR, 30% to under 50%, no equalis.2 -0.1779 0.3472 -0.2638 0.4280 – –
Other health restrictions -0.2542 0.1258 -0.3546 0.1989 -0.9858 0.6646
Qualification Variables
Professional training
Without compl. prof. training, no CSE Ref. Ref. Ref.
Without compl. prof. training, with CSE 0.2433 0.1462 0.1489 0.1721 0.1807 0.3631
Industrial training 0.9678 0.1551 0.9351 0.2041 0.4043 0.4438
Full-time vocational school 1.3885 0.2807 1.5385 0.4891 – –
Technical school 1.6689 0.1928 0.9147 0.3320 0.6527 0.8928
Polytechnic 0.9845 0.4491 2.2644 0.7013 – –
College, University 1.5700 0.2741 1.2290 0.5758 – –
Occupational group
Plant cultivation, breeding, fishery 0.0744 0.1443 0.3742 0.2188 0.4983 0.6275
Mining, mineral extraction – – – – – –
Manufacturing Ref. Ref. Ref.
Technical professions 0.3159 0.1637 0.8039 0.2839 1.0893 0.6660
Service professions 0.0388 0.0827 -0.0562 0.1293 0.4940 0.3101
Other professions -1.0677 0.5161 -1.2010 0.7368 0.1282 0.8041
Professional rank
Worker, not skilled worker Ref. Ref. Ref.
Worker, skilled worker 0.2333 0.1096 0.2948 0.1844 0.7054 0.3654
White-collar worker, simple occupations 0.2536 0.1223 0.5018 0.2143 -0.4972 0.6897
White-collar worker, advanced occupations 0.1020 0.2281 -0.5324 0.4396 0.8921 1.2048
Other 0.0613 0.0903 0.1888 0.1453 0.0524 0.3099
Qualification (with work experience) 0.4693 0.1144 0.5986 0.1706 -0.2520 0.2902
Career Variables
Duration of last employment (months) -0.0026 0.0005 -0.0011 0.0008 -0.0045 0.0023
Duration of unemployment (weeks)
Up to 13 weeks Ref. Ref. Ref.
Between 13 and 52 weeks -0.2099 0.1285 -0.3230 0.2729 -0.7341 0.5949
More than 52 weeks -1.0925 0.1362 -1.5612 0.2742 -0.8532 0.5495
Number of placement propositions 0.0392 0.0077 0.0461 0.0122 0.0392 0.0271
Last contact to job center (weeks) -0.1073 0.0176 -0.0142 0.0242 -0.2505 0.0760
Rehabilitation attendant -0.6310 0.2032 -0.2549 0.2324 0.0968 0.3644
Placement restrictions -0.8055 0.1704 -1.0862 0.2418 0.0211 0.6638
Programme before unemployment
No further education or programme Ref. Ref. Ref.
Further education compl., cont. education -0.2280 0.1136 -0.1241 0.2088 0.7459 0.4421
Further education compl., voc. adjustment -0.0454 0.1499 0.1614 0.2658 0.8615 0.5636
Job-preparative measure -0.9887 1.0263 0.1747 0.8019 1.0704 1.2199
Job creation scheme 0.7500 0.1114 0.8692 0.2045 1.4599 0.4315
Rehabilitation measure -0.0674 0.4974 -0.2202 0.4681 0.0743 0.6860
Regional Context Variables
Cluster Ia -0.3988 0.2204 -0.2230 0.3446 -0.2794 0.8194
Cluster Ib -0.6045 0.2136 -0.5581 0.3323 -0.1361 0.7871
Cluster Ic -0.7589 0.2305 -0.4487 0.3536 0.0587 0.8278
Cluster II Ref. Ref. Ref.
Bold letters indicate significance at the 1% level. Italic letters refer to the 5% level. – not included in the
estimation/ no observations. Ref. denotes the reference category.
1 DoR = Degree of restriction
2 People with accepted degree of restriction, but no equalisation to other persons with the same DoR.
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2 Means of Standardised Biases for Main Groups, Selected
Target Groups and Target Scores
Tab. 17: Results of the Calculations for the Means of the
Standardised Biases Before and After Matching
West Men Women
before after before after
Main Group 14.62 2.51 16.08 3.20
Target Group
Age < 25 10.48 3.08 12.50 6.82
Age > 50 17.82 5.83 20.48 6.62
Without professional training 14.31 3.29 16.79 4.25
Without work experience 14.02 5.69 15.93 6.36
Long-term unemployed (more than 52 weeks) 17.77 3.06 19.13 4.18
Number of placement propositions 8.28 1.95 11.42 4.00
Vocational rehabilitation 18.13 8.45 23.96 16.31
Placement restrictions 19.29 4.61 26.99 4.99
Participation in ALMP before unemployment 18.59 6.46 16.93 8.80
Target Scores
0 15.58 10.10 14.16 6.73
1 10.51 3.93 14.25 5.79
2 15.30 2.42 16.36 4.51
3 21.40 3.72 25.06 4.42
4 26.25 3.81 31.58 5.68
5 and more 24.90 11.65 27.99 29.14
East Men Women
before after before after
Main Group 12.01 1.78 10.83 1.60
Target Group
Age < 25 14.74 4.94 13.73 8.90
Age > 50 16.79 2.55 14.98 1.55
Without professional training 11.17 2.48 11.04 2.72
Without work experience 12.10 4.18 12.17 3.35
Long-term unemployed (more than 52 weeks) 13.55 2.00 11.61 1.69
Number of placement propositions 11.67 2.52 8.62 1.62
Vocational rehabilitation 12.88 4.38 15.87 5.87
Placement restrictions 15.35 3.91 18.37 3.11
Participation in ALMP before unemployment 13.20 4.82 10.62 3.08
Target Scores
0 15.71 7.41 7.68 4.39
1 9.92 3.56 9.68 2.48
2 12.61 2.78 12.85 2.49
3 17.56 3.12 15.65 2.26
4 18.91 3.75 18.04 2.14
5 and more 16.80 4.69 22.51 8.84
Mean of Standardised Bias calculated as mean of the single characteristics’ stan-
dardised biases.
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Fig. 1: Balancing of AGE within Strata
West Germany
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Fig. 2: Balancing of MARITAL STATUS within Strata
West Germany
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Fig. 3: Balancing of PLACEMENT RESTRICTIONS within Strata
West Germany
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Fig. 4: Balancing of NO OF PLACEMENT PROPOSITIONS within Strata
West Germany
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Fig. 5: Balancing of DURATION OF LAST EMPLOYMENT within Strata
West Germany
Men Women
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
M
e
a
n
 o
f 
D
u
ra
ti
o
n
 o
f 
la
s
t 
e
m
p
lo
y
m
e
n
t 
in
 m
o
n
th
s
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Stratum
Participants Non−Participants
3
4
5
6
M
e
a
n
 o
f 
D
u
ra
ti
o
n
 o
f 
la
s
t 
e
m
p
lo
y
m
e
n
t 
in
 m
o
n
th
s
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Stratum
Participants Non−Participants
East Germany
Men Women
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
M
e
a
n
 o
f 
D
u
ra
ti
o
n
 o
f 
la
s
t 
e
m
p
lo
y
m
e
n
t 
in
 m
o
n
th
s
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Stratum
Participants Non−Participants
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
M
e
a
n
 o
f 
D
u
ra
ti
o
n
 o
f 
la
s
t 
e
m
p
lo
y
m
e
n
t 
in
 m
o
n
th
s
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Stratum
Participants Non−Participants
Fig. 6: Balancing of JOB CREATION SCHEME within Strata
West Germany
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